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DISSERTATION ABSTRACT 
 
Seth S. Crawford 
 
Doctor of Philosophy 
 
Department of Sociology 
 
March 2013 
 
Title:  The Political Economy of Medical Marijuana 
 
This study aims to shed light on several vexing questions surrounding marijuana 
at various levels of analysis.  Why have some states adopted medical laws when others 
have not, and what are the implications of these adoptions for elites at the federal level?  
Why are certain areas within states hotbeds of marijuana use and production?  Why, in 
the face of serious penalties, do certain individuals continue to use, produce, and sell this 
particular drug?  How is the marijuana market structured and how much economic impact 
does it have?  Possible sociopolitical factors responsible for passage (or failure) of 
marijuana-related voter initiatives and legislation in states are examined and the process 
of policy diffusion occurring between states that adopt such measures is detailed.  An 
analysis of geographic variations in medical cardholder rates in Oregon is conducted 
using longitudinal data.  Using a Respondent-Driven Sample and a detailed survey of 
legal and illegal marijuana users in Oregon, I identify differences between the two 
groups, elucidate differences between marijuana users and the general population, and 
estimate the economic impact of marijuana on Oregon’s informal economy.  Overall, the 
study finds that innovative, Democratically dominated states tend to pass medical 
marijuana laws and are the most at risk of doing so in the future.  Within Oregon, county-
level participation in the medical marijuana program is associated with Democratic party 
 v 
members, unemployment rates, and timber harvest levels.  The Oregon marijuana market 
consists of a robust network of small producers, with individual users primarily managing 
distribution of the drug.  Economic estimates indicate that the legalization of marijuana 
could generate between $37 million and $153 million per year in taxes for the state.  
Finally, historical evidence suggests that legalization of this drug could lead to its control; 
however, doing so could structurally transition the market from a robust network of small 
producers into tight oligopolic control by a limited number of producers, thereby 
disenfranchising small, artisan growers, communities traditionally reliant on marijuana 
for revenue, consumers who seek variety, and the plant’s genetic diversity. 
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CHAPTER I!
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
Barring all possibility of double entendre, the role of marijuana in American 
society is a sticky issue.  Psychoactive plants of all shapes and sizes pervade the pantheon 
of human consciousness alteration, but few—if any—have enjoyed the ubiquity or 
historical longevity of cannabis.  Anthropologic and botanical evidence indicate that 
humans have cultivated and consumed cannabis since at least 3000 BCE, and that it 
dispersed widely through trading networks from the Far East into the Middle East and 
Europe (Rudgley 2000).  Genomic studies suggest that semi-distinct varieties first 
emerged from Vavilovian centers in China and India, and, later, Eastern Europe (Hillig 
2005).  Some of these varieties (with very low psychoactive constituents) have been 
utilized for their unique fiber production capabilities, while others (with higher 
psychoactivity) were used for various medical and consciousness alteration applications.  
Anthropological accounts of cannabis consumption suggest that its use has been 
invariably minor, but persistent across many societies and time periods (Rudgley 2000).   
The history of cannabis regulation in the United States is robustly detailed 
elsewhere (Becker 1963; Goode 1970; Herer 1998; Kane 2001; Deitch 2003; Ferraiolo 
2007) and bears little need for repeating.  In short, cannabis (both fiber and drug 
cultivars) was unregulated at the federal level in the United States until the Pure Food and 
Drug Act of 1906, when the government required that “narcotic ingredients be listed on 
the labels of patent medicines shipped in interstate commerce,” though enforcement of 
this law was lax and sporadic (Ferraiolo 2007: 150).  Spurred by racialized fear 
mongering (the drug was primarily associated with Mexican immigrants, Blacks, and, to 
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a lesser extent, counterculture Whites) at the behest of Harry Anslinger and the newly 
formed Federal Bureau of Narcotics (FBN), the Marihuana Tax Act of 1937 dramatically 
altered the oversight of cannabis (Turk 1976; Chambliss 1995; Goode and Ben-Yehuda 
1994a, 1994b).  The tax act required that producers of hemp and cannabis (it did not 
distinguish between non-psychoactive hemp and psychoactive cannabis) obtain 
production licenses from the FBN and pay taxes on their agricultural products; however, 
the FBN refused to issue any production licenses—commercial hemp and cannabis 
production essentially vanished overnight (Ferraiolo 2007).  Despite the new, stringent 
oversight on production, possession and use remained unregulated by the federal 
government until 19701, when Congress passed the Comprehensive Drug Abuse 
Prevention and Control Act (also referred to by the name of a subsection within it, known 
as the Controlled Substances Act (CSA)), followed shortly thereafter by President 
Nixon’s proclamation of a “war on drugs.”   
The CSA established a five-tier categorization of drugs in which specific 
substances are ranked according to their potential for abuse, current accepted medical 
use, and treatment under international treaties ratified by the United States.  Marijuana 
was placed in the most stringent category (Schedule 1), which is reserved for drugs with a 
high potential for abuse, no current accepted medical use, and a lack of safety associated 
with its use2.   
Due to this classification, federal penalties for possession and production can be  
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!1!By 1937, all 48 states had implemented marijuana control legislation of one variety or 
another—yet it remained unregulated by the federal government (Bonnie and Whitebread 1970).!2!Cocaine and methamphetamine—two other common drugs of abuse—are classified as Schedule 
2 substances.!
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very harsh; first-time offenders face felony charges, up to 5 years in prison, and a 
$250,000 fine (for possession of 1 to 49 plants or less than 50kg of marijuana).  As 
Figure 1-1 illustrates, the so-called “war” has been primarily waged against individuals 
involved with marijuana.   
 
Figure 1-1.  FBI Uniform Crime Report Data on Drug Arrests, 1970-2010 
This is, in large part, due to marijuana’s status as the most widely used drug in the US, 
and because law enforcement agencies spend the majority of their allocated drug 
enforcement funding on marijuana suppression activities (Miron 2005).  Between 1980 
and 1996, state and federal incarceration rates increased by over 200%; this growth is 
attributed primarily to drug offense arrests, which increased by a factor of ten in the same 
period (Blumstein and Beck 1999).  The context of these arrests is highly racialized; as 
Beckett (2005) and Golub (2007) note, Blacks and Latinos are much more likely to be 
arrested for marijuana related offenses than their White counterparts, even though Whites 
use at a higher rate (McCabe et al. 2008).  The classification of marijuana as one of the 
most dangerous drugs in the US (by the CSA) has also hindered genuine research on its 
effects:  medical, economic, and sociological studies of this drug are impeded by legal 
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and institutional sanctions against those who seek a broader understanding of its role in 
society.   
Despite its classification and the un/official research moratorium imposed 
(coupled with a concomitant push by the US to maintain its illegality worldwide), some 
evidence has accumulated about marijuana and its effects on the human body.  
Researchers have identified 483 active chemical constituents, with tetrahydrocannabinol, 
tetrahydrocannabivarin, cannabidiol, cannabinol, and cannbigerol thought to be the most 
useful to humans (ElSohly and Slade 2005).  For adults, the negative effects of marijuana 
use include short-term cognitive impairment following heavy, long-term use (Crean et al. 
2011), potential kindling effects in people predisposed to schizophrenia (Wassink et al. 
2011), impaired motor skills when consuming very high doses (Brickner et al. 2008), 
anxiety, nervousness, and dry mouth (Crippa 2012), an extremely rare condition known 
as “cannabis hyperemesis syndrome” following decades of chronic use (Soriano-Co et al. 
2010), social ostracizing, and severe legal implications if prosecuted.  On the other hand, 
positive effects have also been demonstrated.   
Marijuana has “therapeutic potential” for inflammatory disorders and diabetes 
(Pacher 2012), alleviating muscle spasms (Valle 2006), and as an anti-cancer treatment 
(Munson et al. 1975; Guzman 2003; Bifulco et al. 2006; Singh and Budhiraja 2006; Preet 
et al. 2007; Velasco et al. 2012); additionally, it provides positive immunological effects 
(Turner 2010), suppresses or reduces many symptoms for those with epilepsy (Gordon 
and Devinsky 2001), chronic pain (Ware et al. 2010), depression (Denson and 
Earleywine 2006), post-traumatic stress disorder (Bremner et al. 1995), glaucoma (Nucci 
2008), migraines (Russo 2008), erectile dysfunction (Shamloul and Bella 2011), 
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Tourrettes syndrome (Hemming and Yellowlees 1993; Sandyk and Awerbuch 1988), 
severe nausea (Cotter 2009), and cachexia (Gorter 1999).  Moderate lifetime use is 
associated with higher pulmonary and lung function over abstainers, though chronic use 
results in similar pulmonary and lung function as abstainers (Pletcher et al. 2012).  
Marijuana is also known to provide euphoria and lowers overall indicators of mental 
stress for several personality types (Zablocki et al. 1991), while not negatively 
influencing an individual’s ability to operate a motor vehicle3 (Hindrick et al. 1993; 
Robbe 1995; Anderson et al. 2010).  While the US government classifies marijuana as 
one of the highest risk drugs, studies of drug risks indicate that it is among the least 
dangerous of legal or illegal drugs (Nutt et al. 2010). 
Despite concerted efforts by law enforcement officials and federal policy makers, 
cannabis continues to be widely used and relatively ubiquitous in American society.  
Estimates of economic impact suggest that marijuana is the one of the largest cash crops 
in the country (Gettman 2006; Miron 2010).  Public opinion polls indicate that, for the 
first time in polling history, more people support its legalization (50%) than those who do 
not (46%) (Gallup 2011), while medical marijuana continues to enjoy an overwhelming 
majority of support (72%) (Gallup 2010).  As of this writing, 18 states (and the District of 
Columbia) have enacted medical marijuana laws, allowing their citizens to obtain legal 
protection from state authorities to use the drug for qualifying medical conditions.  These 
states (including DC) account for 32.5% of the total US population.  As I complete this 
dissertation, two laws allowing for the re-legalization of “recreational” use—in 
Washington and Colorado—go into effect early in the month (12/2012).  The wave of !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!3!The only significant effect found in studies of marijuana use and driving indicate that, when 
under the influence, users drive slower. 
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direct democracy responsible for the passage of medical marijuana and recreational use in 
some states has dispelled many of the pervasive myths propagated by the federal 
government and anti-marijuana moralists.  In many tangible ways, the emerging shift in 
public opinion and legal changes have altered perceptions.  In states where sales are legal, 
some elements of production have moved into the formal economy, giving us an 
opportunity to assess the size and impact of this activity on state-level economies.  In 
states where medical use is legal, but sales remain illicit, individuals are more likely to 
discuss their use, sale, and production of this psychoactive plant with candor than 
previously possible.  This particular moment in time offers researchers the chance to 
compare the current marijuana economy—which I consider “quasi-underground”—to the 
emerging, legitimate marijuana economy of the future.   
This study aims to shed light on several vexing questions surrounding marijuana 
at various levels of analysis.  Why have some states adopted medical laws when others 
have not?  Why are certain areas within states hotbeds of marijuana use and production?  
Why, in the face of serious penalties, do certain individuals continue to use, produce, and 
sell this particular drug?  How is the marijuana market structured and how much 
economic impact does it have?  While its contribution is limited by data availability, the 
methods selected to investigate these questions, the fluidity of current policy 
developments, and my own shortcomings, I hope this study can at least partially 
illuminate some key aspects of marijuana’s modern political economy.  An overview of 
the dissertation structure follows. 
Chapter II examines the possible sociopolitical factors responsible for passage (or 
failure) of marijuana-related voter initiatives and legislation in states and details the 
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process of policy diffusion occurring between states that adopt such measures.  Chapter 
III moves from the macro-level to the mezzo-level of analysis; a single-state case study is 
presented to assess which social, political, economic, and ecological factors explain the 
wide variations in medical cardholder rates between Oregon counties.  Chapter IV relies 
on a Respondent-Driven Sample (RDS) and a detailed survey of legal and illegal 
marijuana users in Oregon to identify differences between the two groups, differences 
between marijuana users (legal or otherwise) and the general population, and to elaborate 
on some of the potential cultural factors that could explain differences in cardholder rates 
between Oregon counties.  Chapter V relies on the same survey to provide estimates of 
the economic impact of marijuana on Oregon’s informal economy.  Chapter VI offers 
concluding thoughts on the evolving political economy of American marijuana and 
outlines possible directions of future policy developments. 
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CHAPTER II 
STATES OF HEADS OR HEADS OF STATES?:  MARIJUANA VOTER 
 
 INITIATIVES, MEDICAL MARIJUANA LAWS, AND STATE POLICY DIFFUSION 
 
Introduction 
 
When are marijuana-related voter initiatives successful?  What has led to the 
adoption of medical marijuana laws in US states?  Which states are most likely to pass 
medical marijuana laws in the future?  In this study, I inspect two interrelated 
components of policy diffusion amongst states to better understand the current trajectory 
of marijuana policy in the US.  In the first section, I examine marijuana-related voter 
initiative outcomes in states between 1972-2011 using Qualitative Comparative Analysis; 
this model employs social, political, and economic variables to assess the relationship 
between states’ characteristics and their propensity to pass direct-democracy marijuana 
measures.  In the second section, I turn to the process of medical marijuana policy 
diffusion amongst states, using geographic, sociopolitical, and temporal factors in an 
Event History Analysis model to assess their respective roles in the adoption of marijuana 
policy.  Finally, the findings of the research sections are compared to marijuana-related 
ballot measure results in several states for the 2012 election cycle to assess their validity 
in predicting passage or failure, and I develop a predictive roadmap of future states “at 
risk” of adopting medical marijuana laws. 
Voter Initiatives 
The use of direct-democracy marijuana initiatives in US states has been the core 
pro-legalization strategy for decades, though it yielded little success and rarely placed 
measures on the ballot (Ferraiolo 2007).  After years of failed lobbying (and in some 
cases, because of personal health crises), many leaders of the marijuana legalization 
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movement began signature gathering campaigns in the early 1990s and sent medical 
marijuana ballot measures directly to state voters (Ferraiolo 2007).  In a four-year surge 
of direct democratic action (1996-2000), the elected officials of six states were bypassed 
by successful medical marijuana ballot initiatives.  Ten other states (and the District of 
Columbia) implemented similar laws in the subsequent decade, some through voter 
initiatives and others though legislative processes (see Appendix A).  Today, 18 states 
and Washington, DC have medical marijuana laws in place.  The laws enacted are fairly 
uniform in terms of (1) qualifying conditions, (2) allowing for personal production, (3) 
permissible marijuana possession amounts, and (4) plant counts per patient—though 
California and Oregon are exceptions4. 
The recent success of medical marijuana ballot measures has corresponded with a 
radical shift in popular support for full legalization and concerted efforts by legislatures 
in non-medical states to implement similar programs.  Until recently, support for 
marijuana legalization—medical or otherwise—was very low.   
!
Figure 2-1.  Gallup Public Opinion Poll Data on Marijuana Legalization 
 !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!4!See Appendix A.!!
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However, recent Gallup surveys indicate that public opinion has moved from 12% 
support of legalization in 1969 to 50% in 2011 (Gallup 2011; see Figure 2-1), while 
support for medical marijuana provisions rests at 70% (Gallup 2010).  Support for full 
legalization is particularly high in younger age groups (18-29; 62%), self-reported 
“liberal” political orientations (69%), those who live in the west (55%), and males (55%).  
The causal mechanisms driving this shift in public opinion are unknown, but the surge in 
medical marijuana programs and potential cohort effects (de Beer 1985; O’Brien 2000) 
stemming from higher rates of lifetime use among more recent generations are prime 
suspects (Jacobson 2004).   
Much has been written about the role of elites in establishing marijuana 
prohibition (Becker 1963; Lindesmith 1967; Bonnie and Whitebread 1974) through the 
manufacture of a racially motivated moral panic (Turk 1976; Chambliss 1995; Goode and 
Ben-Yehuda 1994a, 1994b).  Becker suggests that the application of rules, mores, and 
norms do not occur in a vacuum; “moral entrepreneurs,” who are often members of the 
upper class, actively pursue agendas to outlaw specific activities that they deem 
inappropriate or deleterious to society (1963: 152).  Once enacted, the laws are upheld by 
“rule enforcers” (usually law enforcement officers, attorneys, and judges), who face the 
dual problem of demonstrating their proficiency at stomping out acts of deviance and 
pointing to the deviant acts as a continuing scourge (which is particularly apparent with 
marijuana).  Lindesmith (1967) argues that, even at the outset of marijuana prohibition, 
scientific studies had established the relative banality of its use.  Despite expert opinion, 
however, Harry Anslinger and his Federal Bureau of Narcotics compatriots were 
successful in creating a widespread coalition of legislators, churches, temperance 
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organizations, and drug manufacturers to have marijuana production criminalized 
(Lindesmith 1967; McWilliams 1990; Gerber 2004).  As with any successful bureaucratic 
agency, the FNB was able to increase its budget and expand its scope of operation over 
time; this process continued with the reformation of the FNB into the DEA in 1972 
(Gerber 2004).   
 Little, however, is known about the state-level processes responsible for 
overturning the decades-long moratorium on marijuana possession, use, production, and 
distribution.  In addition to the ten successful voter initiatives (see Table 1 in Appendix 
A), nine states have used legislative procedures to implement medical marijuana 
programs, despite vociferous outcries by federal agencies tasked with maintaining this 
particular prohibition.    
Literature Review 
Major theories that address political action include pluralist theory and class-
domination theory.  The uniting element present in these approaches is the fundamental 
assumption that political activities represent an expression of power.  The definition of 
“power” is multifaceted and the subject of many fruitful interpretations (Russell 1938; 
Dahl 1957; Weber 1978; Adorno 1973; Lukes 1974; Foucault 1977; Gramsci 1971; 
Althusser 1971; Domhoff 2010), though, in the confines of political activity, mainstream 
researchers tend to focus on aspects of distributive power—a concept best elaborated 
upon by Weber (1978):  “we understand by ‘power’ the chance of a man or a number of 
men to realize their own will in a social action even against the resistance of others who 
are participating in the action” (43).  An overview of pluralist and class-domination 
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theories are presented, followed by findings from empirical examinations of voter 
initiatives.   
Pluralist theory contends that power within American politics is distributed 
broadly amongst issue-oriented, compartmentalized, competing interest groups (Dahl 
1961).  Power, in Dahl’s words, is a relation between “individuals, groups, roles, offices, 
governments, nation-states, or other human aggregates” and exists where “A has power 
over B to the extent that he can get B to do something that B would not otherwise do” 
(1957: 202-203).  According to Dahl, a key feature of the American political system (at 
any level of analysis) is the inability of any one group to dominate multiple policy 
development arenas or issues, which leads to a democratic equilibrium (1971).  Power, 
then, is viewed as a diffuse entity requiring coordinated action amongst actors to harness 
and direct towards any particular goal.  Once a group coalesces and begins to engage in 
political activity, action takes many forms, but is dependent upon the resources and 
potential policy paths available to the group.  Elected or appointed political leaders play a 
key role in pluralist decision-making processes, but are under constant threat due to re-
election concerns; the transient nature of political office leads to an “ambiguity of 
leadership,” where reciprocal influence is possible between engaged citizens or interest 
groups and officeholders (1961: 89).  When the interests of a particular group are shared 
with a majority of the voting public, pluralists predict that elected officials will often 
respond to their concerns, even in the face of disagreement from other powerful groups 
(business groups, unions, academics, etc.).  Thus, in the context of marijuana policy, 
pluralist theory suggests that state governments will only alter the status quo (strict 
prohibition) if their constituents pressure them to do so and a majority supports such a 
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change.  I expect that a majority of state citizens must have a positive opinion of medical 
marijuana programs—which, in this case, serves as a proxy for both constituent pressure 
and public support—for a state legislature to approve such a program. 
H1: State medical marijuana laws will only be passed legislatively when a 
majority of citizens support it. 
   
The narrow interests of particular interest groups—when combined with positive 
public support—should also sway state-level political leaders (Dahl 1971).  Medical 
marijuana laws can protect the economic interests of marijuana producers by shielding 
them from state prosecution and granting public legitimacy to a federally prohibited 
activity.  So long as growers represent a significantly large interest group, such programs 
would also allow medical marijuana producers and associated interests to provide 
campaign funding in support of individual political leaders.  In that regard, I expect states 
that are targeted by DEA marijuana eradication programs—an indicator of the size of 
marijuana interests in a particular state—to be adopters of medical laws, as it offers states 
(and their citizens) an opportunity to preempt the assertion of federal supremacy over 
drug regulation (Mikos 2009) and protect an economically lucrative, locally produced 
commodity (Gettman 2006). 
H2: States targeted by the DEA eradication program are more likely to adopt 
medical marijuana laws 
 
Citizen-driven voter initiatives carve out a unique position in pluralist thought.  
On one hand, voting outcomes are an expression of the polity’s interests on issues that 
elected officials have often neglected; on the other hand, citizen initiatives provide an 
avenue for interest groups (from the very small and disorganized to very large, 
professional political machines) to challenge political orthodoxy or advance narrow 
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policy interests (Boyte 2005).  The challenge to orthodoxy seems necessary in certain 
circumstances, as Dahl (1998) notes: 
One of the imperative needs of democratic countries is to improve 
citizens’ capacities to engage intelligently in political life…In the years to 
come…older institutions need to be enhanced by new means for civic 
education, political participation, information, and deliberation that draw 
creatively on the array of techniques and technologies available in the 
twenty-first century (187-8). 
 
While state-level citizen initiatives are not new technology or techniques (South Dakota 
was the first in 1898; Oregon the second in 1902), their use has expanded in recent years 
to the point where they serve as a powerful alternative to institutional-based political 
regimes (Piott 2003).  In some regards, medical marijuana voter initiatives present a 
minor theoretical crisis for pluralist theory; if the citizens of a state overwhelmingly 
support medical marijuana and local government officials fail to construct an assuaging 
policy—but one is passed through the initiative process anyway—are these leaders truly 
heeding the public’s will?  It seems that multiple approaches are necessary to understand 
this phenomenon, as the method of passing these laws has been almost evenly split:  ten 
were approved voters and nine were enacted by state legislatures.  Are there other 
considerations or processes involved that may sway political leaders into action?  
States are commonly viewed as fertile laboratories for policy experimentation 
(Volden 2006).  Differences between states—especially in regards to education 
attainment, urbanization, industrialization, political ideology, wealth, and geographic 
proximity to other innovative states—appear to influence their adoption of novel policy 
approaches (Dawson and Robinson 1963; Dye 1966; Walker 1969; Gray 1973; 
Hofferbert 1974; Grupp and Richards 1975; Sharkansky 1978; Blomquist 1992). The 
analysis of policy diffusion amongst states traditionally focused on either internal 
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determinants or regional diffusion models to explain variations in policy adoption or 
experimentation; however, many current studies attempt to integrate these approaches 
using event history analysis models for hypothesis testing (Berry and Berry 1990).  Most 
studies focus on single policies, such as lotteries (Berry and Berry 1990), tax policy 
(Berry and Berry 1992; Best and Teske 2002), hate crime legislation (Haider-Markel 
1998), crime policy (Hays 1996), same-sex marriage laws (Haider-Markel 2001), 
environmental policy (Blomquist 1992), abortion policy (Mooney and Lee 1995), 
insurance regulation (Cheit 1993), tobacco lawsuits (Winder and LaPlant 2000), energy 
policy (Andrews 2000), and educational policy (McLendon et al. 2005; 2007).  Using a 
data set comprised of 85 separate policies from 1960-1999, Boehmke and Skinner (2012) 
provide the most comprehensive analysis of policy diffusion amongst states, finding that 
the most innovative states have large, diverse populations, high per capita incomes, and 
are geographically proximate to other innovative states.   
I expect that states that border other medical marijuana states will adopt similar 
policies more often than non-border states.  I also expect that greater ethnic diversity, 
higher per capita incomes, and larger populations will be positively associated with the 
adoption of these laws.  Since educational attainment (Mauss 1969; Gallup 2010, 2011) 
and Democratic political orientation (Pollock 1983; Martinez 1990; Ferraiolo 2007; 
Gallup 2010, 2011) are prominent predictors of marijuana acceptance at the individual 
level, I expect that both of these factors will be positively related to medical marijuana 
adoption at the state level as well.   
H3: States bordering medical marijuana states are more likely to adopt medical 
marijuana laws 
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H4: State ethnic diversity is positively related to the adoption of medical 
marijuana laws 
 
H5: State per capita incomes are positively related to the adoption of medical 
marijuana laws 
 
H6: State population is positively related to the adoption of medical marijuana 
laws 
 
H7: State-level aggregate educational attainment is positively related to the 
adoption of medical marijuana laws 
 
H8: Democrat-dominated states are more likely to adopt medical marijuana 
laws 
 
 
C. Wright Mills offered a comprehensive explanation of arising collusion between 
government, industry, and the military, indicting the upper echelons of these bureaucratic 
organizations, and those who inhabit the positions of power within them, as the dominant 
forces of control in the United States (1956).  This approach to explaining power in the 
US was decried by a cacophony of pluralist scholars, who claimed that power is too 
dispersed, and competing interests too divided amongst potential allies for any sustained 
coalition to dominate the decision-making process (Dahl 1961).  In response to both Mills 
and the pluralist rebuttal, Domhoff recast Mills’ general argument in more specific terms 
by identifying key organizations inside and outside of government, examining the 
outcomes of several key policy battles between the elite and competing interests, and re-
specifying the nexus of power in the United States as a set of four interrelated power 
networks (2010).  
These primary power networks—policy-planning, special interest, candidate 
selection, and opinion shaping—are said to be dominated by the social elite, the corporate 
community, and policy-planning directors (2010: 116).  Scholarly interest in the policy-
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planning network has resulted in a proliferation of studies that track the penetration of 
corporations into this increasingly influential sociopolitical process.  While some studies 
focus on the most powerful organizations in the national policy-planning network 
(Mizruchi 1982; Domhoff 1990; Burris 1992; Domhoff 2005), others investigate sector-
specific networks (Roose 1975; Dreiling 2000; Crawford 2012), and a few examine local 
planning networks (see Domhoff 2007).  The findings at all levels of analysis suggest that 
elites consistently win policy battles, benefit from policy decisions, and influence the 
policy-planning network.  Though power and influence are thought to be achieved 
through a number of avenues, power structure research has often relied on the existence 
of director interlocks when examining corporate influence on the policy development 
process (Domhoff 1978; Burris 1992; Mizruchi 1996; Crawford 2012).  In the case of 
marijuana, several of the leading policy-planning organizations5 (Burris 1992: 121) have 
issued research reports that argue against various forms of marijuana legalization 
(Heritage Foundation 2010; Hoover Institution 2000), while others (Council on Foreign 
Relations and American Enterprise Institute) have advocated for a repeal of current laws 
(Shirk 2011; Satel 2005; Gottlieb 2008; Frum 2009) or conducted studies demonstrating 
the benefits of medical marijuana laws on crime incidence (RAND 2011).  Local 
affiliates of the US Chamber of Commerce (particularly in California) have spent 
considerable amounts of money fighting against proposed legalization voter initiatives 
(Hoeffel 2010).  The other three networks identified by Domhoff have not received 
recent, similar extended studies; for an issue like marijuana legalization (medical or !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!5!Burris (1992) includes: American Enterprise Institute, Business Council, Business Roundtable, 
Brookings Institution, Committee for Economic Development, Conference Board, Council on 
Foreign Relations, Heritage Foundation, Hoover Institution, National Association of 
Manufacturers, Trilateral Commission, and US Chamber of Commerce.!
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otherwise), examinations of the pubic opinion shaping (i.e. media) apparatuses and 
special interest networks would be eminently useful.  One study of early marijuana 
rhetorical framing (Speaker 2001) draws parallels between the government’s anti-drug 
propaganda and previous castigations of Masons, Mormons, and Catholics, arguing that it 
“is linked to a larger American rhetorical tradition, one that stems from Protestant-
Republican ideology and cultural concerns—fears of being owned or controlled, fears of 
anarchy, fears of loss of dynamism, fears of falling away from past virtue and promise” 
(591).  Another problematic aspect of class domination theory of power is it’s focus on 
national issues, leaving state and local political battles largely unaddressed—though an 
important insight is presented in Domhoff’s description of local “growth coalitions” 
(2010: 49). 
Growth coalitions bring together the most important small businesses within a 
particular geographic area to ensure the passage of measures intensifying land use and 
increasing rents.  The goals of growth coalitions differ in an important way from large 
corporations, namely: 
Growth coalitions are trying to maximize rents from land and buildings, 
which is a little different than the goal of the corporate community, 
namely, maximizing profits from the sale of goods and services.  To 
emphasize this difference, the concept of rents includes purchases of land 
and buildings as well as payments that tenants or home buyers make to 
landlords, realtors, mortgage lenders, and title companies (Domhoff 2010: 
49-50). 
 
The legalization of marijuana—medical or recreational—presents an interesting paradox 
where local growth coalitions are potentially pitted against federal power elites; when 
implemented at the state level instead of nationally, this type of policy change offers local 
growth coalitions an opportunity to produce a high-value agricultural commodity and 
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capture an increase in property value when storefront dispensaries are permitted.  This 
local revenue generation is a threat to corporate profits in the alcohol, tobacco, and 
pharmaceutical industries6.  Simultaneously, it has the potential to increase federal 
funding to local law enforcement agencies when they cooperate with DEA eradication 
programs, while reducing local expenditures for judicial proceedings and incarceration 
costs.  The class domination theory of power suggests federal elite supremacy over these 
local growth coalitions, while acknowledging the possibility that pockets of resistance 
may be successful—in the short term—at hedging elements of their control (Mikos 
2009).    
Aspects of the Marijuana Policy Planning Network 
Since the first medical use law was established in California, prominent policy-
planning organizations have addressed the issue, though contradictory messages have 
emerged and no elite consensus can be distilled from these actions.  Is this evidence of a 
pluralist reform process underway or the early stage of policy cohesion amongst elites?  
Delineating some aspects of the federal marijuana policy planning structure is necessary 
to properly approach this question, as state-level medical marijuana policy 
implementation can be viewed (in several regards) as a response to federal recalcitrance 
towards rescheduling marijuana. 
In light of the compelling scientific evidence which suggests that marijuana is, at 
minimum, a medically useful palliative, a number of individuals and organizations have 
beseeched the federal government to reschedule marijuana into a classification that !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!6!Conflicting evidence has emerged regarding marijuana’s substitutability for alcohol; Reiman’s 
(2009) findings suggest it is a substitute, but Williams et al. (2001) indicate they are 
complementary. 
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would, at minimum, allow for sustained research into its effects.  The agencies and 
individuals who have power over rescheduling decisions are the key actors in the 
marijuana policy-planning network, and the attempts to reclassify this drug offer a view 
of this network’s structure.   
Due to its legislative origins, parallel processes allow for the rescheduling of CSA 
drugs.  Any drug can be rescheduled by Congress and presidential signature—this is the 
least complicated route towards rescheduling, but also the most politically tenuous7.  The 
US attorney general retains the power to unilaterally reschedule as well (as provided in 
Section 201 of the CSA).  In contrast, the DEA (a sub-agency within the Department of 
Justice)—which is tasked with enforcing the CSA provisions—and the Department of 
Health and Human Services (HHS) can initiate proceedings to reschedule at any time.  
Affected citizens, advocacy groups, state and local governments, and other recognized 
organizations can petition that either the DEA or HHS conduct rescheduling proceedings 
as well.  Before rescheduling proceedings are initiated, the DEA is allowed to gather 
necessary data (which includes non-binding fact-finding provided by HHS)—if the data 
supports rescheduling, the DEA can initiate rescheduling proceedings.  If rescheduling 
proceedings are initiated, both the DEA and HHS must conduct scientific reviews.  Two 
HHS departments—the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) and National Institute on 
Drug Abuse (NIDA)—play a powerful role in the scientific reviews, as any 
recommendations made by them are mandatorily binding and enforced by the DEA.  One 
must imagine how definitive the evidence must be for a rescheduling proceeding to be 
initiated by the DEA; in the case of marijuana, none have ever taken place.  This is not !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!7!Rep. Barney Frank (D-MA), Rep. Ron Paul (R-TX), and others have unsuccessfully introduced 
bills to this effect several times, but none have made it out of committee. !
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due to a lack of effort by marijuana advocates.  Individuals, patient advocacy groups, 
scientists, physician groups, and the governors of two states8 have all submitted petitions 
to reschedule, but most have languished on DEA desks for years.   
The first major challenge to this particular drug scheduling was filed in 1972 by 
the National Organization for the Reform of Marijuana Laws (NORML), who asked the 
DEA to reclassify whole-plant marijuana as Schedule 2 due to its usefulness in treating 
chemotherapy-induced nausea and vomiting in cancer patients (Young 1988).  The DEA 
rejected this supplication, claiming that the required FDA assessment of marijuana found 
no “accepted medical use” because the drug had not received FDA approval for lawful 
marketing.  In 1988, Francis Young—the chief administrative law judge at the DEA—
ruled against the agency’s decision, claiming that this approach was not in the spirit of 
the law.  In his ruling, Young addresses the “accepted medical use” argument, stating: 
It is not for this Agency to tell doctors whether they should or should not 
accept a drug or substance for medical use.  The statute directs the 
Administrator merely to ascertain whether, in fact, doctors have done so.  
The overwhelming preponderance of the evidence in this record 
establishes that marijuana has a currently accepted medical use in 
treatment in the United States for nausea and vomiting resulting from 
chemotherapy treatments in some cancer patients.  To conclude otherwise, 
on this record, would be unreasonable, arbitrary and capricious (1988: 32-
34). 
 
Young also addresses the safety of this drug; after reviewing the evidence, he claims that:  
“Marijuana, in its natural form, is one of the safest therapeutically active substances 
known to man.  By any measure of rational analysis marijuana can be safely used within 
a supervised routine of medical care” (58-59).  Despite this ruling (which was non-
binding), the DEA rejected the rescheduling petition.  The most recent major petition was !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!8!http://www.mpp.org/media/press-releases/governors-ask-obama-to.html!
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filed in 2003 and is now before the US Court of Appeals (DC) (Americans for Safe 
Access v. Drug Enforcement Administration) after being rejected by the DEA on the 
following grounds (Federal Register 2011: 40551): 
(1) Marijuana has a high potential for abuse. The DHHS evaluation and 
the additional data gathered by DEA show that marijuana has a high 
potential for abuse.  (2) Marijuana has no currently accepted medical use 
in treatment in the United States.  According to established case law, 
marijuana has no “currently accepted medical use” because:  the drug's 
chemistry is not known and reproducible; there are no adequate safety 
studies; there are no adequate and well-controlled studies proving 
efficacy; the drug is not accepted by qualified experts; and the scientific 
evidence is not widely available.  (3) Marijuana lacks accepted safety for 
use under medical supervision.  At present, there are no US Food and 
Drug Administration (FDA)-approved marijuana products, nor is 
marijuana under a New Drug Application (NDA) evaluation at the FDA 
for any indication.  Marijuana does not have a currently accepted medical 
use in treatment in the United States or a currently accepted medical use 
with severe restrictions.  At this time, the known risks of marijuana use 
have not been shown to be outweighed by specific benefits in well-
controlled clinical trials that scientifically evaluate safety and efficacy. 
 
The arguments against holding a rescheduling hearing have evolved very little in the last 
40 years and most are dismissible off-hand:  there are no known deaths from marijuana, 
its addictive capacity is less than caffeine, significant scientific consensus exists that the 
drug provides relief for a number of clinical maladies, and a synthetically-derived THC 
(dronabinol, known by its trade name Marinol) is classified as a Schedule 3 drug and has 
been available via prescription since 1986 in the US (Nutt et al. 2010).  Additionally, 
NIDA has operated the only federally legal medical marijuana program since 1978 (the 
“Compassionate Investigational New Drug Study”); NIDA currently grows and provides 
an average of 8.5 ounces of marijuana to a handful of individuals on a monthly basis9.  
Furthermore—in a move that can only be described as highly ironic—HHS applied for !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!9!http://archives.drugabuse.gov/about/organization/nacda/MarijuanaStatement.html!
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and received a patent on the use of “cannabinoids as antioxidants and neuroprotectants” 
from the US Patent and Technology Office in 2003; as the abstract of their awarded 
patent describes (USPTO #6,630,507): 
Cannabinoids are found to have particular application as neuroprotectants, 
for example in limiting neurological damage following ischemic insults, 
such as stroke and trauma, or in the treatment of neurodegenerative 
diseases, such as Alzheimer's disease, Parkinson's disease and HIV 
dementia.  Nonpsychoactive cannabinoids, such as cannabidoil, are 
particularly advantageous to use because they avoid toxicity that is 
encountered with psychoactive cannabinoids at high doses useful in the 
method of the present invention. 
 
The federal agency, which actively claims that marijuana has no medical use, patented 
the application of marijuana-derived cannabinoids for targeted medical treatment.  By all 
accounts, the activities of federal marijuana policy planners (NIDA and DEA in 
particular) seem scientifically disingenuous—why would they approach a drug with such 
significant medical benefits in this manner? 
NIDA—the HHS department that conducts the bulk of scientific reviews on drug 
classification and oversees federally-sponsored drug abuse research—provides an 
interesting case.  NIDA’s directors are credentialed, professional researchers who 
specialize in various aspects of addiction (see Table 2-1).  The three previous 
administrators’ research investigates dopamine receptor inhibition from drug 
consumption and suggest the disruption of natural dopamine uptake brought on by 
chronic drug use leads users into a cycle of continued use—each has staked their 
professional career on this particular form of the disease model of addiction (Leshner 
1997; Fleckenstein et al. 2007; Volkow et al. 2004).  There is no question that marijuana, 
when consumed, leads to higher concentrations of dopamine in the body (Loeber and 
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Yurgelun-Todd 1999).  Does this feature justify its classification as one of America’s 
most dangerous drug? 
Table 2-1.  NIDA Administrators 
Name  Years  Degree/University   Previous Occupation 
Alan Leshner 1994-2001 BS, Franklin and Marshall College Director, NIMH 
    MS, Rutgers University 
    Ph.D., Rutgers University    
 
Glen Hanson 2001-03 BS, BYU    Professor, Dept. of 
    DDS, UCLA    Pharmacology 
    Ph.D. University of Utah  University of Utah 
     
Nora Volkow 2003-  BA, Modern American School  Professor, Dept. of  
    MD, National University of Mexico Psychiatry 
         SUNY-Stony Brook  
         
 
Unlike central stimulants or even depressants, marijuana is associated with relatively low 
levels of peak dopamine increase: 6.6x lower than amphetamines, 2.3x lower than 
cocaine, 1.5x lower than nicotine, and 1.1x lower than alcohol (Di Chiara and Imperato 
1988).  In fact, the dopamine response triggered by eating food and having sex are 
stronger than from marijuana use (Di Chiara et al. 1999; Fiorino and Phillips 1997). The 
long-term consequences of marijuana use on our dopamine system are unlike other drugs; 
once reaching adulthood, there are no known alterations even with chronic use (Stokes et 
al. 2011; Urban et al. 2012). Despite this knowledge, NIDA continues to demonize 
marijuana as a drug of abuse through their spurious dopamine argument; between 1998 
and 2004, the agency spent over $1 billion on anti-marijuana ads10, often invoking their 
newly constructed and technologically sophisticated variant of “this is your brain on 
drugs” (see Figure 2-2). 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!10!http://archives.drugabuse.gov/initiatives/westat/!
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Figure 2-2.  Images from NIDA Presentation on Addiction Science11 
Recasting the anti-marijuana argument in terms that are unassailable by the average 
person is a common tactic implemented by a society’s intellectual class (Konrad and 
Szelényi 1979), allowing them to build and wield cultural capital through their framing of 
and determining what constitutes legitimated knowledge (Gouldner 1982).  In that vein, 
Verdery (2005) argues “the intelligentsia seek to obtain power and reward for itself by 
exploiting its relative monopoly of complex knowledge as a means of…justifying one’s 
social position” (2).  Since most people do not have the luxury of foraging through 
university libraries and paid-access electronic databases, or the requisite knowledge to 
investigate the validity these arguments, we can view the debate over marijuana’s status 
as a Schedule 1 drug as a battle within the intellectual class over finite resources and 
social distinction.  
NIDA administrators are powerful actors in the federal marijuana policy 
apparatus because of their command of capital.  Bourdieu’s (1986) delineation of capital 
forms helps elucidate the roots of NIDA’s power; he contends that: 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!11!http://www.drugabuse.gov/sites/default/files/addictionscience.ppt!
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Capital can present itself in three fundamental guises:  as economic 
capital, which is immediately and directly convertible into money and may 
be institutionalized in the forms of property rights; as cultural capital, 
which is convertible, on certain conditions, into economic capital and may 
be institutionalized in the forms of educational qualifications; and as social 
capita, made up of social obligations (‘connections’), which is convertible, 
in certain conditions, into economic capital and may be institutionalized in 
the forms of a title of nobility (243). 
 
In NIDA administrators’ case, their economic capital is derived from large budgets 
($1.08 billion in FY201212) and the funding of extramural research (the agency claims to 
control 85% of world’s total research funding for drug abuse studies13).  This economic 
power is intimately related to their accumulated social capital, which Bourdieu defines 
as: 
the aggregate of the actual or potential resources which are linked to the 
possession of a durable network of more or less institutionalized 
relationships of mutual acquaintance and recognition…which provides 
each of its members with the backing of the collectivity-owned capital, a 
‘credential’ which entitle them to credit, in the various senses of the word 
(1986: 248-49).  
 
NIDA administrators directly oversee about 500 employees, control over 1700 research 
grants, and engage in nearly 200 research and development contracts with individual 
scientists, non-profit organizations, and for-profit corporations14.  They are deeply 
embedded in networks of power, authority, and knowledge generation, which bestows the 
ability to exert influence over other scientists and policy makers.  Previous administrators 
have used this capital to gain academic appointments and prestigious editorships 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!12!http://www.drugabuse.gov/about-nida/legislative-activities/budget-information/fiscal-year-
2012-budget-information!13!http://www.nih.gov/news/pr/jul2001/nida-19.htm!14!http://www.drugabuse.gov/about-nida/legislative-activities/budget-information/fiscal-year-
2012-budget-information!
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following their dismissal at NIDA15 .  Cultural capital is manifested in three particular 
states: 
In the embodied state, i.e., in the form of long-lasting dispositions of the 
mind and body; in the objectified state, in the form of cultural goods 
(pictures, books, dictionaries, instruments, machines, etc.); and in the 
institutionalized state, [i.e.] educational qualifications (Bourdieu 1986: 
243). 
 
 The cultural capital of NIDA administrators stems from their institutionalized 
educational credentials and their ability to cultivate the normative guidelines of embodied 
capital through the exercise of scientific authority.  Creating definitions of and framing 
the debate around marijuana’s usefulness is a powerful element of this scientific 
authority.  Whatever NIDA recommends to other federal agencies regarding this drug 
must be adhered to, and, since the federal government claims supremacy over states on 
this issue, NIDA definitions of marijuana’s medical-scientific value is the law of the land 
and can be enforced through the state’s monopoly on legitimate violence (Weber 1978).    
The adoption of medical marijuana laws by state legislatures or their passage by 
popular referendum can be viewed as a direct challenge to this particular subset of 
scientific claims, or alternately, as an attempt by state elites and the general public to 
recoup capital—in this case, cultural—from dominant members of the marijuana policy 
planning network.  For NIDA administrators—past and present—legitimizing marijuana 
research (let alone use) is a challenge to their accumulated capital, particularly in its 
social and cultural forms, but also in a pure economic sense as well.   
Gordon (1994) suggests that DEA administrators are powerful actors in the 
marijuana policy-planning decision-making process and are primarily driven by !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!15!Alan Leshner is a professor of pharmacology at the University of Utah; Glen Hanson is the 
Executive Editor of Science.!
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unconscious ideological commitment to drug prohibition.  As Table 2-2 illustrates, no 
administrator has been trained as a scientists or medical doctor16.  Since its creation in 
1972, the agency has been lead by two former FBI agents, two former DEA agents, a 
former NYPD cop, four former US district attorneys, and a sales manager from the 
Brunswick Corporation.  In terms of educational attainment, one held a high school 
diploma, five possessed a bachelor’s degree (only), and four earned law degrees.   
Table 2-2.  DEA Administrators 
Name   Years  Degree/University  Previous Occupation 
John Bartels, Jr.  1973-75 BS, JD    US District Attorney 
     Harvard University   
 
Peter Bensinger  1976-81 BS    Sales Manager 
     Yale University   Brunswick Corporation 
 
Francis Mullen, Jr. 1981-85 BS    Special Agent 
Central Connecticut State Coll.  FBI 
 
John Lawn  1985-90 BA, MA   FBI Agent 
     St. Francis College of Brooklyn, St. John’s University 
 
Robert Bonner  1990-93 BA, JD    US District Attorney 
     University of Maryland, Georgetown University 
 
Thomas Constantine 1994-99 ---    NYPD 
 
Donnie Marshall 2000-01 BS    DEA Agent 
     Stephen Austin State University 
 
Asa Hutchinson  2001-03 BS, JD    US District Attorney 
     Bob Jones University, University of Arkansas 
 
Karen Tandy  2003-07 BS, JD    US District Attorney 
     Texas Tech University 
 
Michele Leonhart 2007-current BS    DEA Agent 
     Bemidji State University    
         
 !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!16!http://www.docstoc.com/docs/1086185/DEA-History-Book-part-1---PDF!
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They are classic examples of Becker’s (1963) “rule enforcers,” doubly bound to 
demonstrate their effectiveness at controlling drugs, while not being so effective as to 
wipe out the problem altogether.  Their history of enforcement—of all drugs, but 
particularly with marijuana—suggest exogenous factors could be influencing their actual 
effectiveness (Figure 2-3). 
 
Figure 2-3.  Millions of Drug Doses17 Seized by DEA, 1986-201118 
 
The direction of oscillation in DEA-reported marijuana confiscation is strongly 
associated with changes in presidential administrations.  The amount seized dramatically 
declined under George H. W. Bush (though it crept up in the year of his failed re-election 
bid).  Clinton’s tenure is associated with an immediate decline in the first year, followed 
by modest increases in seizures for the next three; he presided over steady increases for 
his entire second term.  George W. Bush presents a mixed case; his first term saw small !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!17!Doses are estimated from Itzhak and Anderson (2012), Dobler-Mikola et al. (1999), Stough et 
al. (2012), and Weill et al. (1968).  The figure assumes very high purity for all drugs.  
Standardization in this regard (doses) is necessary to compare enforcement strategy alteration 
with respect to various drugs, as the impact of seizing 1kg of marijuana is different than 1kg of 
methamphetamine.   !18!http://www.justice.gov/dea/resource-center/statistics.shtml 
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declines from Clinton’s high seizure year (1999), but they steadily increased during his 
second term.  The most pronounced seizure spike in modern history occurred in Bush II’s 
final year in office, with an 83% increase between 2007 and 2008.  Seizures continued to 
increase under Barack Obama, reaching their highest point in US history in 2010, then 
slightly declined in 2011.  The DEA seized more marijuana in Obama’s first three years 
than under Clinton’s entire eight-year presidency.  This data lends credibility to the 
contention that DEA enforcement of marijuana prohibition is strongly influenced by 
presidential administrations, particularly in election years (Gordon 1994).  The DEA is a 
powerful actor in the marijuana policy-planning network, but their importance appears to 
be overshadowed by presidential politics.  
Deriving a testable hypothesis regarding marijuana laws from elite domination 
theories presents a conundrum; at this point, there appears to be a lack of consensus 
among elite policy-planning organizations—some favor legalization and some favor 
maintaining prohibition.  It appears as if the passage of state-level medical marijuana 
laws, through both grass-roots movements and local legislative initiative, have forced 
elites to reconsider the issue seriously.  If marijuana prohibition repeal is anything like 
that of alcohol, we will see consensus among elites emerge first, followed by federal 
action (Levine 1985).  At this point, however, no such consensus exists and the status quo 
is firmly entrenched. 
Empirical Studies of Voter Initiatives 
The success of individual voter initiatives often depends on campaign spending, 
ideologically motivated voter turnout, the complexity of proposed measures, and the 
degree of departure each proposal offers from established laws.  Some assessments of 
 31 
campaign spending on ballot measures suggest that spending by opponents against a 
particular measure is an effective strategy, but of limited utility to proponents (Gerber 
1999; Lupia and Matsusaka 2004).  Others (Schrag 1998; Smith 1998; Ellis 2002) find 
that spending is advantageous—and necessary—to both proponents and opponents to 
particular ballot measures—Broder (2000) goes so far as to claim that it is the single-
greatest determinant of passage.  Stratmann (2006) finds that spending is effective for 
supporters and opponents to achieve their desired outcome, with supporter spending 
having a slightly larger impact, but suggests that further research in this area requires “for 
controlling of voter preferences and initiative particulars” (798).  Contrary to others (and 
similar to Stratmann’s claims), Ferraiolo (2004) finds that campaign spending in 
contested medical marijuana initiatives during the 1990s had little to no effect on their 
outcome; instead, public opinion on medical marijuana (which did not change 
significantly during the campaign process) was accurately reflected in the successful 
passage of these particular policies, outside of endogenous factors.  A comparison of 
campaign spending by proponents/opponents at the state level could help elucidate the 
magnitude of this particular relationship in marijuana-related voter initiatives; however, , 
the veracity of campaign spending records varies with time and from state to state, 
making a reliable longitudinal, cross-state comparison difficult to initiate19.    
Hrebenar and Benedict (1991) find that (in western states) voter turnout is not 
significantly influenced by the presence of initiatives on the ballot; rather, candidates for !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!19!Candidate campaign spending reports are required in all states; however, independent 
spending, either candidate or ballot initiative related, is treated differently by individual states.  
Some states have detailed reports (e.g. Washington, California, and Ohio) while others have 
minimal to no reporting requirements (e.g. New Mexico, Alabama, and Indiana).  More details 
can be found at: http://www.followthemoney.org/press/ReportView.phtml?r=482!
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major state offices (governor, senators, congress members) attract voters to the polls 
(134).  Childers and Binder (2012), on the other hand, demonstrate that contentious voter 
initiatives tend to produce higher turnout during mid-term elections, but—for non-
contentious issues and presidential elections—voter turnout is unaffected by the presence 
of initiatives.  Higher voter turnout on its own does not predict the success of a specific 
ballot measure; however, in states where a particular measure might be ideologically 
palatable to the majority of citizens, Gerber et al. (2008) find that such initiatives 
mobilize voters to pass legislation that most government officials would not otherwise 
support.  In this sense, contextualizing each measure and the ideological orientation of 
the respective voting populations of each state will likely provide more analytical value 
than comparing voter turnout rates (Stratmann 2006: 798).     
Contextually, clear language plays a significant role in ballot measure success; 
Reilly and Richey (2011) note that the reading level required of prospective voters to 
comprehend a specific initiative and the total word count of the measure were significant 
determinants in the success of 1,211 ballot measures.  The concept of clear language 
extends to clear thinking as well—the presence of multiple policy issues within a 
measure often leads to failure (Reilly and Richey 2011).  I expect that single-issue 
marijuana-reform measures will be more likely to pass than their multiple-issue 
counterparts.  For marijuana, Democratic political orientation is the strongest predictor of 
support for policy change (Pollock 1983; Martinez 1990; Ferraiolo 2007; Gallup 2010, 
2011); I expect that states with this orientation will be more likely to pass marijuana 
reform laws.  The historical innovativeness of a state—or its propensity to adopt unique 
policies before other states—should affect an electorate’s willingness to vote in favor of 
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future innovations (Boehmke and Skinner 2012).  I expect that historically innovative 
states are more likely to adopt marijuana reform measures as well.  
H9: Single-issue marijuana-reform ballot measures are more likely to pass than 
their multiple-issue counterparts  
 
H10: Marijuana-reform ballot measures are more likely to pass in states who 
vote for Democratic presidential candidates 
 
H11: Innovative states are more likely to pass marijuana-related ballot 
initiatives 
 
Data and Methods 
Two methods—QCA and EHA—are applied to two unique pools of data to 
answer the proposed research questions and hypotheses.  An explication of both models 
and their data sources follows. 
Qualitative Comparative Analysis Models  
QCA, developed by Ragin (1987), offers researchers an alternative strategy to 
traditional quantitative and qualitative studies.  QCA is arguably more appropriate than a 
quantitative approach in this case, as the goal is to elucidate “convergent causal 
conditions” (Ragin 1987: 14), operationalized via voter initiative and state attributes in 
this study, that enable certain marijuana-related voter initiatives to pass.  Additionally, 
QCA allows for an examination of necessary and sufficient causes of passage or failure.  
Notation of voter initiative attributes in the constructed QCA models follows Ragin’s 
prescription, where upper-case letters refer to the “presence of a condition and lower-case 
letters indicate an absence” (89).  In this model, data is derived from qualitative 
assessments of all statewide voter initiatives involving marijuana between 1972 and 2011 
(n=34) and state-level sociopolitical measures.  Data begins in 1972 with the first 
marijuana voter initiative (California) and ends in 2011, allowing for the resulting models 
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to be compared against the historic results of 2012.  The text of each initiative was 
obtained from respective state elections offices, then examined based on the presence of 
specific categories of proposed legal alteration.  These categories include:  deescalating 
penalties for marijuana (such as reducing jail time and expungement requirements for 
drug offenders, but not decriminalizing), decriminalizing possession or production of 
marijuana, full legalization, medical use provision, and allowing medical marijuana 
dispensaries.  The presence of proposed legal changes to one of those categories is 
operationalized as an upper case letter, while the absence of any proposed changes is 
operationalized as a lower case letter.  Sociopolitical variables include Democratic 
political orientation and historical state policy innovation rankings.  The Democratic 
political orientation variable is operationalized as “P” if a state was carried by the 
Democratic presidential candidate in the election preceding the initiative in question, and 
a “p” if the state was carried by the republican presidential candidate.  As previously 
noted, Democrats are (and have been historically) more supportive of liberalizing 
marijuana laws.  The historical state policy innovation variable relies on Boehmke and 
Skinner’s (2012) ranking of states based on their adoption of innovative policies between 
1959-2009.  Boehmke and Skinner partition states into six tiers of innovativeness based 
on their speed of policy adoption relative to other states and the number of innovative 
policies adopted over time (2012: 40).  In this study, states who scored in the first three 
tiers are assigned an “I” and states in the bottom three tiers are assigned an “i”.  While 
previous research suggests that campaign spending by proponents and opponents of 
measures have a significant impact in many issue-oriented elections, I do not include this 
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variable due to inconsistencies in state campaign reporting over time—much of the data 
is missing or fraught with operationalization issues.   
The dichotomous dependent variable (S) represents passage or failure of a voter 
initiative.  Dichotomous independent variables for the model are:  Democratic political 
orientation (P), policy innovator (I), deintensifying penalties for marijuana (but not 
decriminalizing) (D), decriminalizing possession or production of marijuana (C), medical 
use provision (M), and providing for medical dispensaries (R).  The full model is 
expressed as:  
S = P + I + D + C + L + M + R 
Event History Analysis Models 
EHA models are a tool for estimating the hazard probability of an event occurring 
to an actor or set of actors, with respect to other operant conditions, within specific 
duration data.  The hazard probability “expresses the instantaneous risk of having the 
event at time t, given that the event did not occur before time t,” or “the ratio of 
unconditional instantaneous probability of having the event f(t) divided by the survival 
probability” (Yamaguchi 1991:  9-10).   In this study, the hazard probability of medical 
marijuana policy adoption is investigated at the state level between 1996 and 2011, with 
the adoption of a medical marijuana law treated as the failure event.  Continuous-time 
Cox proportional hazard regression models are used to assess the estimated effect of 
several key independent variables (Yamaguchi 1991: 101).  The hazard function for this 
model is expressed as: 
(1) 
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This gives the expected hazard at time t for a state with explanatory variables X.  The 
partial likelihood is estimated as: 
(2) 
 
where θj = exp(β′Xj) and X1, ..., Xn are the covariate vectors for the n independently 
sampled states in the dataset. 
Independent variables include population, racial diversity, per capita income, 
education attainment, Democratic political orientation, the presence of a border state with 
a medical marijuana law, and the number of marijuana plants eradicated by the US Drug 
Enforcement Administration.  Population data are derived from the US Census Bureau’s 
current population estimates.  Racial diversity is operationalized as the estimated 
percentage of white residents in each state (US Census Bureau).  Per capita personal 
income is derived from US Bureau of Economic Analysis data (chained 2011 dollars).  
Education attainment is operationalized as the percentage of state residents over the age 
of 25 who hold a bachelor’s degree or above (derived from the US Census Bureau’s 
American Community Surveys).  Democratic political orientation is operationalized as a 
dichotomous variable representing a state’s voting history in the last four presidential 
elections; states who were carried by a Democratic presidential candidate in three or 
more elections are assigned a “1”—all other states are assigned a “0”.  Border states—
those who share a political boundary with a medical marijuana state—are assigned a “1” 
in the year following adoption by their neighbor and for every year after that; all other 
states receive a “0”.  Marijuana plant eradication data is collected from historical US 
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DEA figures; to normalize the data, this measure is operationalized as each state’s 
percentage of the total cultivated plants eradicated by the agency. 
Results  
QCA Results 
QCA results are presented below in their reduced form for specific combinations 
of voter initiative and state-level sociopolitical attributes (truth table located in Appendix 
B).  Certain characteristics—historically—have lead to failure, success, and contradictory 
results.  Unsuccessful results are presented first.    
Unsuccessful Results (n=11): 
(1) s = PIdcLMr 
s = pIdcLmr 
 
(2) s = pIDclMR 
s = PIDclMr 
 
(3) s = PIdClmr 
s = pidClmr 
  
(4) s = PIdclmR 
 
In the first group of unsuccessful results, it is apparent that any ballot measure 
attempting to legalize marijuana possession, consumption, or production for recreational 
use (L) has failed20, regardless of all other attributes involved.  In the second group, 
measures that mix decriminalization (D) or de-escalation of penalties for marijuana 
possession (C) with medical marijuana laws (M) have also failed, even in the presence of 
a Democratic majority and an innovative policy adoption history.  The third group 
demonstrates that de-escalating penalties for marijuana crimes (C) are rarely successful at 
the ballot box; no voter initiative attempting to pass this type of legislation has succeeded !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!20!November 2012 election results have altered this finding in a surprising way.!
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(though it has on a number of occasions in legislative assemblies).  The fourth group (one 
case) was the result of Oregonians voting down medical marijuana dispensaries several 
years after the passage of their 1998 medical use provision; while it is only one case, it 
does suggest that proponents of dispensary systems should include them in initial medical 
marijuana measures to have a chance at success.  Successful results are detailed next. 
Successful Results (n=12): 
(1) S = IdclM 
S = pdclMR 
S = PdclMr 
 
 All of the successful combinations involve medical marijuana policies; some 
include dispensaries where patients can obtain the drug, while others do not.  Innovative 
states and those with Democratic political orientations have experienced the most success 
in passing medical laws.  However, even Republican dominated states have passed these 
laws (though only when dispensaries included).  The key finding derived from these 
results is that medical laws have only been successful when they do not attempt to alter 
aspects of recreational marijuana prohibition.    
Contradictory Results (n=10): 
(1) S / s = IDclmr 
 
(2) S / s = pidclMr 
 
 Two contradictory results emerge in this analysis:  decriminalization measures in 
innovative states (ID) and medical marijuana laws (without dispensaries) in non-
innovative, Republican dominated states (piMr).  The first finding is similar to those 
noted in the unsuccessful ballot measures; it appears that altering the level of criminality 
associated with recreational marijuana use through popular referendum is a poor 
 39 
approach that results in only occasional success.  The second finding is that non-
innovative, Republican dominated states have mixed success when dispensaries are not 
included in medical marijuana legislation—it appears that these states may require more 
assurance of bureaucratic control and oversight in the distribution of this substance before 
acquiescing to a new policy regime.  
 EHA Results 
 The estimated survival function for US states between 1996 and 2011 are 
presented in Table 2-3.  As the table indicates, 2/3rds of states remain at risk for the 
adoption of medical marijuana laws by 2011.  Without incorporating the effects of 
independent variables to determine specific state-level hazard rates, each of these states 
has the same likelihood (33%) of adopting a medical marijuana law in the next year.    
Table 2-3.  Cox Survivor Function Estimates for US States 
 
Beg.             Survivor     Std. 
Time    Total Fail    Function      Error     [95% Conf. Int.] 
1996       51       1 0.9804               0.0194     0.8689    0.9972 
1998       50       3  0.9216     0.0376     0.8044    0.9698 
1999       47       1       0.9020     0.0416     0.7804    0.9580 
2000       46       3       0.8431    0.0509     0.7107    0.9183 
2004       43       2       0.8039    0.0556     0.6662    0.8893 
2006       41       1       0.7843     0.0576     0.6445    0.8743 
2007       40       1       0.7647     0.0594     0.6230    0.8589 
2008       39       1       0.7451    0.0610     0.6019    0.8432 
2010       38       3       0.6863     0.0650     0.5399    0.7946 
2011       35       1  0.6667     0.0660     0.5198    0.7778 
 
 Table 2-4 identifies the estimated effect of each independent variable on the 
likelihood of a state adopting medical marijuana laws.  In models 1, 2, 3, and 4, only 
Democratic political orientation proves statistically significant, though the models 
themselves are significant.  
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Table 2-4.  Cox Proportional Hazard Regression Models 
   1  2  3  4  5 
Border   1.43  1.44  --  --  -- 
Population  .99  .99  .99  .99  .99* 
PC Income  .99  .99  .99  .99  -- 
DEA Plants   1.31  --  --  --  -- 
White   .98  .98  .99  --  -- 
Education  1.08  1.08  1.07  1.06  -- 
Democrat  5.78*  5.77*  5.92*  6.49**  5.63** 
 
Prob > chi2  .012  .006  .003  .001  .000 
 
* = p < .05, ** = p < .01 
 
The estimated direction of variables affecting medical marijuana law adoption is mostly 
as expected:  border states are more likely to adopt similar policies as their neighbors, and 
states with high proportions of DEA-eradicated plants, more diverse populations, and 
higher education attainment are more likely to adopt medical marijuana laws—though the 
magnitude of these last two effects are negligible.  The effect of per capita income is 
small as well, though it appears that the relationship is negative.  In any event, the lack of 
statistical significance for all variables except political orientation is relatively striking.  
In model 5, which is restricted to population and political orientation, both variables are 
highly significant.  The effect of population is insignificant.  Democratic political 
orientation appears as the most prominent and consistent arbiter of medical marijuana 
policy adoption—in model 5, Democratic states are 4.5x more likely to adopt this type of 
policy than Republican states.  Figure 2-4 and Table 2-5 present stratified survivor 
estimates based on political orientation.  When controlling for political orientation, the 
likelihood of any one state adopting a medical marijuana law becomes much more clear.  
The chance of any Republican state adopting this type of policy in the next year is about 
13.8%, while the rate for Democratic states is about 59%. 
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Figure 2-4.  Kaplan-Meier Survival Estimates for Republican and Democratic States 
Table 2-5.  Survivor Functions for Republican and Democratic States 
 
               Beg.     Survivor       Std. 
  Time    Total    Fail   Function      Error     [95% Conf. Int.] 
 
Republican States 
  1998       29       1                    0.9655     0.0339     0.7795    0.9951 
  2000       28       1                    0.9310     0.0471     0.7514    0.9823 
  2004       27       1                    0.8966     0.0566     0.7126    0.9654 
  2010       26       1                    0.8621     0.0640     0.6731    0.9459 
  2011       25       0                   0.8621     0.0640     0.6731    0.9459 
 
Democratic States 
  1996       22       1                    0.9545     0.0444     0.7187    0.9935 
  1998       21       2                    0.8636     0.0732     0.6344    0.9539 
  1999       19       1                    0.8182    0.0822     0.5853    0.9276 
  2000       18       2                    0.7273     0.0950     0.4910    0.8671 
  2004       16       1                    0.6818     0.0993     0.4462    0.8338 
  2006       15       1                    0.6364     0.1026     0.4029    0.7988 
  2007       14       1                    0.5909     0.1048     0.3610    0.7621 
  2008       13       1                    0.5455     0.1062     0.3207    0.7239 
  2010       12       2                    0.4545     0.1062     0.2444    0.6433 
  2011       10       1                    0.4091     0.1048     0.2085    0.6007 
___________________________________________________________________ 
 
The difference between these two groups is pronounced, though it matches expectations 
about the palatability of marijuana in regards to specific political parties in the United 
States. 
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Discussion 
 The findings of this study suggest several new orientations on marijuana law 
enactment, while substantively confirming the importance of state-level Democratic 
political orientation as a consistent correlate with successful marijuana reform attempts.  
The QCA models demonstrate that single-issue ballot measures are necessary—
regardless of the political orientation or historical policy innovativeness of a particular 
state—to have a chance of passing.  Direct democracy efforts were—until the most recent 
election—also demonstrably ineffective tools for altering the criminality of recreational 
marijuana use.  Medical marijuana voter initiatives appear to be the most consistently 
approved reform efforts, with relatively consistent success in Democratically controlled 
states and those with a history of policy innovation.  In Republican dominated states, the 
passage of medical marijuana voter initiatives appears to hinge upon the inclusion of 
dispensaries—but their presence is not a sufficient attribute for success.   
Three states—Colorado, Oregon, and Washington—voted on full marijuana 
legalization and two states voted on medical marijuana issues (Massachusetts and 
Arkansas) in November 2012.  QCA modeling of the proposed initiative—which relies 
on historical patterns to determine necessary and sufficient causes of successful 
outcomes—concluded that none would pass in 2012.  The successful outcomes in 
Washington and Colorado necessitate a revision to that model, though the largest 
criticism of the Oregon measure was its verbosity21.  On the other hand, the QCA model 
successfully predicted the passage of Massachusetts’ medical marijuana law, and the 
subsequent defeat of the Arkansas measure. !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!21!http://www.katu.com/politics/Ore-gambling-measures-loses-pot-measure-losing-
177590511.html!
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 The EHA models suggest that several commonly cited state-level variables 
(bordering a state with medical laws, educational attainment, ethnic diversity, per capita 
income, and history of marijuana production) are not associated with the adoption of 
medical marijuana laws and have little effect on any particular state’s hazard rate for 
adoption of these policies.  Population, while significant, offers little explanatory or 
predictive power as well.  Democratically dominated states are at much greater risk of 
passing medical marijuana laws, though only eight had not approved this type of policy 
change when the analysis was conducted.  These states can be ranked in terms of their 
overall risk, though it is important to note that the independent variables in a multivariate 
context.  That important caveat aside, the hazard risk order is:  (1) Massachusetts, (2) 
Connecticut, (3) Maryland, (4) New York, (5) New Hampshire, (6) Pennsylvania, (7) 
Wisconsin, (8) Minnesota, and (9) Illinois.  The first six states are most at risk due to 
their shared borders with other medical marijuana states.  Following the election cycle of 
2012, both Massachussetts and Connecticut legalized medical marijuana, which suggests 
that this approach has some explanatory validity.  With such similar hazard rates, it 
would not be surprising if any of the remaining states were to adopt medical laws in the 
near future; if all seven were to do so and joined the other 18 states (and DC), over 51% 
of the US population would have access to medical marijuana in one form or another.  
For both prohibitionists and reformers alike, these states will be the key battlegrounds of 
marijuana policy for some time to come. 
 Which theoretical approach—pluralist or elite domination theory—best explains 
the rise of medical marijuana laws in the United States?  Both theories contribute to our 
understanding of the phenomenon, but they also fail to capture important causal elements.  
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Small, uncoordinated grassroots organizations were responsible for placing the original 
medical use provisions on ballots in six states after local governments refused to take 
action on the issue (Ferraiolo 2007).  In all six of those states, marijuana use for medical 
purposes was supported by a majority of adults22.  Since then, the dominant method of 
passing these laws is through legislative action, and, as this study demonstrates, states 
with histories of policy innovation have led the way in this regard.  In one sense, pluralist 
theory fails to account for the success or necessity of voter initiatives to pass these laws; 
contrarily, their subsequent legislative adoption suggests that political leaders are 
responding to the will of their constituents.  The latter is debatable; of the six state 
legislatures (Illinois, Massachusetts, Missouri, New York, New Hampshire, and 
Pennsylvania)23 considering such laws in 2012, only one was approved (Massachusetts).  
At the federal level, pluralist theoretical explanations are an incontrovertible failure, as 
over 70% of Americans support the legalization of marijuana for medical use (Gallup 
2010) and the federal government has only become more recalcitrant in their enforcement 
of this prohibition as more states permit its use, production, and (in certain states) sales.  
Elite domination theory is not anymore coherent on the issue; however, its primary 
contribution is to provide a better understanding of the federal response to local decision-
making.  From this theoretical vantage point, maintaining prohibition is the current elite 
position; the mobilization of federal resources to combat marijuana producers in rogue 
states is an expression of their consensus and dominative power on the issue.  On the 
other hand, the demonstrable lack of consensus among policy-planning organizations and !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!22!http://www.mpp.org/assets/pdfs/library/State-Polling.pdf!23!http://thinkprogress.org/justice/2012/06/13/498675/seven-more-states-may-legalize-medical-
marijuana-in-2012/?mobile=nc!
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the impossibility of controlling marijuana production/use in the US without exponentially 
increasing enforcement funding suggests that the elites are dominating this issue only as 
far as the law is concerned.  The on-ground reality is obviously very different.     
Conclusion 
In this study, I inspected two interrelated components of policy diffusion amongst 
states to better understand the current trajectory of marijuana policy in the US.  The 
findings suggest that Democratically dominated states are much more likely to pass 
marijuana reform laws, particularly those relating to medical marijuana access; 
additionally, I identified certain attributes of states and voter initiatives that lead to 
success and failure of direct democracy measures.  Theoretical positions from pluralist 
and elite domination scholars were examined to identify possible causal routes of the 
medical marijuana movement, and a brief sketch of the two most important federal 
agencies involved in drug scheduling were offered.  The evidence suggests that 
marijuana’s classification as one of the US’s most dangerous drugs is part of a larger 
battle amongst members of the intellectual class, who are attempting to maintain or 
expand their various forms of capital.  Both theories contribute to our understanding of 
various marijuana legalization efforts, but effectively do so at different levels of analysis. 
The federal prohibition of marijuana is in its 75th year, but a number of key 
political and judicial battles loom in the near future that may irreversibly alter the policy 
landscape regarding this drug.  Public opinion polling has catalogued a rapid turn towards 
majority support for legalization (and overwhelming support for medical provisions), and 
has been confirmed by additional medical marijuana programs in new states and, for the 
first time in the history of this prohibition, two states legalized recreational use for adults 
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21 and over.  For proponents and opponents of marijuana use alike (medical or 
otherwise), the findings presented in this study may offer insight into strategies for future 
ballot measures and identifies key medical marijuana battleground states.  Marijuana will 
continue to be cantankerous political issue, deeply divided along partisan lines, but, for 
now, the tide appears to be turning. 
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CHAPTER III 
PATCHES OF GREEN:  EXPLAINING VARIATION IN MEDICAL CARDHOLDER  
 
RATES BETWEEN OREGON COUNTIES 
 
Introduction 
In November 1998, Oregon voters approved a ballot measure legalizing the 
cultivation, possession, and consumption of marijuana for qualified medical patients24.  
Since its inception, the Oregon Medical Marijuana Program (OMMP) has experienced 
significant growth, starting with several hundred patients in 1998 and expanding to over 
55,000 registered marijuana users today, of which over half grow their own supply of the 
drug25.  The explosive development of the program has surprised many, including 
legislators, law enforcement officials, and the state agency tasked with overseeing it.  An 
interesting trend has emerged under this regime of rapid growth:  despite relatively 
homogenous health statistics for the major afflictions covered under the OMMP, Oregon 
counties have widely divergent rates of participation in the program.  As Figure 3-1 
illustrates, the rate of cardholders in each county (relative to population) varies  
significantly.  Using 2011 data to construct confidence intervals on cardholder rates leads 
to a data-driven tripartite division; 8 counties exceed the 95% confidence interval, 10 fall 
within it, and 18 fall below the 5% confidence interval.  This division appears relatively 
consistent over time; data collection at the county level began in 2005, and since that time 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!24!To qualify, patients must obtain a doctor’s recommendation stating that marijuana may provide a benefit 
to them.  Qualifying conditions include agitation related to Alzheimer’s disease, cachexia, cancer, 
glaucoma, HIV or AIDS, nausea, severe pain, seizures, or persistent muscle spasms. 
25 Oregon Department of Human Services.!
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a small cadre of counties have consistently ranked ahead of their counterparts (Appendix 
3-1 presents historical cardholder rates in Oregon counties).   
 
Figure 3-1. Oregon Cardholder Prevalence by County, 2011 
 
Several southern Oregon counties (Josephine, Curry, Coos, and Douglas) emerge as the 
de facto flag-bearers for medical marijuana cards, while a handful of other counties 
(Tillamook, Lincoln, Jackson, and Wasco) also consistently score much higher than their 
counterparts.  Looking at the most extreme example from recent data (see Appendix 3-1), 
top-ranked Josephine county has a cardholder rate more than 9x higher than last-ranked 
Umatilla county (34.98 patients / 1000 residents vs. 4.84 patients /1000 residents, 
respectively).  Rates of cardholder growth in each county are also highly variable, though 
all counties in Oregon have experienced rapid expansion in the last few years, with an 
astonishing average growth rate of 41% between 2010 and 2011. 
 The startling differences in cardholder rates and the lack of any existing studies 
on medical marijuana prevalence drives the research question for this study:  why do 
Oregon counties have such divergent rates of participation in the state medical marijuana 
program?   
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Literature Review 
Who Uses Marijuana and Why? 
Marijuana is the most widely used illicit drug in the United States, with 16.7 
million US residents estimated to have used the drug in the last 30 days and 4 million 
using it 300 days per year or more (SAMSHA 2009: 13; 27).  Males are nearly twice as 
likely to report using marijuana regularly as females, and individuals between the ages of 
18 and 25 are the prime demographic group of consumers (21; 17).  Despite the near-
monopoly on use by young people, older adults are increasing their use of marijuana in 
the US as the baby-boomer generation ages (DeNitto and Chol 2011).  With the 
exception of Asian Americans, non-whites are more likely to use marijuana than whites 
(SAMSHA 2009: 24).  College graduates are less likely to be current users than those 
with lower educational attainment, though more likely to have tried marijuana (24).  
Additionally, individuals who are employed full time have lower rates of use than those 
who are either unemployed or working part time (25).  Finally, rates of use increase 
monotonically with city/area of residence population size (26).   
Investigations into the causal factors responsible for marijuana experimentation 
traditionally focused on attributes of individuals:  i.e., “What characteristics predispose or 
otherwise condition people to use an illegal, psychoactive substance?” (Marcovitz and 
Meyers 1944; Gaskill 1945; Charen and Perelman 1946; Kaplan et al. 1986; Kandel 
1986).  More structural approaches have emerged in recent years, which attempt to chart 
the causal, explanatory power of a variety of social forces (family structure and attitudes, 
school characteristics, demographic attributes, city size, economic circumstances, etc.). 
Empirical studies of marijuana use are robust for adolescents (both initiating use and 
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continuing use), sparse for young adults, and relatively non-existent for those over 31 
years of age.  Since participation in the OMMP is almost uniformly reserved for 
individuals over the age of 18, a description of research on young adults and adults 
follows. 
Young Adults 
Mauss (1969) situates marijuana experimentation within the context of college 
preparation, arguing that many university-bound high school students begin use before 
matriculating to assist in the cultural assimilation process.  Conversely, Brown (1974) 
finds that college students cease marijuana use following graduation, citing social 
pressures of work, family, and social integration as key causal factors.  Yamaguchi and 
Kandel (1985) use cross-sectional event history analysis to demonstrate that marijuana 
use is negatively related to marriage and becoming a parent, yet positively related with 
separation/divorce.  This research design was replicated and validated with longitudinal 
data by Yamaguchi (1997).  
Jackson et al. (1986) rely on a survey of 15+ year olds to assess the validity of 
Differential Association (DA) theory, finding that individuals who excessively associate 
with “definitions favorable to crime and/or deviance tends to increase 
crime/deviance…but this effect is mainly indirect, through increasing motivation to 
engage in deviant acts” (335).  Though the dependent variable in their study was a self-
prediction of future deviant activity (with marijuana use included as one possible 
activity), the authors view these results as supporting a key tenet of DA theory—namely, 
that “association, through its effect on motive, consistently led to increases in self-
predicted crime” (349).    
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Tittle et al. (1986), on the other hand, asserts that marijuana use does not follow 
the expectations of DA theory; rather, for marijuana smokers, they find that “(1) the 
reciprocal reinforcement between association and perceived acceptance of crime 
completely disappears; (2) association has a smaller positive effect on motive; and (3) 
tolerance increases perceived acceptance which, in turn, increases the motive to use 
marijuana” (423).  These findings indicate that marijuana users move to this specific form 
of deviant behavior through two mechanisms:  (1) “a weak and questionable immediate 
effect via motive” and (2) “a more indirect but more significant path in which association 
produces tolerance, which ultimately increases crime” (423).   
Association, for both Jackson et al. (1986) and Tittle et al. (1986), is the key 
causal force predicting future use of marijuana for young adults; however, they differ in 
their explanations as to how association works—does it impact motive or produce 
tolerance, or both? 
 Adults 
Research on adult marijuana use is largely restricted to substance abuse studies 
(see Stephens et al. 1993; McBride et al. 1994; Haney et al. 1999; Budney et al. 2001; 
McRae et al. 2003) or deleterious health effect examinations (such as Gong et al. 1987; 
Hall and Solowij 1999; Gruber and Yurgelun-Todd 2005).  Ogborne et al. (2000) 
conducted a phone survey of Ontario, Canada residents to assess the prevalence of 
marijuana use (medical and recreational) among the adult population; their findings 
indicate that 8.7% of adults used marijuana in the previous year, with 1.9% of the users 
reporting that it was for various medical purposes.  Age (18-25), gender (males), cigarette 
smoking, and heavy alcohol use were highly correlated with marijuana use. 
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Recent research indicates that marijuana use clusters together at multiple 
geographic scales (Ennett et al. 1997; Bobashev and Anthony 1998; Cerdá et al. 2012; 
Fur-Holden et al. 2011).  This clustering phenomenon is present between states, within 
states, and neighborhoods.  Cerdá et al. (2012) find that states with medical marijuana 
programs have higher rates of marijuana use than their non-medical counterparts.  The 
causal implications of this finding are that states with higher rates of use are more likely 
to implement medical programs, rather than medical programs leading to higher rates of 
use (a point confirmed by Anderson et al. 2012).  Bobasheve and Anthony (1998) 
identify clustering patterns of marijuana use in neighborhoods, though no causal 
mechanism for this phenomenon is presented.  Similarly, Furr-Holden et al. (2011) 
employ a measure of “neighborhood disorder” (operationalized as the number of 
abandoned buildings within a city block) and find that it is highly correlated with 
marijuana use over time.  Abandoned buildings, while not as robust an indicator as more 
comprehensive economic data, provide a starting point for examining structural 
differences that emerge within economically depressed communities.  One can posit that 
other indicators, such as unemployment rates or the vitality of regionally specific 
economic activities, could be implemented as meaningful determinants of marijuana 
consumption.  While such studies are useful in identifying users of illegal marijuana for 
recreational purposes and predicting future use by individuals, they do not address the 
quasi-legal consumption of medical marijuana, nor do they grapple with the additional 
qualification presented by the Oregon medical marijuana law allowing for personal 
production of the drug. 
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Medical Use 
Reinarman et al. (2011) provides the lone scholarly attempt at identifying medical 
marijuana users.  Using a sample of 1,746 patients from nine separate medical marijuana 
clinics in California, the authors find that Blacks and Native Americans use at higher 
rates than other ethnic groups, while Latinos and Asians have lower rates of use (Whites 
are near the average for all groups).  Use is heaviest in the 25-44 year age range, and 
males made up 73% of the sample.  Chronic pain suppression and improved sleep were 
the most commonly cited uses/benefits of marijuana reported by subjects (82.6% and 
70.7%, respectively).  Other conditions/uses of medical marijuana included relaxation 
(55%), muscle spasms (41%), headaches (41%), anxiety (38%), nausea (28%), and 
depression (26%).  
Who Grows Marijuana and Why? 
Due to the nearly worldwide prohibition and concomitant secrecy surrounding 
marijuana cultivation, few studies examine the demographic composition and rationales 
of growers.  The application of criminologic theories to marijuana producers radically 
differs depending on the stated rationales of growers; after surveying Weisheit (1992) and 
Decorte’s (2010) findings, the range of possible theoretical explanations is revisited. 
Weisheit’s (1992) qualitative study of arrested growers in Illinois offers the most 
detail and insight into this phenomenon, though it is limited by an admittedly small 
sample size and narrow geographic scope.  Weisheit identified police cases involving the 
cultivation of 20 or more plants in Illinois (n=74) and attempted to interview the 
defendants; the growers interviewed (n=31) were overwhelmingly white, nearly all male, 
middle age (median: 38), simultaneously employed in other professions, often highly 
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educated, had not been arrested for other major crimes, and were long-term residents of 
their respective communities (159; 71-73).  Building on the in-depth interviews, Weisheit 
constructs a typology of growers based on their stated rationales and the size of their 
growing operations (hustlers, pragmatists, and communal growers).   
Hustlers are entrepreneurs involved in marijuana production “because it is a 
business challenge,” and are involved with large-scale, highly lucrative operations (as 
well as other legitimate businesses) (41).  This type of grower acts as a coordinator of 
satellite employees, provides start-up money and plants, and, relying on connections with 
large dealers, serves as a purchasing agent for smaller growers; they are not involved in 
the day-to-day growing operations and are the most rare of cannabis producers (42).  Due 
to the size of their operations, individual hustlers “may contribute significantly to the 
illicit marijuana trade” (75).  As Weisheit notes, (between 1987 and 1989 in Illinois), 
criminal justice “cases involving 100 or more plants accounted for 15 percent of the cases 
but 92 percent of the plants” (76).    
Pragmatists “enter the marijuana business out of economic necessity and approach 
the activity with no moral or philosophical righteousness” (43).  As opposed to hustlers, 
pragmatists are not in the business to get rich; rather, they use marijuana production as a 
temporary means of survival.  Some of the interviewed subjects who fell in this category 
were farmers (soybeans, corn, and wheat) who were attempting to mitigate the effects of 
depressed agricultural commodity prices (89).  Additionally, this type of grower 
“demonstrate[s] that growing marijuana for profit requires no commitment to a drug 
lifestyle or even a ‘liberal’ or tolerant attitude toward drugs in general”; some do not use 
the drug and others are outspoken critics of its impact on society (45).  The size of their 
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growing operations directly relate to their monetary needs, but are typically much smaller 
than the hustler’s. 
Communal growers “cultivate marijuana as part of a larger lifestyle,” which 
usually begins with regular cannabis use; they often graduate to growing “for their own 
consumption, either to defray the costs of their habit or as a hobby” (45).  For these 
cultivators—who “probably represent the single largest category of growers”—marijuana 
production is variably regarded as a means of self-sufficiency, short-term economic 
stimulus, a “personal statement of independence or rebellion,” a way of validating self-
worth, and a didactic opportunity to gain gardening/farming skills.  Many of these 
growers are said to sell small amounts of marijuana, but also give it away to close 
friends; growing operations are typically small in size (45, 74).  Where hustlers and 
pragmatists are profit-oriented (to varying degrees), the communal grower is driven by 
“the spiritual, the social, or the intrinsic rewards of growing” (88).   
Spiritual rewards were those feelings of satisfaction expressed in almost 
transcendental terms.  Social rewards included the pride that came from 
impressing fellow growers and users with a highly potent product or with 
a product with an unusual form of high. Finally, intrinsic rewards were the 
feelings of self-satisfaction that arose from the process of growing itself 
and were comparable to the feelings of many people who become deeply 
enmeshed in hobbies.  The frequency with which growers reported 
feelings of pride and satisfaction from their operation suggested that 
understanding what motivates marijuana growers requires an appreciation 
of these intangible rewards (99-100).   
 
In addition to revealing varying personal motivations of growers, Weisheit also finds 
distinct variations in marijuana garden seizures between regions within Illinois, with most 
occurring in the southern-most counties—despite the fact that northern counties are home 
to much of the agricultural production in the state.  Furthermore, the number of garden 
seizures does not appear related to several commonly cited social and economic factors 
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(population density, percent below the poverty line, unemployment rate, crime rate, 
percent minority) (69).  With these findings in mind, Weisheit states: 
It is clear that whatever impact economic factors have is not direct.  These 
economic and social factors may interact with other cultural features of 
these regions to shape the production of marijuana.  Further study of these 
patterns may be useful in explaining patterns of marijuana growing in 
other states as well (69-70). 
 
Though this information is quickly becoming historical (Weisheit’s work is derived from 
research conducted in the late 1980s) and it focused on individuals growing 20 or more 
plants, more recent studies offer corroborating evidence.  
Decorte (2010) implemented a web-based survey of cannabis cultivators in 
Belgium (n=659) and found similar results—though important differences emerged as 
well.  Basic demographic information gathered on age (mean: 28.5), gender (88.5% 
male), marital or relationship status (77.5% unmarried, 66.5% in a “steady” relationship), 
and educational attainment (47.6% college graduates) indicate strong similarities to 
Weisheit’s conclusions.  On the other hand, the self-reported size of growing operations 
was much smaller (over 75% were growing 10 plants or less) and money was less of a 
motivating factor for growing (68% claimed to have never sold their marijuana).  As 
Decorte notes,  
On average, 67.2% of the cannabis harvested by our participants was 
intended for personal use, and another 22.8% was given away:  mostly to 
friends (19.3%), and on occasion to acquaintances (2.4%), anyone who 
asks (0.4%), or for medical use (0.7%).  Very little of the cannabis 
harvested by our respondents is sold (9.0%) to friends, acquaintances, or 
others (356). 
 
Outdoor growing dominated the Illinois study, but only accounted for 53.2% of the 
Belgian grows (35.1% reported using artificial lighting in either greenhouses or indoor 
operations).  This is not surprising given the shift from outdoor to indoor growing due to 
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stricter enforcement of marijuana prohibition in many industrialized countries and harsh 
crackdowns on large-scale international smuggling operations opening the door to high 
quality domestic cannabis production (Weisheit 2011).  A final piece of relevant data 
gleaned from these surveys details the average weight obtained per marijuana plant 
harvested, with outdoor plants weighing in at 63.7 grams and indoor plants producing 
48.8 grams.  
 The distinct rationales for growing proffered by marijuana producers suggests 
multiple theoretical explanations are necessary.  Traditional theories of deviance (DA, 
social learning, labeling, and social control theories) are still applicable, but, to date, have 
not achieved significant descriptive power outside of users.  More structurally oriented 
theories, such as social strain theory (Merton 1938), differential opportunity (Cloward 
and Ohlin 1960) and Marxist approaches to deviance (Spitzer 1975) appear most fertile 
for application to the subculture of deviant marijuana growers. 
 Merton (1938) assumes that deviant activity is generated from the tension of two 
social forces—cultural goals and institutional norms—acting upon individuals (673).  
Merton’s typology of individual orientations to cultural goals and institutional norms (see 
Figure 2) creates five groups:  conformists and innovators (who accept dominant cultural 
goals), ritualists and retreatists (who reject dominant cultural goals), and rebels 
(developers of new goals and institutions).  When an individual internalizes the dominant 
cultural goals of American society (material success), they either adhere to the 
institutionalized means of achieving “success,” or reject them in favor of illegitimate 
avenues (674).  If someone rejects the dominant cultural goals, they either adhere to 
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institutional norms or reject them.  The majority of society both accepts cultural goals 
and the institutional means to attain them. 
!
Figure 3-2.  Merton’s Typology of Deviance 
Growers who are predominantly profit seeking clearly fit as “innovators,” whereas those 
who operate with other goals in mind are not easily categorized.  In Weisheit’s (1992) 
interviews, many growers indicated that marijuana either brought them extra money 
(since the majority were simultaneously employed in other professions) or offset the cost 
of buying on the black market (which seems to fit the innovative category); however, the 
largest group—communal growers—espoused a myriad of rationales for their activities.  
Where does marijuana cultivation as a political statement, validation of self-worth, 
didactic opportunity to learn farming skills, to provide for friends and family, or as 
spiritual practice fit in this typology?  Knowing that many growers are educated, 
integrated in their communities, and legitimately employed in other professions (Weisheit 
1992; Decorte 2010) also poses a significant analytical problem:  are marijuana growers 
wholly defined by this particular act of deviance or can their aggregate constellation of 
social features allow them to be pot-producing conformists (Bourdieu 1984)? 
 59 
Cloward and Olin (1960) expand strain theory by describing the role of 
differential opportunity structures available to individuals, positing that the specialized 
knowledge and social connections required to carry out particular illegitimate means is 
not equally accessed.  This is particularly applicable to cannabis production, especially in 
the pre-internet days.  Colloquially, the stories of retreatist hippies flocking to rural, west 
coast counties to “get back to the land” in the 1960s and 70s are well known (Schlosser 
2003; Decorte 2011); areas of Northern California and Southern Oregon are widely cited 
by marijuana aficionados as “hot spots” of cultivation (King 2001).  These areas are ideal 
cultural transmission centers, where specific knowledge of evading the law to carve out a 
living could be passed down from generation to generation, or to anyone else able to gain 
entry into the appropriate social circles.  This type of hypothetical enculturation is very 
similar to the alcohol prohibition’s Appalachian moonshiners (Stewart 2011). 
Spitzer’s (1975) Marxian approach to deviance illuminates some of the 
underlying paradoxes present in data collected about marijuana growers.  Taking the 
monopoly stage of capitalism (Baran and Sweezy 1966) as the dominant historical 
condition shaping social relations, Spitzer argues that increasing competition amongst 
laborers (largely due to automation and other labor saving devices) and oligopolic market 
control by the largest firms has created persistent social turmoil in the form of class 
struggle.  Large swaths of the laboring class are viewed by elites as problematic; Spitzer 
categorizes these groups as “social junk” (unneeded laborers with few marketable skills) 
and “social dynamite” (those critical of the capitalist system) (645).  In the case of “social 
junk…controls are usually designed to regulate and contain rather than eliminate and 
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suppress the problem” (645). Social dynamite, on the other hand, pose significant risk 
when they:  
“actively call into question established relationships, especially relations 
of production and domination.  Generally, therefore, social dynamite tends 
to be more youthful, alienated and politically volatile.  The control of 
social dynamite is usually premised on an assumption that the problem is 
acute in nature, requiring a rapid and focused expenditure of control 
resources.  This is in contrast to the handling of social junk frequently 
based on a belief that the problem is chronic and best controlled through 
broad reactive, rather than intensive and selective measures.  
Correspondingly, social dynamite is normal processed through the legal 
system with its capacity for active intervention, while social junk is 
frequently (but not always) administered by the agencies and agents of the 
therapeutic and welfare state (646). 
 
Data on marijuana producers suggests that many are educated, young, and male (Decorte 
2010), and many espouse philosophical positions that are antagonistic towards capitalism 
and established political institutions (Weisheit 1992).  The duality of many growers’ 
lives—both committing felonies and engaging in regular civic responsibilities—presents 
a problem for policy makers in the sense that these individuals are not actively 
challenging the underpinnings of capitalism (surplus accumulation), and, outside of large 
criminal enterprises, marijuana is not associated with significant levels of violence 
(Kepple 2012).  Spitzer’s theoretical prescriptions for reigning in deviant behavior 
suggest that US policy makers can:  (1) normalize the behavior (i.e. legalize marijuana 
production in some fashion), (2) convert marijuana growers into drug enforcement 
agents, (3) hope to contain growers by selectively enforcing the existing laws, or (4) 
surreptitiously support large criminal enterprises which undercut smaller growers’ 
usefulness (649). 
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Literature Conclusions 
Geographically bounded pockets of marijuana users, such as those identified by 
this study within Oregon, are confirmed at several levels of analysis; however, no causal 
mechanisms for this unequal distribution are known, though social disorganization and 
economic malaise are suggested by other studies.  Colleges and universities appear linked 
to higher rates of use because of the age and life-stage of attendees, and more accepting 
peer attitudes towards the drug.  While no one has examined the political affiliations of 
users, attitudinal evidence suggests that Democrats have a more favorable view of the 
drug and areas with a higher prevalence of individuals from this party are likely to have 
higher rates of use.      
Methods 
 
I construct two classes of explanatory models using political, social, economic, 
and ecological variables at the county-level to disentangle the relationship between 
medical marijuana cardholder rates and the specified structural forces at work in Oregon.  
The first models are cross-sectional OLS regression analysis applied to 2008 data, while 
the second are Prais-Winsten panel-corrected standard errors time-series models (AR(1)) 
utilizing Feasible Generalized Least Squares (FGLS), applied to 2005-2011 data 
(Chatfield 2004).  In all models, the dependent variable is “cardholder count,” which is 
operationalized as the number of registered medical marijuana patients in each county.  
Cardholder data for each county is derived from the Oregon Department of Human 
Services and covers 2005-2011, using published figures from January 1st of each year26.  !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!26!Data for certain counties is excluded from public dissemination by ODHS due to patient 
confidentiality issues; any county with less than 50 registered medical marijuana patients in a 
particular year is treated as missing.!!
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To maintain appropriate time-order, I then lag cardholder counts by one year, essentially 
using the January data as a cumulative indicator for the previous year (i.e. 2006 card rates 
are used as the dependent variable for year 2005); this is appropriate since the 
independent variables used in this analysis are derived from aggregated year-end data as 
well.  Independent variable operationalization and data source explication follows. 
Political 
Public opinion polling consistently demonstrates that Democratic political party 
affiliation strongly correlates with positive views on marijuana legalization and medical 
marijuana applications, though this explanatory variable is heavily mediated by 
geography and time (the West is home to the highest support levels, while positive views 
of legalization has increased consistently in the last 30 years).  While Oregon—like many 
states—has a significant rural/urban political divide, county-level cardholder rates appear 
to defy this traditional dichotomy; for example, the de facto leader in the county 
cardholder rate race—Josephine—is primarily rural, Republican, and heavily dependent 
upon resource extraction, yet it is home to a 3.6x higher rate of cardholders than the 
urban, Democratic, and multifaceted economy of Multnomah county.  Additionally, 
county cardholder density appears unrelated to county-level voting on the original 
medical marijuana ballot initiative.  These confounding inconsistencies aside, I 
hypothesize that Democratic party membership is positively related to cardholder rates in 
Oregon counties.  I operationalize political party affiliation as the number individuals 
registered with the Democratic party in each county.  Voter registration data from 
January 2005-January 2011 is derived from the Oregon Secretary of State publications 
(Elections Division 2011).  
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Social 
On its face, the primary differences between previous studies of marijuana use 
and this project stems from the legality of cannabis consumption and the unit of analysis.  
While many of the commonly cited social variables undoubtedly help to explain why 
individuals participate in the OMMP, they are not amenable to higher levels of analysis.  
Additionally, the basic requirement for obtaining a medical marijuana card in Oregon is 
medical necessity—cardholders must demonstrate that they suffer from one of the 
included conditions and receive a recommendation from a licensed doctor indicating that 
marijuana may be beneficial to them.  Unfortunately, county-level epidemiological data 
on qualifying conditions does not exist; this is unfortunate, as current figures on the 
conditions reported by participants in the OMMP program suggest that the overwhelming 
majority suffer from “severe pain,” and Hoffman et al. (2002) identify a discrepancy in 
chronic pain incidence between urban and rural residents.  Consequently, the most 
appropriate social variable—affliction prevalence—is not used in this study. 
Following findings of related literature, social variables include county-level 
population (obtained from the Population Research Center at Portland State University), 
land area (reported in the Oregon Blue Book (2010)), the presence of a state university 
within the county (operationalized as a dichotomous measure), and the presence of a 
Metropolitan Statistical Area (MSA) in the county (also operationalized as a dichotomous 
measure—MSA data obtained from the US Census Bureau’s 2010 census).  Additionally, 
educational attainment, operationalized as the percent of county residents holding a 
bachelor’s degree or higher (derived from US Census Bureau data). 
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Economic 
 Due to its prohibition in the United States, marijuana commands a high price 
relative to many other agricultural commodities.  Prices range from $1800 to $7000 per 
pound, depending on where and in what quantity the marijuana is sold (DEA 2005).  In 
addition to providing in-state legal protection for authorized consumption of marijuana, 
the Oregon Medical Marijuana Act licenses individuals or their registered growers to 
produce cannabis.  While the scale of allowed production is small, a registered cardholder 
could, depending on their horticultural skills, illegally sell their produced marijuana for a 
small profit. 
This economic reality is the basis for claims by law enforcement officials in 
Oregon (Fattig 2010) that the medical marijuana program simply serves as a legal shield 
for profit-oriented cultivators—or “pragmatists,” following Weisheit’s (1992) typology.  
If this is the case, it is reasonable to expect that certain economic indicators--
unemployment counts and rates are used in this study—within a county should be 
positively related with cardholder rates.  Contrarily, Weisheit (1992) and Decorte (2010) 
both found that the majority of the growers interviewed were simultaneously employed in 
another occupation while producing cannabis; however, the current economic contraction 
in Oregon has produced both higher jobless rates and fewer hours worked by those with 
jobs (US Bureau of Labor Statistics 2010).  For both pragmatists and communal growers, 
marijuana production is regarded as an economic buoy to maintain an accustomed 
standard of living.  While incorporating the number of hours worked by those employed 
would be a sensible strategy, county-level data on this measure does not exist.  Instead, I 
use unemployment figures (counts of unemployed workers in each county) for January 
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2005-January 2011 (unadjusted), obtained from the Oregon Labor Market Information 
System, as an independent variable in both regression models.  
Keeping with previous research on the positive relationship between marijuana 
consumption and economic malaise in a region, I also examine timber harvests in 
Oregon.  Timber harvests were a harbinger of economic health in Oregon for the better 
part of a century; recently, more efficient mills—combined with lower timber harvests 
and loosened international trade regulations—have decimated forest products 
employment in the state.  Foster (2002: 121) provides the definitive summary of the 
political economy of northwest timber production in recent years:  
In the 1980s, forest product workers in the Northwest were hit by a 
process of industrial restructuring that seriously undermined their 
economic positions and their capacity to engage in effective class 
struggles.  These included: (1) a drastic drop in housing starts; (2) 
increased exports of unprocessed logs coupled with rising excess capacity 
in Northwest mills; (3) a vastly stepped-up rate of imports of lumber from 
Canada (which had the effect of creating deep fissures between Canadian 
and U.S. workers within the International Woodworkers of America); (4) 
rapid declines in employment due to mechanization; (5) wage competition 
from Southern wood workers (who earned almost $3 an hour less on 
average in 1986 than their Northwest counterparts); and (6) a general shift 
of the industry from the Northwest to the Southeast, where faster growing 
pine plantations and right to work laws provide a greater ‘comparative 
advantage’ in timber production.  Of all of these factors affecting 
Northwest timber employment, automation has been the most important.  
In 1987 it took only eight workers to process one million board feet of 
timber, compared to ten workers a decade earlier.  In 1976, a total of 15 
bbf of timber was harvested from all sources in Oregon and Washington, 
giving employment to 150,900 workers in the lumber and wood products 
and paper and allied products industries.  In 1989, the same total harvest 
level employed 135,700 or about 10 percent fewer workers.  In Oregon, 
the state with the largest old-growth forests, employment in the lumber 
and wood products industries declined by 21.9 percent between 1978 and 
1990, with 71 percent of this decline occurring between 1978 and 1988, 
before the northern spotted owl became a major issue.  
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The debate on appropriate timber harvest levels, forest products employment issues, 
species protection, and ecosystem preservation still rages in Oregon, though, as Foster 
illustrates, the debate needs to be reframed from the oft-cited industry vs. 
environmentalist dichotomy to one of capitalist vs. laborers—and must consider the role 
of efficiency advances as well.  Due to the major economic role of forest products in 
many Oregon counties, I include the total timber harvest data (2005-2011, in millions of 
board feet) for each county (an aggregation of harvests from private industry land, other 
private lands, Native American, State, BLM, Forest Service, and other public lands, 
measured in thousands of board feet)—this data is derived from Oregon Department of 
Forestry publications. 
Ecological 
Cannabis indica is day-length sensitive annual that matures in Oregon between 
September-November.  It thrives in a warm climate (70F-90F), low relative humidity 
(40%-60%), minimal variation in day/night temperatures (+/- 10F), and rich, well-drained 
soil (Hillig 2005; Cervantes 2006).  While most locations in Oregon are suitable for 
marijuana cultivation, certain areas offer distinct advantages.  Southwestern Oregon, the 
Willamette Valley, and areas along the Columbia River Gorge have long, predictable 
growing seasons coupled with relatively dry summers—though cannabis production has 
some agriculturally unique considerations to account for. 
Due to prohibition and aggressive eradication efforts by government agencies 
(federal, state, and local) in the 1980s, many growers turned to indoor cultivation.  To 
facilitate this dramatic change in environment, marijuana growers/breeders introduced 
broad leaf cannabis indica into the long-flowering, narrow leaf cannabis indica gene 
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pool; the result is a faster and denser flowering plant that remains relatively short in 
stature (Clarke 1993).  However, this creative breeding strategy fomented a number of 
unforeseen latent consequences.  Shorter internodal distances between branches provide a 
fertile breeding ground for voracious spider mite colonies.  Denser flower clusters make 
plants more susceptible to a number of pathogens (botrytis and powdery mildew), 
particularly in late flower stages.  The quick-maturation genes make many modern 
cannabis cultivars extremely sensitive to changes in day-length and prone to inopportune 
early flowering27 (Cervantes 2006).  
In Oregon, the main determining factors in successful outdoor marijuana 
production is prolific sunlight, appropriate temperatures, and minimal late season rainfall.  
In agricultural research, growing degree-day figures—a measure of temperature degrees 
above the minimum and below the maximum for a specific crop over time—are often 
employed as composite measures for sunlight and temperature.  In this study, I 
operationalize a degree-day measure using cannabis-specific thresholds (50F minimum, 
100F maximum) over the normal outdoor growing season (April 1st-October 31st) in 
each county (Clarke 1993).  Degree-day data is derived from meteorological station 
readings throughout Oregon, and aggregated by the Oregon State University Climate 
Research Service; stations were selected based on their proximity to population centers 
within respective counties and, in several instances, more remote stations are utilized due 
to data gaps in the primary climate station data.  Though this form of ecological 
measurement is only applicable to outdoor marijuana cultivation, I expect a positive !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!27!Early flowering is generally viewed as a benefit, as it leads to quicker harvests; however, light-
cycle sensitivity can trigger premature early-season flowering that dramatically reduces the 
quality and quantity of yields.!
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relationship between cumulative degree-days and cardholder rates.  Inclusion of late-
season rainfall data was attempted, but not included due to serious gaps in weather station 
data for the years included in this study. 
Results 
To test the hypotheses proposed above, I construct two classes of regression 
models:  (1) cross-sectional OLS regression models using 2008 data, and (2) Prais-
Winsten time-series models with 2005-2011 data.  Primary results are presented in Tables 
3-1 and 3-2.  The cross-sectional models appear in Table 3-1.   
Table 3-1.  Cross-Sectional (2008) OLS Regression Models (Std. Error) 
 
DV:  
Cardholders 
Model 1 
(N = 27) 
Model 2 
(N = 27) 
Model 3 
(N = 27) 
Model 4 
(N = 27) 
Unemployment -.01 
(.02) 
-.03* 
(.01) 
-.03** 
(.01) 
-.05*** 
(.01) 
Timber Harvests 1.23 
(.59) 
.99 
(.49) 
.84 
(.46) 
--- 
Degree Days .16 
(.10) 
.15 
(.09) 
.14 
(.09) 
--- 
Democrat -.06 
(.10) 
-.14* 
(.06) 
-.16** 
(.05) 
-.16** 
(.05) 
Land Area -.02 
(.04) 
-.02 
(.03) 
--- --- 
State University 233.72 
(189.15) 
--- --- --- 
MSA 65.56 
(207.62) 
--- --- --- 
Education -24.8 
(17.62) 
-5.93 
(8.01) 
--- --- 
Self Employment 69.07 
(32.84) 
51 
(28.8) 
39.28 
(25.12) 
--- 
2008 Obama Vote 9.29 
(13.34) 
--- 
 
--- --- 
Poverty 32.10 
(28.14) 
18.77 
(22.41) 
--- -- 
 
Population .006 
(.004) 
.01*** 
(.00) 
.01*** 
(.00) 
.01*** 
(.00) 
Constant  -1865 -1232 -890 90 
Adj. R2 .86 .87 .88 .87 
* = p < .05, ** = p < .01, *** = p < .001 
 
In model 1, a wide variety of theoretically appropriate independent variables are 
included, but no statistically significant findings are present.  The direction of 
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relationship between several variables of interest are as hypothesized; degree days, 
presence of a state university and a metropolitan statistical area, carrying President 
Obama in the 2008 election, poverty rates, self-employment rates, and population are all 
positively related with county cardholder counts.  Most variables with negative 
coefficients, however, undermine several key hypotheses:  unemployment, Democratic 
party affiliation, and land area have a negative impact on cardholder counts within 
Oregon counties.  Education attainment, as predicted, is negatively related as well.  
Timber harvests—which were hypothesized to be negatively related—are, instead, 
positively related to cardholder counts.  Standard errors for four variables (state 
university presence, metropolitan statistical area presence, voting for Obama, and poverty 
rates) are problematically large, so they are dropped in later iterations of the regression 
model.  Model 2 provides several statistically significant findings that hold in Models 3 
and 4, but the magnitude of effect is relatively limited.  Unemployment, Democratic party 
affiliation, and total population are significant at the .01 level.  Specifically, cardholder 
counts in each county: (1) decline by .03-.05 with each unemployed person; (2) decline 
by .16 with each registered Democrat; and (3) increase .01 with each person.  All of the 
cross-sectional models possess strong explanatory power (Adj. R2 range .86-.88), likely 
due to the strong relationship between population and cardholder counts (which accounts 
for 74% of the variation about the mean on its own). 
Time-series findings (Table 3-2) indicate that changes in timber harvests, number 
of registered Democrats, and population are statistically significant correlates with 
changes in medical marijuana cardholder counts in counties across Oregon.  The 
direction of relationship for counts of registered Democrat, presence of a state university, 
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presence of a metropolitan statistical area, timber harvests, and unemployment run 
counter to the proposed hypotheses.  Degree days, land area, and population are 
positively related (as expected); however, neither of the first two factors appear 
significant in this analysis.  
Table 3-2.  Prais-Winsten PCSE Regression Models, 2005-11 
 
DV:  
Cardholders 
1 
(N = 156) 
2 
(N = 156) 
3 
(N = 192) 
Unemployment Rate 63.90*** 
(11.22) 
60.75*** 
(9.90) 
78.91* 
(33.81) 
Timber Harvests 1.11*** 
(.15) 
1.08*** 
(.14) 
.99*** 
(.19) 
Degree Days .18** 
(.06) 
.17* 
(.07) 
--- 
 
Democrat -.18*** 
(.03) 
-.18*** 
(.02) 
-.18* 
(.08) 
Land Area -.01 
(.01) 
--- 
 
---- 
State University 103.44 
(62.17) 
--- --- 
MSA 78.14* 
(39.34) 
--- --- 
Population 003*** 
(.00) 
.007*** 
(.00) 
.008*** 
(.00) 
Constant -923.19 
(228.85) 
-870.59 
(206.36) 
-695.99 
(355.29) 
Adj. R2  .77 .77 .66 
* = p < .05, ** = p < .01, *** = p < .001 
 
In all three models, changes in the unemployment rate, timber harvest levels, and 
population are positively related with changes in medical marijuana cardholder rates, 
while changes in the count of Democratic party members is negatively related.  Overall, 
each 1% increase in a county’s rate of unemployment coincides with an increase of 60-79 
cardholders.  Timber harvest coefficients suggest that an additional .99 to 1.11 million 
board feet harvested is associated with 1 additional cardholder in any Oregon county.  
Similarly, model 3 indicates that a county will lose approximately 1 cardholder for every 
5 people registered with the Democratic party.  Finally, model 3 predicts that 1 
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cardholder will be added to the rolls for every 125 people present in a county.  While not 
as robust as the cross-sectional models, Adj. R2 values suggest that approximately 66%-
77% of the variation about the mean is captured by these explanatory variables.   
Examining individual counties provides a more specific lens to examine the 
relationship between several key variables, particularly timber harvest levels, 
unemployment rates, and population.  This set of individual, county-level time-series 
model results provide the most interesting findings, in that they isolate specific counties 
where unemployment rates and timber harvest levels explain significant variation in 
cardholder rates.  The most common result is a positive relationship between 
unemployment rates and cardholder counts, and a negative relationship between timber 
harvest levels and cardholder rates, though county-level coefficients vary amongst 
counties with statistically significant findings for both variables (Table 3-3).   
Table 3-3.  County-Specific Prais-Winsten Time-Series Models 
 
County 
DV = 
Cardholders 
n Unemployment 
Rate 
Timber 
Harvests 
Population Constant Adj. R2 DWS 
(t) 
Baker 5 -4.12 
(26.22) 
-5.14 
(14.99) 
.04 
(3.72) 
-614 .83 2.33 
Benton 5 20.15 
(12.40) 
-2.55* 
(.80) 
-.01 
(.01) 
1122 .96 2.12 
Clackamas 6 80.89* 
(8.73) 
-13.51** 
(1.23) 
-.00 
(.00) 
4496 .99 2.49 
Clatsop 7 8.32 
(5.12) 
-.39* 
(.09) 
.08* 
(.01) 
-2828 .97 2.63 
Columbia 7 17.11 
(6.09) 
-1.67* 
(.43) 
.03 
(.02) 
-1023 .95 1.88 
Coos 7 -12.94 
(7.48) 
-2.43 
(.22) 
-.43 
(.07) 
28486 .99 1.59 
Crook 0 --- --- --- --- --- --- 
Curry 7 -4.64 
(5.20) 
-2.14* 
(.51) 
-.13 
(.07) 
3405 .95 2.40 
Deschutes 7 31.88 
(21.85) 
-23.12 
(9.63) 
.01 
(.00) 
-2092 .96 2.75 
Douglas 7 40.63* 
(7.38) 
-1.28** 
(.19) 
-.06 
(.02) 
7845 .99 2.34 
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Gilliam 0 --- --- --- --- --- --- 
Grant 0 --- --- --- --- --- --- 
Harney 0 --- --- --- --- --- --- 
Hood River 7 5.67 
(6.34) 
-.76 
(1.28) 
.12* 
(.02) 
-2684 .97 2.18 
Jackson 6 196.18*** 
(6.44) 
-41.72*** 
(1.01) 
-.03* 
(.00) 
10405 .99 2.88 
Jefferson 0 --- --- --- --- --- --- 
Josephine 7 200.40* 
(55.35) 
-78.31 
(28.16) 
-.67 
(.30) 
56300 .89 2.25 
Klamath 7 42.81 
(30.58) 
-3.99 
(2.52) 
-33 
(.38) 
22589 .42 1.28 
Lake --- --- --- --- --- --- --- 
Lane 7 155.05* 
(46.99) 
-3.81 
(1.37) 
-.00 
(.04) 
5020 .96 2.22 
Lincoln 7 7.12 
(12.28) 
-1.69* 
(.54) 
.05 
(.21) 
-1792 .95 2.17 
Linn 6 20.23* 
(3.35) 
-1.69** 
(.15) 
.03* 
(.00) 
-2768 .99 3.52 
Malheur 0 --- --- --- --- --- --- 
Marion 7 39.54 
(55.52) 
-5.38 
(5.93) 
.02 
(.03) 
-7458 .56 1.19 
Morrow 0 --- --- --- --- --- --- 
Multnomah 7 134.24 
(181.42) 
-63.47 
(55.94) 
.07 
(.03) 
-53933 .72 1.42 
Polk 7 13.05 
(5.16) 
-1.90* 
(.34) 
-.01 
(.01) 
1469 .98 1.87 
Sherman 0 --- --- --- --- --- --- 
Tillamook 7 13.09*** 
(.85) 
-.41** 
(.05) 
.01 
(.00) 
-33 .99 2.20 
Umatilla 6 1.93 
(6.05) 
-2.80 
(.98) 
.33* 
(.06) 
-23699 .98 3.19 
Union 7 1.38 
(.48) 
-1.67*** 
(.08) 
.03* 
(.00) 
-561 .99 1.61 
Wallowa 0 --- --- --- --- --- --- 
Wasco 7 17.29** 
(2.26) 
-1.93* 
(.49) 
.47** 
(.05) 
-11444 .99 3.05 
Washington 7 164.81 
(55.43) 
-9.66 
(4.02) 
-.01 
(.01) 
6918 .94 1.93 
Wheeler 0 --- --- --- --- --- --- 
Yamhill 7 16.29 
(9.02) 
-1.84* 
(.55) 
.03 
(.01) 
-2640 .92 1.63 
* = p < .05, ** = p < .01, *** = p < .001 
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This particular modeling approach is effective at contextualizing the role of 
unemployment rates and timber harvests in counties with higher than average cardholder 
figures, but is problematic when applied to others.  The emerging picture among high 
cardholder counties is that cardholder counts rise with the unemployment rate, while 
timber harvests have a negative effect on cardholder counts.  The available data does not 
allow for an inference of the cause of this relationship; however, it does present an 
interesting point for researchers and policy makers to ponder, suggesting that marijuana 
could serve as an economic buoy to counties that are historically timber-dependent. 
Discussion 
This analysis demonstrates that many commonly cited predictor variables for 
marijuana use do not correlate with medical marijuana cardholder counts, nor do the 
proposed ecological measures.  In the aggregated cross-sectional and time-series models, 
Democratic party registrants appear to pull down cardholder counts, while increases in 
timber harvests and unemployment rates are associated with higher cardholder numbers. 
Political party orientation could be an appropriate predictor of individual attitudes and 
beliefs (i.e. support for medical marijuana or participation in the program), but, as an 
aggregated variable at a higher level of analysis, it has the opposite effect as 
hypothesized.  The strong association between unemployment rates and cardholder 
counts suggests that marijuana production could serve as an alternative source of income 
for the economically displaced—this is particularly true in high cardholder rate counties.  
When counties are separated (individual county time-series models), a slightly different 
view is offered:  high cardholder counties—who were the traditional powerhouses of 
timber production in the state—have a negative relationship between timber harvests and 
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cardholders.  Unfortunately, the results of these regression models—cross-sectional and 
time-series—offer conflicting accounts of the differences between cardholder rates 
among Oregon counties.  It appears, at least in the case of medical marijuana use and 
production, a new theoretical framework is necessary to explain the variations in 
participation between regions.  
While this study successfully isolates explanatory forces at work in counties with 
high rates of cardholders, it is not able to identify the factor(s) responsible for creating the 
significant variation between counties.  Other explanatory variables suggested by 
reviewers—particularly baby-boomers’ percentage of the population and the number of 
Vietnam War veterans in a county—were modeled, but did not provide any elucidating 
findings.  It appears likely that there is a cultural difference at play between these 
counties that cannot be captured through statistical analysis.  There is a strong history of 
marijuana cultivation in southern Oregon (and northern California) dating back to the 
early 1970s (King 2001).  This cultural proclivity towards cannabis cultivation—legally 
sanctioned or otherwise—probably outweighs any of the other commonly cited 
variables—though they are probably working in tandem.  When economic uncertainty is 
on the rise, a certain set of people who have been exposed through their parents or 
community to this alternative means of subsistence react by participating in marijuana 
cultivation.  Additionally, individuals may be more amenable to this lifestyle if they 
know others involved in it; this phenomenon can best be described as the normalization 
of behavior considered deviant in other parts of the state.  Regardless, it appears that the 
surge in medical marijuana cardholders in particular regions of the state is driven—at 
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least in part—by economic necessity (unemployment) and shifting production forces 
(timber harvests).  
If economic necessity were truly driving the surge in medical marijuana 
cardholder rates, these findings would support the claims of law enforcement officials in 
the state who believe that some medical marijuana patients are using the law to illegally 
profit from the sale of legally grown marijuana.  The extent of this phenomenon, 
however, is unknown—and we can do no more than speculate at this point.  Findings by 
researchers on non-medical marijuana growing (Weisheit 1992; DeCorte 2010) indicate 
that those who grow for profit are usually simultaneously engaged in other, legal 
occupations.  This suggests that for-profit growing often provides supplemental income 
rather than a livelihood.  DeCorte’s (2010) presentation of self-reported production 
amounts by growers in Europe lends credibility to this argument as well, while offering a 
baseline estimate of the potential financial returns for growers.  If we assume DeCorte’s 
data is correct and applicable to Oregon, the average grower produces 49 grams per 
indoor plant and 64 grams per outdoor plant, with three indoor harvests and one outdoor 
harvest per year (Cervantes 2006), which would yield ~1,266 grams (or 44.5 ounces) of 
useable cannabis each year for the average Oregon medical marijuana grower.  Prices per 
ounce vary by quality of product, geographic location, quantity of total amount 
bought/sold, and demand constraints and, historically, any attempt to quantify them are 
rife with controversy (Clements and Zhao 2009).  The most recent average prices 
reported by the US DEA for Oregon is $300 per ounce (personal communication, 
National Drug Intelligence Center).  At this price, the average grower could yield an 
annual gross income of $13,350 from illicit marijuana sales, assuming that all marijuana 
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produced was destined for the black market.  With Oregon’s median household income 
standing at $48,325 in 2010 (as reported by the US Census Bureau), the potential gross 
income increase from illicit marijuana sales seems to fit with previous findings:  if illegal 
sales are happening, they are most likely supplemental to other sources of legitimate 
income.    
Since this study’s findings suggest that medical marijuana could be grown and/or 
sold to supplement certain households’ incomes within the state, it may be appropriate for 
the state of Oregon to investigate a system of licensure and regulation regarding cannabis 
sales for medical use.  Under the Oregon Medical Marijuana law, sales are not permitted 
in any circumstance—even to fellow medical patients.  If regulators could arrive at an 
equitable and enforceable policy framework for the legal sale and distribution of medical 
marijuana, it may be possible to stunt sales of medical marijuana for non-medical use, 
while also creating a significant revenue stream for the state.   
Conclusion 
Though this analysis provides clear findings regarding the relationship between 
several variables and medical marijuana cardholder rates in key Oregon counties, the 
results also suggest that there is something else afoot within the state—possibly driven by 
cultural differences.  Oregon, like many states, is often bifurcated by researchers under a 
traditional rural/urban dichotomy; however, this study highlights a particular facet of 
social mores, which may transcend this oft-cited analytical strategy.  This area of 
research may benefit from comparative in-depth qualitative interviews or some form of 
purposeful sampling followed by a survey, which contrasts the cultural conditions in 
place in counties with high rates of cardholders with those of counties with lower rates.  
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Additionally, it suggests that Oregon policy makers may need to take a closer look at the 
regulatory environment currently in place for medical marijuana—particularly at a time 
when few government programs have successfully created jobs or generated much 
needed tax revenue.   
Finally, with the rapid expansion of state-level medical marijuana programs 
across the US, more research and investigation into this phenomenon is necessary.  The 
discrepancies in cardholder counts between counties may be attributable to other factors, 
such as early adoption  
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CHAPTER IV 
 
REVISITING THE OUTSIDERS:  INNOVATIVE RECRUITMENT OF MARIJUANA  
 
USERS USING WEB-BASED RESPONDENT DRIVEN SAMPLING 
 
Introduction 
 
Aside from using marijuana, are there any substantial differences between regular 
marijuana users and the general population?  Does the composition of marijuana users’ 
friendship networks affect their use of the drug?  What do these friendship networks 
suggest about relations with non-users?  Are there any differences between illegal 
marijuana users and licensed medical marijuana users?  Finally, can individual-level 
factors explain the varying rates of medical marijuana patient participation between 
geographic areas?  This study addresses these questions using a survey of marijuana users 
in Oregon—a location ripe for investigation along these lines.  Oregon has one of the 
highest rates of marijuana use in the US, with the most recent estimate indicating that 
14.09% of individuals over 12 years old have used marijuana in the last year (compared 
to the US average of 10.2%) (SAMHSA 2009).  Oregon is also home to one of the oldest 
medical marijuana programs in the US, established in 1998, just two years after the first 
was created in California, and publishes county-level counts of medical users dating back 
to 2005.  Oregon consistently ranks in the top ten states for plants seized by the Drug 
Enforcement Administration, with estimates of production valued at $473 million in 
2005, making it the state’s largest agricultural commodity (Gettman 2006).  Even with a 
firmly entrenched federal prohibition on marijuana, there is a strong possibility that 
Oregon’s quasi-legalization (through its medical program) makes the likelihood of more 
candid responses from respondents possible.    
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The sample for this study is gathered using a Respondent-Driven Sample (RDS) 
procedure (Heckathorn 1997).  After assembling the sample, respondents answered 
questions relating to their social characteristics, health concerns/problems, political 
ideology, drug abuse potential, and their community’s acceptance of marijuana use.  In 
this study, I provide an overview of pertinent literature and theoretical expectations, 
outline the methods used to assemble the sample and analyze collected data, discuss the 
findings, and describe possible future research directions. 
Marijuana Users 
 Marijuana is the most widely used illicit drug in the United States, with 16.7 
million US residents estimated to have used the drug in the last 30 days and 4 million 
using it 300 days per year or more (SAMSHA 2009: 13; 27).  Males are nearly twice as 
likely to report using marijuana regularly as females, and individuals between the ages of 
18 and 25 are the prime demographic group of consumers (21; 17).  Despite the near-
monopoly on use by young people, older adults are increasing their use of marijuana in 
the US as the baby-boomer generation ages (DeNitto and Chol 2011).  With the 
exception of Asian Americans, non-whites are more likely to use marijuana than whites 
(SAMSHA 2009: 24).  College graduates are less likely to be current users than those 
with lower educational attainment, though more likely to have tried marijuana (24).  
Additionally, individuals who are employed full time have lower rates of use than those 
who are either unemployed or working part time (25).  Finally, rates of use increase 
monotonically with city/area of residence size (26).   
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Theoretical Overview 
Becker originally detailed the cultural assimilation process that must occur for 
individuals to become initiates of a marijuana user community (1953; 1963).  Potential 
community members must first learn how to properly consume marijuana, learn to 
perceive its effects, and, finally, learn to enjoy the effects.  Once a user moves to this 
third stage, they have the potential to continue use—though this possibility is mediated 
by a number of social control mechanisms.  These mechanisms include:  “(a) control 
through limiting of supply and access to the drug; (b) control through the necessity of 
keeping nonusers from discovering that one is a user; (c) control through definition of the 
act as immoral” (61).  Due to its illegality, an individual must have connections to 
elements of society where marijuana is readily available.  At first, this means simply 
using with others who have access; however, as a person progresses into a “more regular 
and systematized mode of use, he can do it only by finding a more stable source of supply 
than more-or-less chance encounters with other users, and this means establishing 
connections with persons who make a business of dealing in narcotics” (63-64).  The veil 
of secrecy surrounding one’s marijuana use is important to ward off “repudiation by 
people whose respect and acceptance he requires both practically and emotionally” (66-
67).  To combat the dominant meme that marijuana users are immoral (unable to be 
responsible for their own welfare or rationally mediate their behavior, particularly 
relating to impulse control around use), frequent users must acquire a “more emancipated 
view of the moral standards implicit in the usual characterization of the drug user” (73).  
This is generally accomplished by acquiring “a series of rationalizations and justification 
with which he may answer objections to occasional use,” such as comparing the activity 
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to more harmful, socially accepted behaviors (alcohol and nicotine use) or generating 
positive narratives about the drug’s effects (74).     
The core of labeling theory (Becker 1963) revolves around the differentiation 
between primary and secondary deviance; primary deviance is an initial deviant act by an 
individual (whether intentional or unintentional) that is observed by someone else with 
the power to castigate or rebuke.  Once this primary act is observed, the deviant label can 
be applied to the offending individual; the likelihood of the label becoming affixed to an 
individual is influenced by their position within society (more powerful people have less 
chance of receiving the formal label).  Secondary deviance refers to any action that 
results from someone being labeled “deviant”; once labeled, individuals may have a 
propensity towards further deviant behavior or will have their opportunities limited to 
participating in deviant groups.  Under this framework, the application of rules, mores, 
and norms are not viewed as occurring in a vacuum; “moral entrepreneurs” actively 
pursue agendas to outlaw specific activities that they deem inappropriate or deleterious to 
society (1963: 152).  Once enacted, the laws are upheld by “rule enforcers” (usually law 
enforcement officers), who face the dual problem of demonstrating their proficiency at 
stomping out acts of deviance and pointing to the deviant acts as a continuing scourge 
(which is particularly apparent in the marijuana realm).  
Sutherland’s differential association theory (DA) (Sutherland and Cressey 1974) 
posits a bifurcation in society between criminal and non-criminal activities, and attributes 
the engagement of individuals in criminal behavior to socialization processes occurring in 
close relationships.  DA began with nine propositions explaining the process of learning 
and committing criminal/deviant behavior (Sutherland and Cressey 1974):   
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(1) criminal behavior is learned; (2) criminal behavior is learned in 
interaction with other persons in a process of communication; (3) the 
principal part of the learning of criminal behavior occurs within intimate 
personal groups; (4) when criminal behavior is learned, the learning 
includes techniques of committing the crime, which are sometimes very 
complicated, sometimes simple and the specific direction of motives, 
drives, rationalizations, and attitudes; (5) the specific direction of motives 
and drives is learned from definitions of legal codes as favorable or 
unfavorable; (6) a person becomes delinquent because of an excess of 
definitions favorable to violation of law over definitions unfavorable to 
violation of the law; (7) differential associations may vary in frequency, 
duration, priority, and intensity; (8) the process of learning criminal 
behavior by association with criminal and anti-criminal patterns involves 
all of the mechanisms that are involved in any other learning; (9) while 
criminal behavior is an expression of general needs and values, it is not 
explained by those needs and values, since non-criminal behavior is an 
expression of those same needs and values. 
 
Once deviant learning has commenced through differential associations, the likelihood of 
an individual engaging in deviant activity becomes dependent upon their internalization 
of pro-deviant rationalizations, though there are a number of possible causal routes 
proposed.  Tittle et al. (1986: 406) characterize these causal routes as:   
(1) A  P  C  (2)   A  C  (3) A    P 
                                                                                                          
                     C 
 
(4) P  C   (5) D  C 
 
Where: A = individual association with definitions favorable to law violation; P = 
criminal perspectives (attitudes rationalizations, etc.); D = definitions in the environment 
are favorable to law violation; C = criminal behavior.  
 
The application of DA to marijuana use has yielded mixed results, due in large part to the 
populations selected for study.  The majority of marijuana use studies focus on 
adolescents and attempt to delineate the causal mechanisms driving initial use, though 
some also attempt to explain continued use (these studies are explicated in the “empirical 
studies” section); however, studies of adults who continue to use are relatively rare.  This 
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is due, in large part, to the history of funding by federal agencies (National Institute on 
Drug Abuse, National Institutes of Health, and Substance Abuse and Mental Health 
Services in particular), which tend to direct research dollars towards adolescent drug use 
prevention strategies and studies, and, if adult research is funded, is focused on substance 
abusers (with anyone using marijuana receiving that label).   
Social learning theory (Burgess and Akers 1966; Akers et al. 1968; Akers 1973) 
offers a reformulation of DA theory; Akers et al. (1979) propose the following pattern of 
social processes leading to (or away from) deviant behavior: 
The primary learning mechanism in social behavior is operant 
(instrumental) conditioning in which behavior is shaped by stimuli which 
follow, or are consequences of the behavior.  Social behavior is acquired 
both through direct conditioning and through imitation or modeling of 
others’ behavior.  Behavior is strengthened through reward (positive 
reinforcement) and avoidance of punishment (negative reinforcement) or 
weakened by adversive stimuli (positive punishment) and loss of reward 
(negative punishment).  Whether deviant or conforming behavior is 
acquired and persists depends on past and present rewards or punishments 
for the behavior and the rewards and punishments attached to alternative 
behavior—differential reinforcement.  In addition, people learn in 
interaction with significant groups in their lives evaluative definitions 
(norms, attitudes, orientations) of the behavior as good or bad.  These 
definitions are themselves verbal and cognitive behavior which can be 
directly reinforced and also act as cue (discriminative) stimuli for other 
behavior.  The more individuals define the behavior as good (positive 
definition) or at least justified (neutralizing definition) rather than as 
undesirable (negative definition), the more likely they are to engage in it 
(637-8). 
 
Reinforcers of behavior are most often important groups—peer-friendship groups, 
schools, parents, and churches—but also include nonsocial aspects, such as physical 
reactions to ingested of drugs.  In simple terms, a person associates with peers who 
engage in deviant behavior, learns to define the behavior favorably, then engages in the 
behavior.  Maintaining deviant behavior is often only possible when an individual, on 
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balance, receives more confirmatory messages than approbation regarding the specific 
act.  In the case of drug use, Akers et al. (1979) specifically state that: 
After the initial use, imitation becomes less important while the effects of 
definitions should continue (themselves affected by the experience of use).  
It is at this point in the process that the actual consequences (social and 
nonsocial reinforcers and punishers) of the specific behavior come into 
play to determine the probability that use will be continued and at what 
level.  These consequences include the actual effects of the substance at 
first and subsequent use (the perception of which may, of course, be 
modified by what effects the person has previously learned to expect) and 
the actual reactions of others present at the time or who find out about it 
later, as well as the anticipated reactions of others not present or knowing 
about the use (638). 
 
The effect of a particular drug on a user—the subjective experience—is argued to be a 
powerful determinant of continued use, a point well established in Becker’s (1963) and 
Goode’s (1970) respective studies of marijuana users.  Perceived reactions from affiliates 
also take on a more powerful determinative force in continued use.  
In opposition to both DA and social learning theories, Hirschi’s (1969) social 
control theory proposes that deviant activity is not a response to learned behavior; rather, 
it emerges from a lack of social bonds (attachment, commitment, involvement, and 
belief).  This approach implicitly assumes that deviance exists in societies and seeks to 
identify the causes (controls) at work in the absence of deviance.  In Hirschi’s 
framework, attachment signifies emotional connections with others, which leads to 
actions that conform to the expectations of those we care about.  Commitment refers to 
the level of integration an individual feels towards conventional social institutions, roles, 
and processes, such as education, family, and occupation.  Involvement refers to the 
rational calculation of time available to each person; if someone is working a full time 
job, raising a family, participating in community activities, and spending time with 
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friends, they are much less likely to engage in deviant behavior simply due to time 
requirements of leading a “straight” life.  Belief describes the intensity of acceptance an 
individual has towards the dominant values, rules, and norms of their society; the more 
someone accepts the official rules as right and proper, the less likely they are to commit 
acts in antagonism towards the status quo.  Social control theory operates under the 
assumption that individuals understand the consequences of their behavior and will 
consistently act in a rational way to preserve their feelings, position amongst close 
associates, and level of integration in society—which is a significant point of contention 
for some (Sampson and Laub 1995). 
Studies of marijuana users corroborate the assembled theoretical model offered by 
Becker (1963), finding that individual attitudes towards the harmfulness of the drug are 
consistent predictors of both initial and continuing use (Derzon and Lipsey 1999), and 
that peer networks provide a key influence in the development and maintenance of these 
requisite attitudes (Goode 1970; Kandel 1978).  The logical extension of this idea is that 
frequency of use is directly related to the proportion of friends who use and the perceived 
acceptance of marijuana use among a person’s peer group; I expect that individual 
marijuana use will increase with the number of friends who use, as well as self-reported 
peer-group acceptance of marijuana use. 
H1: Individual marijuana use will increase with the number of friends who use 
marijuana 
 
H2: Individual marijuana use will increase with peer-group acceptance of 
marijuana use 
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Mauss (1969) situates marijuana experimentation within the context of college 
preparation, arguing that many university-bound high school students begin use before 
matriculating to assist in the cultural assimilation process.  Conversely, Brown (1974) 
finds that college students cease marijuana use following graduation, citing social 
pressures of work, family, and social integration as key causal factors.  Yamaguchi and 
Kandel (1985) use cross-sectional event history analysis to demonstrate that marijuana 
use is negatively related to marriage and becoming a parent, yet positively related with 
separation/divorce.  Since this study’s sample will consist entirely of marijuana users, I 
expect that the average level of education will be higher than the general population, and 
that more individuals will be single (or divorced) and childless than the general 
population.  
H3: Marijuana users are more educated than the general population 
H4: Marijuana users are more likely to be single than the general population 
H5: Marijuana users are more likely to be childless than the general population  
 
Do licensed medical marijuana users differ from their illegal counterparts in their 
rationalizations for using the drug?  The universe of possible reactions to marijuana are 
multifaceted and, often, mutually contradictory; Goode’s (1970) qualitative study of users 
(all illegal) illustrates this phenomenon well (see Appendix 4-1).  Reinarman et al. (2011) 
provide the lone scholarly attempt at identifying characteristics of medical marijuana 
users.  Using a sample of 1,746 patients from nine separate medical marijuana clinics in 
California, the authors find that Blacks and Native Americans use at higher rates than 
other ethnic groups, while Latinos and Asians have lower rates of use (Whites are near 
the average for all groups).  Use is heaviest in the 25-44 year age range, and males made 
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up 73% of the sample.  Chronic pain suppression and improved sleep were the most 
commonly cited uses/benefits of marijuana reported by subjects (82.6% and 70.7%, 
respectively).  Other conditions/uses of medical marijuana included relaxation (55%), 
muscle spasms (41%), headaches (41%), anxiety (38%), nausea (28%), and depression 
(26%).  Studies of non-medical use suggest two dominant views by users:  (1) the drug is 
perceived to stimulate creative thinking, particularly among artists, musicians, and 
writers (Becker 1963; Goode 1970), and (2) users consume it to relax and experience 
euphoria.  Weil et al. (1968), in the first controlled study of marijuana use, found that 
self-reported feelings of well-being were improved with consumption of the drug, and 
that the intensity of these feelings were dose-dependent.  Zablocki et al. (1991) also 
document the feelings of euphoria that accompany use, though they find that these 
feelings are more commonly reported by individuals who score low on scales of 
introspectiveness (75).  Further, a strong experiential dichotomy is present between 
introspectives/non-introspectives, where the former associate their experience with 
marijuana “in self-oriented cognitive and emotional terms,” and the latter focus on 
“distortions of normal sensorimotor functioning and disruptions or modifications of 
normal everyday activities” (75).  For the highly introspective individual, the experience 
seems to: 
stimulate global self-evaluations and sharpen the contrast between the 
ideal and the perceived self.  Rather than being distracted from personal 
problems of unusual sights, sounds, or tastes, such persons may 
experience marijuana as a confrontational drug, which focuses attention on 
the very aspects of self that are currently most troublesome (75). 
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This type of experience is exemplified in one of the more famous explications of non-
medical use; Allen Ginsberg (1966) describes the mind-manifesting perception changes 
that result from marijuana consumption: 
Marijuana is a useful catalyst for specific optical and aural aesthetic 
perceptions.  I apprehended the structure of certain pieces of jazz & 
classical music in a new manner under the influence of marijuana, and 
these apprehensions have remained valid in years of normal 
consciousness.  I first discovered how to see Klee's Magic Squares as the 
painter intended them (as optically three-dimensional space structures) 
while high on marijuana.  I perceived ("dug") for the first time Cezanne's 
"petit sensation" of space achieved on a two-dimensional canvas (by 
means of advancing & receding colors, organization of triangles, cubes, 
etc. as the painter describes in his letters) while looking at The Bathers 
high on marijuana.  And I saw anew many of nature's panoramas & 
landscapes that I'd stared at blindly without even noticing before; thru the 
use of marijuana, awe & detail were made conscious. These perceptions 
are permanent—any deep aesthetic experience leaves a trace, & an idea of 
what to look for that can be checked back later.  I developed a taste for 
Crivelli's symmetry; and saw Rembrandt's Polish Rider as a sublime 
Youth on a Deathly horse for the first time—saw myself in the rider's face, 
one might say—while walking around the Frick Museum high on pot.  
These are not "hallucinations"; these are deepened perceptions that one 
might have catalyzed not by pot but by some other natural event (as 
natural as pot) that changes the mind, such as an intense Love, a death in 
the family, a sudden clear dusk after rain, or the sight of the neon spectral 
reality of Times Square one sometimes has after leaving a strange movie. 
So it's all natural. 
 
While there is pointed evidence indicating that the drug affects individuals in varying 
manners, the subjective experiences described by users also points to a methodological 
problem unaddressed by previous research:  different varieties of marijuana (“strains”) 
tend to elicit different results.  Hillig and Mahlberg’s (2004) review and analysis of 157 
different cannabis accessions lends credibility to the anecdotal evidence reported by 
users; genomically, drug cultivars of cannabis are limited to two subspecies of cannabis 
indica (narrow and broad-leaf varieties), with narrow leaf plants generally producing 
soaring mental euphoria in users and broad-leaf plants inducing a more lethargic, body-
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numbing effect.  The wide variation in effect is attributed to different ratios of two key 
cannabinoids in these plants—THC and CBD—with low amounts of CBD in narrow leaf 
varieties and high amounts in broad-leaf plants. 
 Plant-induced variations in experience aside, current evidence suggests that 
medical users of the drug will focus on symptom alleviation in an attempt to rationalize 
their use; non-medical users should report using for either creative stimulation/personal 
insight or simply to numb themselves from reality (i.e. getting “stoned”). 
 H6: Medical users will use primarily to alleviate acute physical symptoms 
 
H7: Illegal users will use to stimulate creativity, generate personal insight, or 
to numb themselves from reality 
 
In the following sections, I describe the methods used to assemble the 
sample for this study, provide a description of the results, and discuss the 
implications of my findings. 
Methods 
 
 Accessing hidden populations—a status marijuana users, producers, and sellers 
are relegated to in the United States—poses two unique challenges to investigators; as 
Heckathorn (1997) notes,  
First, no sampling frame exists, so the size and boundaries of the 
population are unknown; and second, there exist strong privacy concerns, 
because membership involves stigmatized or illegal behavior, leading 
individuals to refuse to cooperate, or give unreliable answers to protect 
their privacy (174).     
 
To address these concerns, researchers have traditionally relied upon snowball sampling, 
key informant sampling, and targeted sampling to investigate hidden populations.  The 
shortcomings of each approach are detailed elsewhere (Heckathorn 1997), but the 
primary concern is derived from the lack of independence between observations, which is 
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an unassailable artifact of snowball and targeted sampling.  Heckathorn’s (1997; 2002; 
2007; Volz and Heckathorn 2008) Respondent-Driven Sampling (RDS) offers an elegant 
addendum to chain referral procedures by limiting the number of potential recruits that 
each respondent can bring into a research program and incorporating both primary and 
secondary incentive structures into the recruitment process.  Respondents are rewarded 
for participating in the study (i.e. completing a survey or interview), but also receive 
rewards for referring others to the research program.  This approach is successfully 
implemented in the study of intravenous drug users (Heckthorn 1997; Heckathorn et al. 
2002), AIDS patients (Heckathorn et al. 1999), men who have sex with men (Ramirez-
Valles et al. 2005), sex workers (Johnston et al. 2008), and studies of jazz musicians 
(Heckathorn and Jeffri 2001). 
When combined with controls to verify that a prospective respondent is a member 
of the targeted population, the collection of successive waves of respondents leads to “an 
equilibrium mix of recruits…that is independent of the characteristics of the subject or set 
of subjects from which recruitment began,” allowing for the calculation of unbiased 
population estimates (Heckathorn 1997: 183; see also Salganik and Heckathorn 2004; 
Wejnert and Heckathorn 2008; Wejnert 2009).  RDS operates under four assumptions: 
(1) respondents accurately describe the size of their personal network within the sample 
population; (2) recruitment of additional respondents involves random selection by 
recruiters from their personal networks; (3) friendship ties are reciprocal; and (4) 
recruitment operates as a Markov process in that the transition probabilities of the last 
individual recruited converges towards an equilibrium (achieved when that individual’s 
probability of selection is proportional to their personal network size) (Volz and 
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Heckathorn 2008: 82, 84).  In the process of achieving equilibrium, key variables of 
interest (race, gender, or other theoretically specified statuses) are monitored throughout 
the recruitment process.  
Previous studies relying on RDS required interviewers, a physical location to 
operate from, printed recruitment coupons, and a coupon tracking system; while the face-
to-face interaction helps to explain why referral rates are so high in these studies, 
significant limitations arose when assembling samples.  Researchers, regardless of their 
constitution and efficiency, can only interview so many people in one day, interview 
locations are not available at all times, and respondents’ schedules do not always 
correspond with researchers’.  Web-based RDS (webRDS) eliminates many of the 
logistical problems (though introducing new and complicated replacements), and tends to 
increase the speed of sample gathering (Wejnert and Heckathorn 2008; Bengtsson et al. 
2012; Bauermeister et al. 2012).   
Wejnert and Heckathorn’s study (2008) of cross-racial friendship affiliations 
among college students demonstrates that large samples can be assembled in very short 
time periods (72 hours) if respondents view the study as important, the web interface is 
easy to use, and respondents’ personal networks contain one or more individuals who 
possess the targeted attributes.  A primary drawback of webRDS, however, is that 
researchers are not able to meet with respondents face-to-face to confirm their status as 
attribute possessors (such as track marks for intravenous drug users) or to weed out 
respondents who provide fake responses in lieu of recruiting real people (to collect the 
recruitment reward)—though Bauermeister et al. (2012) telephoned each prospective 
recruit to verify their existence and to protect from virtual ballot stuffing.  To counteract 
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the selection of fraudulent respondents, Wejnert and Heckathorn (2008) suggest keeping 
recruitment rewards small and tracking internet protocol (IP) identification numbers so 
that multiple responses cannot emanate from the same computer.   
Bauermeister et al. (2012) encountered both recruiting and tracking issues in their 
study of young adult drug use (the single webRDS examination of this potential 
population to date).  22 initial seeds were recruited via Facebook, took an online survey, 
and were asked to enter the email addresses of two friends—automated emails were sent 
to prospective recruits from the researchers (835).  Unfortunately, even with a $20 
incentive for completing the survey and $10 incentives for each chain referral, only two 
additional respondents elected to participate in the second wave (835).  The researchers 
altered their protocol:  first, a link to the survey was emailed to the original seeds with 
instructions to forward the message to their friends, to “(a) reduce threats to a potential 
young adult’s confidentiality and privacy and (b) reduce concerns that referral chains 
were being broken as a result of filtering of…email invitations” (835).  There is no 
accounting of how successful this augmentation was, except that another alteration was 
required.  This time, the authors “telephoned seeds and asked them about their 
experiences using the referral emails,” finding that most seeds “had never forwarded the 
email and had not told their referrals that they had invited them to participate” (835).  
Referral restrictions were loosened, allowing participants to recruit up to five respondents 
through a variety of social media (email, Facebook, text message, instant messenger).  
This alteration, while successful in rapidly increasing the sample size, led to recruiters 
forwarding the unique recruitment announcements to multiple individuals in hopes of 
capitalizing on the increased incentives.  While their approach yielded an impressive, 
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diverse sample in a short amount of time compared to traditional RDS procedures 
(n=3,448 in 2.5 months), it is questionable that accurate RDS network calculations were 
achieved due to the use of individual IDs by multiple respondents—in other words, it is 
not plausible that recruitment wave origination was traceable after recruitment 
forwarding restrictions were liberalized.  The authors mention that “survey data were 
checked daily to screen out duplicate and fraudulent cases (n=675),” so it is possible that 
the RDS qualities of the network were preserved; however, this unknown without a 
presentation of the actual chain referral network (835).  Their study demonstrates the 
importance of proper controls to limit the use of unique IDs to one person; implementing 
such controls is relatively easy in a web-based survey environment.   
Though unaddressed by Wejnert and Heckathorn (2008) due to the nature of their 
study, webRDS poses an additional complicating feature with hidden populations, 
particularly those who are security conscientious—that of providing anonymous financial 
incentives.  Bauermeister et al. (2012) confront this by issuing “Visa e-gift” cards via 
email to respondents upon completion of their initial survey and reloading them after 
their chain referred recruits complete the survey (835).  This appears to be one of the 
more secure options available to researchers, but it does not fully protect participants in 
the case of compelled disclosure (i.e. subpoena), as the original “loading” of the cards is 
linked to researchers and recipients are required to provide a name and address before 
using the cards.  Such a disclosure may seem like a minor consideration when studying 
use prevalence of multiple drugs in a large sample, but the issue is much more salient as 
sensitivity and security concerns become more of an issue—as is the case with drug 
producers or sellers.  Limiting or completely eliminating monetary incentives to 
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participants is one method of maintaining anonymity; however, no one has attempted a 
RDS study of this nature.  This study, in addition to investigating marijuana users in 
Oregon, attempts the first non-monetary primary incentive RDS implementation. 
WebRDS Investigation of Marijuana Users in Oregon 
 To answer the research questions posed in this study, I developed a webRDS 
protocol and web-based survey to examine a sample of marijuana users in Oregon.  To 
investigate the role of different secondary incentive types in the success of RDS studies 
and to protect respondents’ anonymity, I chose to forego all monetary payments.  Instead, 
multiple non-monetary secondary incentives were implemented:  (1) prospective 
respondents were appealed to based on the potential political and economic importance of 
examining their population; (2) live updates and total network referral counts for each 
respondent were posted on a web site to encourage competition among participants to 
recruit others; and (3) respondents were granted access to near-live aggregate data and 
summary statistics as the project developed.   
Respondents were eligible to participate if they were Oregon residents, over the 
age of 18, used marijuana in the last year, and received a unique study ID from a previous 
participant in the study.  The web-based survey instrument included a question that 
tracked study IDs; any previously used IDs were barred from reuse.  After completing the 
survey, respondents were redirected to another web page with instructions about the 
referral process, as well as links to five additional recruitment letters (in PDF format) that 
could be downloaded and shared with prospective recruits by email, Facebook, or instant 
message. 
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I identified a single “super seed” with a very large number of friends who are 
users, producers, and sellers of marijuana (n=44) in several counties identified in Chapter 
III as “areas of interest” within Oregon (Benton, Josephine, and Multnomah).  The super 
seed was fully briefed on the project, the referral process, and the importance of 
collecting chain referrals by following up with prospective respondents.  The seed 
successfully recruited 26 respondents in the second wave from ten Oregon counties.  
However, the lack of monetary incentives and the format of the recruitment letters appear 
to have quickly affected recruitment rates compared to previous RDS studies (web-based 
and traditional), as the referral process died out with only 72 respondents (five waves).  
The implications of this finding are discussed later. 
Survey Instrument 
 The survey instrument (Appendix 4-3) collected self-reported information on:  (1) 
individual characteristics, such as gender, age, height, weight, frequency of exercise, 
county of residence, ethnicity, political party membership, education level, employment 
status, relationship status, occupational category, health insurance coverage, number of 
close friends, and income; (2) marijuana-related questions, including frequency of use, 
reasons for use, medical license status and roles, number of close friends who use, 
reasons for growing, number of plants growing, method of growing, source and 
reimbursement rate for obtained marijuana, amount consumed, and the perceived 
acceptance of marijuana use by immediate social circle and local community; and (3) a 
detailed political orientation index (using a replication of the 2011 Pew Political Research 
political typology questionnaire). 
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 Variables of interest for hypothesis testing in this analysis include frequency of 
marijuana use, amount of marijuana used per month, number of close friends who use 
marijuana, perceived peer-group acceptance of marijuana use, use status (medical/non-
medical), level of education, relationship status, number of children, and reasons for 
using marijuana.  Frequency of marijuana use (ordinal) is operationalized as six options 
presented to respondents (less than once a month, once a month, 2-3 times a month, once 
a week, 2-3 times a week, and daily or near daily).  Amount of marijuana used per month 
(ratio) is self-reported and measured in grams (0-100).  The number of close friends who 
use marijuana is a ratio measure, with a minimum of zero and maximum of 20.  
Perceived peer-group acceptance of marijuana use (ratio) is operationalized as the 
estimated percentage of friends, relatives, and coworkers who approve of marijuana use. 
Level of education (some high school, high school graduate (or GED), associate’s degree, 
bachelor’s degree, and master’s degree or above) and relationship status (single, married 
or in a civil union, in a stable relationship (but not married or in a civil union)) are 
measured categorically.  Presence of children in the home is a dichotomous, nominal 
variable (yes/no).  Reasons for using (ordinal) include euphoria, sleep aid, pain 
management, appetite stimulant, relaxation, spiritual aspects, to be social, to dull reality, 
to forget problems or worries, stimulate creativity, depression, other medical reasons, to 
get “stoned,” and other—any selected reasons are then rank-ordered.  
Results 
 
 It appears that the lack of monetary incentives severely hampers the recruitment 
process, as the final sample consisted of 72 respondents and took approximately 2 months 
to gather from the initial referral.  This finding is an important addition to the growing 
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RDS literature on its own.  The small sample size approached equilibrium, but did not 
achieve it—this impinges on the generalizability of the findings collected in this study.  
Even with these limitations, the results offer some insight into the population of Oregon 
marijuana users (though not statistically valid for generalizing to the population of 
marijuana users in Oregon or elsewhere).   
 The majority of responses were gathered in the first month of data collection.  
Figures 4-1, 4-2, 4-3, and 4-4 provide a visual representation of recruitment at key cross 
sections of the referral process.  The most robust network growth occurred in the first two 
weeks after survey deployment, with over half of the total sample collected by the end of 
week one (n=37) and nearly two-thirds assembled by week two (n=49).  The pattern of 
growth corresponds with diminishing response rates through the five waves of 
recruitment:  26 respondents are present in the second wave, 35 in the third wave, 9 in the 
fourth wave, and 2 in the fifth wave.  Though speculative, it appears as if recruitment was 
relatively successful through the third wave and that properly structured non-monetary 
incentives can work through this level of the referral process; however, the precipitous 
drop off in waves four and five indicate that any mechanisms at work in earlier waves 
lost their participation-inducing character.  Those wishing to implement a non-monetary 
RDS recruitment process could likely attain equilibrium if enough initial seeds are 
selected and they are properly trained, but it is important to note that very few seeds are 
likely to enter the sample after the third wave.   
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Figure 4-1.  RDS Sample At End of Week 1 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4-2.  RDS Sample At End of Week 2 
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Figure 4-3.  RDS Sample At End of Week 4 
  
 
 
 
 
Figure 4-4.  RDS Sample At End of Week 8 
 
 
 100 
The assembled sample (see Table 4-1) is predominantly male (63.9%), white (90.3%), 
well-educated (69.4% with a bachelor’s degree or above), in a stable relationship of some 
sort (77.6%), are employed (89.8%), illegally use marijuana (75%), and are very frequent 
users of the drug (47.8% daily or near daily use).  Despite an inability to generalize these 
findings to the marijuana-using population, most of this data corresponds with national 
surveys of drug use.  A glaring difference is present in frequency of use figures.  
Estimates for Oregon indicate that 10.27% of individuals 26 or older have used marijuana 
in the last year, and 6.58% used in the last month; for persons in the 18-25 age category, 
36.96% used in the last year and 21.9% used in the last month (SAMHSA 2009).  For 
this sample (all used in the past year), past month usage is 78.5% for the 26 and older 
group (n=14) and 87.5% in the 18-25 year old category (n=48).  Daily or near daily use 
accounts for 57.1% (26+) and 43.7% (18-25) of respondents in these age groups.  
Table 4-1.  Description of RDS Network Sample 
Variable     %  n 
Gender 
 Male     63.9  46 
 Female     36.1  26 
 
Race 
 White     90.3  65 
 Black     1.4  1 
 Latino/a    2.8  2 
 Asian American   1.4  1 
 Native American   1.4  1 
 Other     2.8  2 
 
Education 
 Some high school   0  0 
 High school graduate   19.4  14 
 Associate’s degree   11.1  8 
 Bachelor’s degree   47.2  34 
 Master’s degree or above  22.2  16 
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Frequency of Use 
 Less than once a month   14.5  10 
 Once a month    4.3  3 
 2-3 times a month   10.1  7 
 Once a week    10.1  7 
 2-3 times a week   13.0  9 
 Daily or near daily   47.8  33 
 
Use status 
 Licensed medical user   25  18 
 Illegal user    75  54 
 
Relationship status 
 Single or divorced   22.4  13 
 Married (or civil union)   39.7  23 
 Stable unmarried relationship   37.9  22 
 
Employment status 
 Unemployed    10.2  7 
 Employed    89.8  62 
 
Political party 
 Republican    2.7  2 
 Democrat    44.4  32 
 Independent    18.0  13 
 Libertarian    1.4  1 
 Green     2.7  2 
 
 Other     2.7  2 
 Not registered    27.7  20 
 
Exercise frequency (per week) 
 0     1.5  1 
 1     8.9  6 
 2     7.4  5 
 3     11.9  8 
 4     25.3  17 
 5     31.3  21 
 6     10.4  7 
 7     2.9  2 
 
Body mass index range 
 Healthy     61.1  44 
 Overweight    27.7  20 
 Obese     11.1   8 
 
Respondents are much fitter and exercise more often than average Americans, with 
61.1% reporting “healthy” body mass indexes and averaging four days of aerobic activity 
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per week.  However, this could be a sampling artifact brought on by overrepresentation of 
younger respondents (mean age: 31).  The majority of respondents are registered as 
Democrats (44%) or Independents (18%), with a sprinkling of minor party representation 
as well; surprisingly, 27.7% are not registered with any political party.  Political ideology 
measures suggest that marijuana users are relatively left-leaning overall, though 
conservative outliers are present (Figure 4-5).  Marijuana users’ mean yearly incomes are 
higher than Oregon’s average ($32,962 vs. $26,171), but, with a standard deviation of 
$27,424, are also highly variable.  Finally, the majority of respondents have never been 
arrested (76.3%); of those who have (n=17), eight have been arrested for marijuana 
related charges.   
 
Figure 4-5.  Political Ideology of Oregon Marijuana Users 
 
Why do marijuana users—particularly those who use without a medical license—
break the law and consume this drug?  As Table 4-2 highlights, respondents’ most widely 
cited reasons for using marijuana are to relax, stimulate creativity, alleviate pain, induce 
sleep, and to experience euphoria.  Of the specific rationalizations offered in the survey, 
users also rank these five as their most important reasons for consuming marijuana (in 
order:  sleep, relaxation, pain suppression, creativity stimulation, and euphoria).  
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Differences emerged between licensed medical users (n=18) and their illegal counterparts 
(n=54) as well.  Medical use is primarily engaged in to alleviate pain and induce sleep; 
illegal users seek relaxation and creativity stimulation, although medical users also report 
using the drug for relaxation.  Very few associate their use with a desire to get “stoned,” 
dull reality, or forget problems, and when they do, these rationalizations are ranked low 
in importance.  The terms selected to describe use, in general, frame the drug as a 
positive contribution in users’ lives. 
Table 4-2.  Counts and Ranks of Reasons for Use 
 
 
Reason    n  Mean rank         n ranked as #1 
         Medical Illegal 
Sleep    23  1.97   4  2 
Relax    43  2.34   1  14 
Other    7  2.44   0  0 
Pain    24  2.79   7  3 
Creativity   28  3.25   0  5 
Other medical   3  3.66   0  0 
Euphoria   23  3.73   0  1 
Being social   18  3.77   1  1 
Spirituality   13  3.84   1  2 
Appetite   11  4.36   0  0 
Dull reality   6  4.50   0  0 
Forget problems  9  4.66   0  1 
Get “stoned”   13  4.84   0  2 
Depression   7  5.85   0  0 
n=72 
The number of close friendships (mean: 10.86) reported by respondents in this 
sample is similar to those reported in previous studies of general populations (Roberts 
and Dunbar 2011) (see Table 
 4-3).  This contradicts popular conceptions—though never investigated in a 
systematic way—of marijuana users as reclusive, anti-social, or otherwise socially 
maldeveloped.  Figures 4-6 and 4-7 provide visualizations of the sample with their 
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reported friendship ties included.  Figure 4-7 and Table 4-4 highlight the high level of 
homophily present in the sample’s friendship networks; 69% of close friends are also 
reported to be users of marijuana.  The total sample size obviously hampers 
generalizability of this intriguing finding; this is especially true of the fourth and fifth 
waves of respondents.  There is a possibility that an individual’s frequency of use is a 
causal determinant of friendship composition, and that the abnormally large number of 
“every day” users present in this sample has skewed the average percentage of close 
friend users (though univariate regression suggests otherwise).    
Table 4-3.    Mean Friend Counts by Recruitment Wave and Use Status 
 
Wave  n Close Friends (mean)  Close Friends Who Use (mean %) 
2  27 12.5    68.3 
3  34 10.0    67.1 
4  6 10.1    72.8 
5  3 10.6    86.6 
n=71 !!
Figure 4-6.  Sample Network with Reported Friendships Imputed!
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!
Figure 4-7.  Sample Network with Reported Friendships Imputed (users in green) 
Hypothesis Testing 
Due to the lack of RDS equilibrium in this sample, all hypothesis tests must be 
viewed as tentative and not fully supported by accurate population data—all findings and 
statements only apply to this particular sample of Oregon marijuana users.  That said, the 
collected data suggests that individual marijuana use—both frequency and amount—is 
not related to either the number of friends who use (H1) or peer-group acceptance of 
marijuana use (H2) (Figures 4-7, 4-8, 4-9, and 4-10 in Appendix 4-2).  As illustrated 
above (Table 4-1), marijuana users are friends with other marijuana users at a much 
higher rate than could be expected under a random distribution, and are, on average, 
significantly more educated than the general population (H3).  Are marijuana users more 
likely to be single than the general population (H4)?  Nationally, 43% (96.6 million) of 
Americans over the age of 18 are “single” (unmarried) (US Census Bureau 2010)28.  In 
this sample, 12 respondents were single, while 22 were married, and 22 were in a stable !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!28!http://www.census.gov/newsroom/releases/archives/facts_for_features_special_editions/cb10-ff18.html!
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relationship.  Compared to the national data, marijuana users appear less likely to be 
married; however, there were some missing responses to this particular question (n=16), 
and, overall, marijuana users are more likely to be in a stable relationship (78% married 
or otherwise) than single (a distinction not made in US Census data).  Missing data (valid 
n=58) is also an issue in determining if marijuana users are less likely to have children in 
the home than the general population average (33.5%) (H5).  At 29%, marijuana users 
appear to have slightly below slightly less likely to have children in the home than the 
general population.  Medical users appear—as highlighted by the data present in Table 4-
3—to use the drug to alleviate acute physical symptoms (H6) with generalized pain 
indicated as the primary rational for using.  Illegal users consume the drug to relax and 
stimulate creativity, but rank “numbing reality” (“getting stoned” and “dull reality”) very 
low compared to other rationalizations (H7).  
Discussion 
 
Despite not achieving RDS network equilibrium in this sample, the findings 
contribute in an important way to previous RDS studies and, in regards to marijuana 
users, warrant further investigation; the ramifications of daily or near daily use by a 
significant percentage of the marijuana using population are far reaching from multiple 
(health, criminal justice, economic, and cultural) perspectives.  The basic demographic 
information collected on members of this particular drug using population suggest that 
marijuana users are not dramatically different from their non-using counterparts in many 
ways, but, in areas where they deviate from the norm, they tend to attain socially 
desirable attributes.  Users are similar to average Americans in their number of close 
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friends, employment status, arrest history29, and just slightly less likely to have children 
in the home; however, users’ incomes are slightly higher than average, they exercise 
more regularly and maintain healthier overall weights, are more likely to have health 
insurance and be in a stable relationship, and are much more educated than the rest of the 
population.  Users in this study are employed in diverse occupations:  teachers (16%), 
health care fields (23%), managers (11%), chefs or cooks (11%) are the most cited 
categories, but the sample also includes lawyers, architects, artists, farmers, and 
construction workers.  While incomes are higher than average, they are lower than would 
be predicted for such high educational attainment.  
The distinctly liberal political ideology of users raises questions.  Without 
broaching the subject of causality (i.e. Does marijuana use make you liberal or does being 
liberal make you use marijuana?), does the character of a drug lend itself to a particular 
ideology or worldview?  While this question is not answerable with the collected data, 
the strength of the findings suggests further research. 
The high frequency of use reported could be an artifact of sampling bias, with 
frequent users recruited by previous participants more often or simply more willing to 
participate in a non-monetarily incentivized study.  On the other hand, the paucity of 
investigations of this particular population makes such a conclusion difficult to justify, 
particularly as the drug becomes more acceptable to society at large—more detailed data 
seems necessary.  If the average user ingests the drug regularly (multiple times per week) !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!29!One troubling aspect of this study’s results is that the eight respondents arrested on marijuana 
related charges are well educated (four hold a bachelor’s degree, four hold a master’s degree or 
above); commenting without knowing the details of each situation would be inappropriate, but—
on the face—such a circumstance raises the oft-cited specter of marijuana illegality causing more 
harm than good (Nutt et al. 2010).   !
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and does so using traditional means (i.e. smoking), public health mitigation strategies 
could direct users to less damaging alternatives (i.e. vaporization) that would reduce 
economic losses due to respiratory ailments.  Similarly, high frequencies of use would 
suggest that additional investigations of marijuana-induced driving impairment are 
required, as well as appropriate methods of assessing impairment levels.   
  The composition of users’ friendship networks also raises important 
considerations, particularly as the drug moves into the realm of quasi-legality in several 
states and others attempt to identify successful electoral strategies to achieve similar 
results.  If marijuana users’ in-network friendship selection is as strong as suggested by 
this study (67%), the likelihood of a non-user being friends with a user should be small.  
The effect of limited close friend relationships between non-users and users could have 
significant implications for the non-using population’s perceptions of the drug and its 
acceptability in social contexts, since individuals may have a difficult time accepting that 
marijuana users come in all shapes, sizes, and abilities when they are close friends with 
only one or two.  Additionally, this finding provides another confirmation of the 
homophilic tendencies of status groups (McPherson et al. 2001) and suggests that 
marijuana users represent a distinct sub-population of our society. 
While initial use and initiation into the methods of use (knowing how to obtain 
and ingest the drug) are accurately described by social learning and differential 
association theories, prolonged use extending into and through adulthood—especially 
when conducted in non-social situations—is not adequately explained.  The data 
collected in this study suggests that adult marijuana use is best viewed through Akers’ 
social learning theory, particularly the more nuanced version that attributes continued use 
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of drugs to the biopsychological effects produced their consumption (1979).  For 
Hirschi’s social control theory (1969) to provide a valid explanation of continued adult 
marijuana use, users must lack a combination of social bonds that non-users possess.  If 
anything, that data suggests that this study’s respondents are social bond exemplars in 
many regards.  While this study does not offer a rigorous test of these theories (due to a 
lack of statistical significance) and cannot fully reject their applicability to adult 
marijuana use, the face validity of both social control and differential association theories 
is questionable.  To this point, no theory of deviance or social control has examined the 
causal forces at work before and after a punctuation in the social norm equilibrium—
marijuana legalization (in various forms) offers us an immediate and tangible opportunity 
to explore this phenomenon.     
Conclusion 
 
This study contributes to the emerging RDS methodology literature by 
demonstrating that non-monetary primary incentives are not effective recruiting tools, 
especially after the third wave of recruitment.  WebRDS sampling procedures are viable 
as a methodological strategy to investigate this particular hidden population, but 
monetary inducements appear necessary to achieve appropriate sample sizes.  The results 
suggest that non-monetary primary incentives may work, but studies using them should 
include large initial seed pools and adequate seed training.   
The study also suggests that Oregon marijuana users are not significantly different 
from the general population in many substantial ways, though their deviations—outside 
of marijuana use—are in socially acceptable and rewarding ways.  Additionally, Oregon 
marijuana users are liberal in political orientation, associate with other marijuana users at 
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higher rates than could be expected from random chance, and use the drug far more often 
than previous research projected.  The findings presented in this study demonstrate the 
necessity for further research on marijuana users, particularly as the drug moves into 
mainstream acceptance (with legalization of recreational use in Washington and 
Colorado).  If a “before and after” study of friendship networks was conducted in a state 
where the drug becomes legal, we could gain significant insight into the causal effect of 
laws on the formation of status groups in a particular society.  
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CHAPTER V 
ESTIMATING THE QUASI-UNDERGROUND:  OREGON’S INFORMAL  
 
MARIJUANA ECONOMY 
 
Introduction 
 
How much marijuana is produced, consumed, and sold in Oregon?  How do users 
obtain their drug?  How much does marijuana contribute to Oregon’s economy?  If 
legalized and taxed, how much revenue could the state reasonably expect to earn from the 
sale of marijuana?  This study estimates the size of Oregon’s informal marijuana 
economy30, drawing upon Respondent-Driven Sampling (RDS) procedures and survey 
methods to investigate this quasi-underground activity.  By examining users and 
producers of marijuana, this analysis offers a unique contribution to our understanding of 
both informal economic participation and marijuana market structure in a key marijuana 
producing state. 
Oregon has one of the highest rates of marijuana use in the US, with the most 
recent estimate indicating that 14.09% of individuals over 12 years old have used 
marijuana in the last year, with the average US rate approaching 10.2% (SAMHSA 
2009)31.  Oregon is also home to one of the oldest medical marijuana programs in the US, 
established in 1998, just two years after the first was created in California, and publishes 
county-level counts of medical users dating back to 2005.  Oregon consistently ranks in 
the top ten states for plants seized by the Drug Enforcement Administration, with 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!30!The terms “shadow,” “underground,” “illegitimate,” “unseen,” “unofficial,” “undocumented,” 
and “black market” are used by others to describe this segment of the economy; for clarity, I refer 
to it as the “informal economy” or the “informal sector”.!31!http://oas.samhsa.gov/2k8state/AppB.htm!
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estimates of production valued at $473 million in 2005, making it the state’s largest 
agricultural commodity (Gettman 2006).  Even with a firmly entrenched federal 
prohibition on marijuana, there is a strong possibility that Oregon’s quasi-legalization 
(through its medical program) makes the likelihood of more candid responses from 
respondents possible; additionally, the lack of an established legal means of selling 
medical marijuana in Oregon suggests that traditional models of distribution may still be 
in effect—therefore, the results should be extrapolatable to non-medical states.   
 With three states pursuing full legalization of marijuana in the November 2012 
election32 and repeated calls from anti-prohibitionists to tax and regulate marijuana 
production, distribution, and consumption, it is very important to have a more thorough 
understanding of marijuana market dynamics—particularly the roles that various actors 
play within marijuana distribution networks.  This study describes the literature 
surrounding informal economies and methods of measuring them, assesses what we know 
about marijuana market structure, and details the methods used to collect and question a 
sample of marijuana users in Oregon.  
Literature Review 
The term “informal economy,” first introduced by Hart (1973), defines the set of 
economic transactions outside of state regulation.  Much of the same activity would be 
part of the formal economy if its actors registered their business, sales, or services and 
paid state licensing fees, insurance costs, and taxes.  Informal economic activity—
alternately referred to as the shadow or underground economy—consists of a wide range 
of types, such as unpaid or off-the-books labor, bartering, manufacturing and distribution !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!32!Washington and Colorado voters passed the legalization measures, while Oregonians rejected 
theirs!
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of drugs, weapons, counterfeit goods, and information, as well as a multitude of illegal 
services (sex, financial arrangements, waste disposal, security, etc.).  Informal economies 
are widely viewed as the dominant mode of production in developing nations, but viewed 
as a place of last resort for those marginalized within developed countries—although 
reality is much more complicated than a simple dichotomy.  Recent studies have 
demonstrated that shadow economies are growing in size in many nations, though for a 
multitude of reasons specific to individual countries (Schneider and Enste 2000).  With 
their existence derived from, and shaped by, the formal economy, shadow economies 
offer interesting opportunities to understand the dynamics of labor markets and the 
rationales of individuals participating in them.   
The primary theoretical explanations for actor behavior or market dynamics in 
informal economies include dual market theory and bureaucratization theories, though 
both are underpinned by an assumption of rationality on the part of actors. 
 Dual market theory, elaborated by Reich et al. (1973), posits a bifurcation of the 
economy into primary and secondary labor markets.  The primary market is characterized 
by more stable, higher paying jobs, often with the possibility of promotion.  Within the 
primary market, desirable occupations are further segregated by race and gender, with 
white male workers inhabiting the most desirable jobs.  The secondary market 
encompasses a broad swath of the remaining workforce (but primarily consists of 
women, minorities, and youths), including in its ranks low skilled white collar, blue 
collar, and service industry jobs, as well as all other informal occupations (legal or 
otherwise).  Constructing the theory as an historical explanation of US labor market 
structure, Reich et al. contend that this segmentation was not accidental, but was a 
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component of the trajectory of monopoly capitalism (see Baran and Sweezy 1966).  
Labor force homogenization and growing union politicization collided with new 
manufacturing technology and a necessity for oligopolic capitalists to maintain 
monopolistic control over commodity and labor markets.  Large firms were able to divide 
their workforce up through specialization, union busting, and promotion opportunities to 
well-paying jobs (instilling an appreciation for bureaucracy).  Lesser firms and sectors—
those on the “industrial periphery”—were more unstable and tended to employee less 
stable employees (Reich et al. 1973).   
 Bales (1984) expands this notion into the criminal economy, positing that another 
dichotomy exists within this sub-sector of the secondary economy.  Bales assumes that 
the tendency of criminologists to focus on arrested individuals as representative actors of 
the criminal economy is problematic due to selection bias.  Instead, Bales suggests that a 
similar opportunity structure to the primary sector exists within the world of crime, with 
lower level criminals prone to high turnover and unstable working conditions, and higher 
level criminals enjoying more stable employment and prospects for advancement (147).  
A key explanatory variable in this approach is the availability of investment capital; 
achieving stability in the underground economy is highly dependent upon owning the 
(illegal or quasi-legal) means of production.  
In both cases, individuals within the secondary labor market come to view the 
informal economy as a supplement to unsteady conditions in the formal economy and 
rationally choose to participate in the former.  While helpful to understand the historical 
conditions behind divergent labor markets in the US, this theoretical tradition does not 
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offer a nuanced description of specific causal forces driving informal market 
participation.  
Bureaucratization theories primarily focus on political and economic structural 
forces, which influence the size and composition of informal markets.  Tax and social 
security burdens, the intensity of regulation, social welfare transfers, regulation and cost 
of labor, and the quality of public sector services are the primary influences on the size of 
a nation’s informal economy (Schneider and Enste 2000).  As tax burdens, public 
assistance, and public services increase in a nation’s formal economy, shadow economies 
are said to increase in size and complexity.  Firms respond to these particular forces by 
cutting their labor costs (reduction of hours and benefits, layoffs, and consolidation), and 
individuals (again) rationally augment their lost income by entering the informal 
economy in various manners.  The extent of participation in the informal sector is 
difficult to assess and left unaddressed by this theoretical tradition; bartering, working 
under the table, and manufacturing illegal goods are not qualitatively equivalent in their 
intensity.  Despite significant shortcomings, the approach offers several innovative 
methods for calculating the relative size of informal markets within a country.    
Methods of Calculating Underground Economy Size 
Arriving at an accurate estimate of total activity for any economic sector is 
problematic.  The difficulty is obviously greater with informal activity, illegal or 
otherwise.  A number of studies have attempted to estimate the size of underground 
economies; the approaches vary, but are—due to data availability—generally applied to 
national economies, and include direct micro-level surveys, indirect monetary measures, 
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and indirect non-monetary measures (Williams and Windebank 1998).  A brief review of 
these methods follows. 
 
Direct Methods 
Direct approaches are essentially limited to micro-level surveys, which ask 
respondents to estimate the amount of income they receive from “off-the-books” 
employment and how many illicit goods or services they purchase.  Williams and 
Windebank (1997) note that studies of this variety almost exclusively focus on small 
geographic areas (Barthe 1985; Leonard 1994; Pahl 1984), particular groups (Phizacklea 
and Wolkowitz 1995) or particular sectors of the economy (Lin 1995).  Critics of this 
approach question the willingness of respondents to provide potentially incriminating 
information about their activities, leading to a downward biasing of results.  Counter to 
this criticism, Pahl (1984) found that interviews with both suppliers and consumers of 
underground goods resulted in equivalent levels of informal participation, and others 
(Leonard 1994; MacDonald 1994; Evason and Woods 1995; Fortin et al. 1996) noted an 
inherent willingness of respondents to discuss their participation (as both producers and 
consumers of informal goods and services). The most glaring difficulties of direct 
surveys is meaningfully extrapolating the results of a narrow sample to a larger 
geographic area and locating willing respondents (especially in the context of illegal 
activities).  
Indirect Monetary Methods 
Indirect monetary methods include the high denomination bank note approach, 
cash deposit ratio method, the monetary transaction model, and the income/expenditure 
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discrepancy measures.  While a useful starting point in studying informal economies, 
these strategies all suffer from serious methodological shortcomings. 
The high denomination bank note approach assumes that most illegal and 
informal transactions are conducted with $100 and $50 bills; as a result, tracking the 
production of these bills should provide an estimate of total informal activity (Henry 
1976).  The US Bureau of Engraving and Printing (BEP) produces bank notes; specific 
amounts of particular denominations are manufactured each year according to their 
assumed velocity and rate of physical deterioration.  The BEP states that 95% of year-to-
year money production is meant to replace damaged bills, rather than meet any particular 
demand of end-users (US BEP 2012).  If this is the case, the high denomination bank note 
approach requires that any money made in the informal economy stays out of the formal 
economy—essentially, confining large, illicitly earned bills to shoeboxes, mattresses, or 
additional black market exchanges for an indefinite time.  To make this approach even 
more problematic, others have estimated that anywhere between one half and two-thirds 
of all US currency is held outside of the US (Carlson and Keen 1996).      
The cash deposit ratio method expands on the high denomination bill strategy by 
calculating the ratio of circulating currency to aggregate demand deposit accounts.  
Though this approach is widely implemented by researchers (Cocco and Santos 1984; 
Matthews 1982; Matthews and Rastogi 1985; Meadows and Pihera 1981; Tanzi 1980)—
and only slightly altered by Feige (1979) to include checks (the monetary transaction 
model)—it suffers from the same methodological shortcomings of the high denomination 
bill method—with so much of the physical US currency held in other nations, using this 
approach will lead to inflated estimates of underground activity.  Furthermore, like many 
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other measures of the informal economy, this method relies on establishing a base period 
where no informal activities were occurring, then attributes changes in subsequent years 
to these activities.  Results are highly dependent on base year selection. 
Income/expenditure discrepancy measures use data gathered by national statistical 
agencies to compare reported incomes to reported expenditures; when expenditures total 
more than income, the difference is attributed to informal activity (Paglin 1994).  While 
this is a vast improvement—methodologically and theoretically—over previous indirect 
monetary measures of the underground economy, it has tended to produce inconsistent 
results and suffers from ecological fallacy.  For example, in the case of Switzerland (a 
nation with historically high savings rates), Weck-Hanneman and Frey (1985) find that 
income outpaces expenditure, suggesting a negative informal economy (this is true in the 
US in recent years as well).  Any nation with a positive savings rate is likely to elicit 
similar results when examined with this method.  Additionally, it is important to consider 
the data collection methodology of the national statistical agencies that are relied upon 
for these measures; in the US, the Bureau of Labor Statistics’ Consumer Expenditure 
Survey provides this information.  Discrepancies between reported income and 
expenditures often arise in this particular data set due to tax liabilities and benefits, 
unaccounted transfer payments (SSI, unemployment, TANF, etc.), and deficit spending at 
the household-level.  In any event, reliance on these figures to determine the size of 
informal activity will lead to potentially biased results; the direction of the bias is nation-
specific and, as is the case in the US, historically-specific as well. 
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Indirect Non-Monetary Methods 
Indirect non-monetary methods include labor force estimates, the “very small 
establishment” model, an electricity demand approach, and a national regulatory policy 
method.   
The labor force approach attempts to use official labor statistics to track changes 
in the informal sector.  Some identify occupational categories that are likely to employ 
individuals informally and use official increases in these categories to arrive at a rough 
estimate of the total informal economy size (Alden 1982; Del Boca and Forte 1982).  
Others rely on discrepancies between official estimates (such as the difference between 
CPS and BLS data) to impute the level of informal labor participation (Denison 1982).  
Benefits of this approach are derived from the relative ease of data collection in 
developed nations, where multiple government agencies collect and disseminate labor 
statistics.  However, the primary problem with these approaches is that they assume a 
monotonic relationship between certain “official” occupations and informal employment, 
while barring the possibility of dual employment—i.e. participating in both formal and 
informal sectors—within a national economy.  Theoretical and empirical research on 
underground economies directly contradicts this assumption; formally employed 
individuals often undertake informal employment as an income augmentation strategy 
(Castells and Portes 1989; Schneider and Enst 2000).   
The “very small establishment” model (VSEs) (Portes and Sassen-Koob 1987) 
assumes that legitimate businesses employing less than 10 people are the locus of 
informal activity in advanced economies.  Larger firms are assumed to rely on formal 
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employees due to possible financial sanctions resulting from labor regulation violations.  
With looser government oversight, small enterprises operate within a more fluid and 
flexible labor environment, leaving them capable of utilizing informal labor as needed.  
Portes and Sassen-Koob (1987) find that roughly three-quarters of all businesses in the 
US are VSEs; while this suggests the possibility of significant underground employment 
opportunities, there is little empirical verification of the extent of informal employment.  
How many of these operations rely on informal employment?  What is the assumed 
relationship between VSE counts and total informal activity?  Without a baseline measure 
of the relationship between VSEs and informal activity, we have no meaningful way of 
determining the total level of underground activity within an economy—any attempt to 
do so becomes an exercise in arbitrary assumptions.  
The electricity demand approach moves away from labor and firm data to focus 
on a concretized non-monetary measure of total economic activity:  electricity 
consumption.  Pioneered by Lizzeri (1979) and implemented in various forms (Del Boca 
and Forte 1982; Portes 1996; Kaufmann and Kaliberda 1996; Johnson, Kaufmann, and 
Shleifer 1997; Lackó 1998; Lackó 2000), this method assumes: (1) official GDP 
estimates do not account for informal activity, (2) total electricity consumption can 
account for informal activity because underground participation requires physical input 
and electricity is the most important, and (3) a unitary elasticity between electricity 
consumption and GDP production is present in most economies.  By establishing a 
baseline relationship between electricity consumed and GDP produced in a given year, 
researchers can assess the size of a nation’s informal economy through excess electricity 
consumption relative to official GDP.  Lackó (1998; 2000) extends and addresses critics 
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of this approach (Hanousek and Palda 2004) by incorporating multiple ancillary measures 
that could affect relative informal economy size and focuses on household electricity 
consumption.  The new measures (Lackó 2000) are formalized as: 
(1) 
ln ERij = α1 ln Cij + α2 AGij + α3 Gij + α4 Qij + α5 PRij + α6 Hij+ α7 
α1 ≥ 0, α2 ≤ 0, α3 ≤ 0, α4 ≤ 0, α5 ≤ 0, α6 ≥ 0 
 
Where: i: country; j: year; ERij: per capita household electricity consumption in country i 
in year j (kWh); Cij: per capita real consumption of households (at purchasing power 
parity); AGij; the share of GDP produced in agriculture in total GDP; Gij: index for 
weather-differences = relative frequency of months with the need for heating in houses 
(under 10°C) multiplied by the average temperature in January; Qij: the ratio of energy 
sources other than electric energy to all energy sources in household energy consumption; 
PRij: real price of consumption of 1 kWH residential electricity in US dollars (at 
exchange rate); Hij per capita output of the hidden economy. 
 
(2) 
Hij = β1 TLij + β2 TCij + β3 Dij + β4 Iij + β5 EXij 
 
β1 ≥ 0, β2 ≥ 0, β3 ≥ 0, β4 ≥ 0, β5 ≥≤ 0 
 
Where:  TLij: tax rate on labor income in country i in year j; TCij: tax rate on capital 
income in country i in year j; Dij: output decline since 1989: Dij = 1 – (GDPij / GDPi 1989); 
Iij: annual inflation rate of consumer prices; EXij: general government expenditure, per 
cent of GDP. 
 
While Lackó’s revised approach certainly adds necessary nuance to the previous 
measures, several issues remain embedded in this model.  First, establishing a baseline 
level of informal activity is required before proceeding with year-to-year estimates of 
change.   In Lackó’s case, this baseline is extracted from an editorial published in 
International Economic Insights that estimates the size of the US informal economy 
(Morris 1993), which is then applied uniformly to all nations.  As with other approaches, 
using any estimated baseline—while necessary and important—introduces elements of 
circularity and methodological artifacts into the analysis.  Second, the assumption of 
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unitary elasticity between total electricity consumption and GDP is problematic.  As 
Lackó (2000) notes, reliance on this method can create problems when applied uniformly 
to all nations; developing nations’ growth in electricity consumption is often lower than 
GDP growth, middle-income nations increase electricity consumption at higher rates than 
GDP growth, and high income nations approach unitary elasticity between the two 
measures (Gray 1995).  These divergent findings are further complicated by studies of 
causality between electricity consumption and GDP measures; some find that electricity 
consumption determines GDP (Altinay and Karagol 2005; Aqeel and Butt 2001; Jumbe 
2004; Morimoto and Hope 2004; Narayan and Singh 2007; Shiu and Lam 2004; Wolde-
Rufael 2006; Yoo 2005), some find that GDP determines electricity consumption (Ghosh 
2002; Mozumder and Marathe 2007), and others find mixed results (Murry and Nan 
1996; Yoo 2006).  Furthermore, recent studies on the implications of energy efficiency 
on economic growth and total energy consumption in advanced economies suggest that 
the unitary elasticity assumption is problematic (York 2010).  These divergent findings 
indicate that a careful comparison of informal economies between nations must 
accommodate the differences in both the elasticity of energy consumption and GDP 
production, and the direction of causality present.  Third, the assumption that the 
proceeds of informal labor do not appear in official GDP statistics seems erroneous in 
cases of cash exchange.  While it is true that initial transactions will not appear in GDP 
data, income derived from underground economic activities is bound to re-enter the 
formal economy, particularly if informal work is undertaken to supplement legitimate 
jobs.  This is obviously not true of any informal activity relying on bartering, trade, or 
other non-remunerated labor; however, any transference of underground earnings back 
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into the formal market will be captured in official GDP statistics (after the initial 
transaction).  The velocity of informal wages returning to the official economy becomes a 
key unknown variable. 
 Best Method? 
The most difficult aspect of calculating the size of an informal economy using any 
of the above-described methods is data availability.  This is particularly true for the more 
sophisticated econometric models.  Additionally, most studies of informal economy size 
are comparative in their approach and carried out at the nation-level.  Assessing the size 
of a particular state’s informal economy or the size of a narrowly focused activity like 
marijuana production and consumption leaves few methodological options.  This analysis 
relies on a direct, web-based survey of self-reported marijuana users in Oregon to answer 
the posed research questions; while using a direct measure limits the generalizability of 
the findings, it permits for a more accurate estimation of the size and structure of 
Oregon’s marijuana economy (Pahl 1984). 
The Marijuana Economy  
 Investigations of the marijuana economy in the US are limited, but 
findings appear relatively consistent.  The popular view of domestic marijuana 
distribution networks follows a deterministic flow reminiscent to any other commodity; 
individual growers (or, more often, criminal syndicates) are believed to produce large 
quantities of the drug and sell it to wholesalers, who break it down and sell to street-level 
distributors (“pushers”), who in turn sell to individual consumers—profit is believed to 
be extracted from each transaction (Carey 1968; Schlosser 2003).  Adler and Adler 
(1983) reaffirm one aspect of this structure in their study of large-scale drug smugglers; 
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the bulk of imported marijuana is handled by a relatively small number of wholesalers.  
Similarly, Weisheit’s (1992) study of arrested marijuana growers in Illinois contends that 
a relatively small number of producers are responsible for the bulk of domestic marijuana 
(76), though he also finds a dichotomy amongst growers of marijuana, with most 
engaging in the activity for non-monetary, pro-social reasons (“communal growers”) 
(45).  In a study of the Baltimore and Washington DC area, Eck and Gersh (2000) 
contend that most drug distribution is handled through a “cottage industry” of individuals 
or small cooperatives, though a handful of large, well-coordinated organizations exist and 
tend to dominate small geographic areas—however, no attempt is made to identify the 
quantity of drugs handled by the two respective classes of dealers (262).  The structure of 
smaller level sales, however, is less clearly delineated.   
Becker (1963) and Goode (1970) identified transaction patterns amongst 
marijuana users, demonstrating that most obtained their drug from friends; access to a 
friend with marijuana plays a key role in maintaining use (Becker 1963: 63-64) and, 
within friendship networks, very little financial profit was realized by sellers (Goode 
1970).  Further, the transactional roles of seller and buyer appear fluid amongst a 
community of marijuana users; as Goode indicates,  
Selling takes place on many levels, among many kinds of participants. 
Selling is often a matter of convenience; it may be an arbitrary decision as 
to who is the buyer and who the seller on a specific transaction. 
Knowledge of current deals being transacted, or simply having requisite 
cash, often defines who is to play the role of the dealer on a given 
occasion. Among our informants, nearly half (44 percent) said that they 
had sold at least once. Moreover, there was a continuum from the user 
who had sold only once (12 percent of those who admitted ever selling) to 
the one who sold frequently, say, more than fifty times (18 percent of all 
sellers), with shades of variation between. One is struck by the evenness of 
the range of selling, while if one took the classic pattern of pushing 
seriously, one would expect to see very few sellers, with nearly all of 
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those that sold to have done so innumerable times in gigantic quantities. 
Rather, what we actually find is that many marijuana smokers sell, 
characteristically in very small quantities. Over a third of those who had 
sold (36 percent) reported that they most commonly sold in ounces, and 
about 5 percent said that selling in quantities of a pound or more was 
usual. The typical seller sold a median of eight times in an average 
quantity of two ounces (1970: 75). 
 
It appears that many marijuana users engage in selling, usually an ounce or less at a time; 
the activity appears motivated by both intrinsic social rewards (helping out a friend, 
gaining positive subcultural status) and a rational attempt to support one’s habit.  
Additionally, Goode (1970) found that individuals’ frequency of use is positively related 
to their status as a seller and the amount they sell. 
In any event, the distributed nature of marijuana distribution provides necessary 
nuance to our conceptions of the marijuana market; regular users of the drug play an 
important role in ensuring access to the drug for others, though their location in the 
supply chain is unknown.  
Methods 
I use a direct approach for assessing the size of Oregon’s informal marijuana 
economy, with data collected via web-based survey.  Sample construction was made 
possible through Respondent Driven Sampling (RDS) procedures.  This process and its 
limitations (both in general and specifically relating to this study) are detailed in Chapter 
IV.  Survey responses of interest directly assess individuals’ level of participation in 
several aspects of the marijuana economy. 
 The survey instrument collected self-reported information on:  (1) demographic 
characteristics (gender, age, body mass index (BMI), frequency of exercise, county of 
residence, ethnicity, political party membership, education level, employment status, 
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relationship status, occupational category, health insurance coverage, number of close 
friends, and income); (2) marijuana-related questions (use status, frequency of use, 
reasons for use, medical license status and roles, number of close friends who use, 
reasons for growing, number of plants growing, method of growing, source and 
reimbursement rate for obtained marijuana, amount consumed, amount sold and for what 
price, and the perceived acceptance of marijuana use by immediate social circle and local 
community); and (3) detailed political orientation (using a replication of the 2011 Pew 
Political Research political typology questionnaire).  OLS regression is used to identify 
variables associated with marijuana use amount.  These results are then used to predict 
Oregon’s total marijuana demand, estimate the economic value of Oregon’s marijuana 
market, and provide several tax revenue projections if the drug were to be legalized. 
Results 
 
 This section addresses how marijuana is obtained in Oregon, who sells and 
produces the drug (and their rationales for doing so), and provides an evaluation of illegal 
marijuana sales’ impact on Oregon’s economy.  
Obtaining Marijuana:  Sources, Use Amount, and Costs 
Where do users obtain the drug?  Respondents were asked to identify all of the sources 
they received or purchased marijuana from in the last year; this information is presented 
in Table 5-1, divided along Oregon Medical Marijuana Program (OMMP) participation 
status.  Friends, the black market, and medical growers are the most widely cited sources 
of marijuana in Oregon.  Licensed medical users, as a group, appear to be the most self-
sufficient, though they still rely on other medical growers or friends.  Most non-licensed 
users obtain the drug from friends, the black market, and medical growers.   
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Table 5-1.  Sources of Marijuana for Users and OMMP Status 
 
OMMP   Black    Medical  
Participant Self Market     Dispensary  Growers Friends Other  
No  4 25  1  14  34  3 
Yes  12 3  5  7  6  0 
Total  16 28  6  21  40  3 
 
The majority of respondents use less than 20 grams per month, though a handful 
of outliers consume between 2-3 ounces over the same period.  Men, at first glance, 
appear to use significantly more than women (19.6g vs. 11.1g); however, all of the 
extremely heavy users are men.  If the major outliers (n=4) are dropped, men average 
11.8g per month—or roughly the same as women.  Assuming an 11g per month average 
use rate, each marijuana-using adult in Oregon will consume approximately 4.5 ounces 
per year; with an estimated 550,000 users in Oregon, the state requires over 154,000 
pounds of processed marijuana to meet the market’s demand.  Determinants of monthly 
marijuana consumption are presented in Table 5-2. 
Frequency of use and possession of an Oregon medical license is positively 
related with monthly marijuana use; for each increase in frequency of use category, users 
consume approximately 4.6g more per month.  Holding a medical license is associated 
with much higher usage—over 12g more per month—before controlling for age at first 
use.  Higher levels of education are associated with lower consumption of the drug.  
Having children in the home is positively related and consistently statistically significant 
with monthly use amounts; in the final model (4), this variable has the greatest overall 
effect on use amounts (12g).  Age at first use is negatively related to monthly 
consumption; in this context, each additional year of waiting before trying marijuana for 
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the first time leads to a 2g reduction in monthly consumption.  Gender, age, and income 
do not appear to be related to total monthly marijuana use, although more data is 
necessary to strengthen the robustness of these findings.  Despite their statistical 
insignificance, coefficients for all three of these variables are negative.  With a larger 
sample size, women may use less.  Age has a small effect on use (1g less per month for 
every four years aged).  Income is negatively related, but the coefficient is zero.   
Table 5-2.  OLS Regression Models Estimating Marijuana Use Amounts  
 
 
Variable      Model 
   1  2  3  4 
 
Use Frequency   4.64*** 4.58*** 4.05*** 4.63***  
    (1.06)  (1.08)  (.96)  (.91)  
   
OMMP Cardholder  12.82** 12.57** 2.47  ----   
    (4.35)  (4.31)  (4.42)    
   
Gender    ----  -3.38  -5.50  ----   
      (4.01)  (3.58)     
 
Age    ----  -.39  -.08  ----   
      (.21)  (.23)     
 
Education   ----  ----  -5.37**  -5.85***  
        (1.75)  (1.67)  
   
Income    ----  ----  -.00  ----   
        (.00)     
 
Children in home  ----  ----  12.02** 11.52**  
        (4.04)  (3.91)  
   
Age at First Use  ----  ----  -2.00**  -2.14***  
        (.66)  (.59)  
   
Constant   -8.39  5.28  54.43  49.10   
    (4.96)  (8.52)  (14.79)  (13.14)   
 
n =    68  68  62  62   
(Adj. R2)   (.35)  (.36)  (.50)  (.50)  
   
* p > .05, ** p > .01, *** p > .001  
 129 
 
The average price paid per ounce of marijuana is $177 (std. dev.: $91; n=57). 
Interestingly—and contrary to the claims of many law enforcement officers and policy 
makers—there is not a statistically significant relationship between the per capita rate of 
OMMP cardholders and marijuana prices in Oregon counties (see Figure 5-1), though the 
coefficient is negative and small (-2.37; p=.072; Adj. R2: .04) in univariate regression 
tests.    
 
Figure 5-1.  Marijuana Price and County-Level Cardholder Rates 
 
It would be logical to assume that individuals paying under $50 per ounce are members 
of the OMMP and are receiving the drug at cost from licensed growers (as specified in 
the Oregon medical marijuana law); however, data indicates that all 8 of these people are 
illegal users, obtain the drug from “friends,” and use slightly more marijuana per month 
than average (15g vs. 11g).  This finding—which is further supported by anecdotal 
statements from those involved in marijuana production—suggests that there is a 
bifurcation in this particular market between medium and small buyers/sellers.  
Additionally, the price paid per ounce could also be a function of social proximity; close 
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friends and family may receive steep discounts or free marijuana, while others pay 
market price.  
While there is little difference in the mean price reported by OMMP participants 
and illegal users ($0.11), the variation in prices are significantly greater for non-medical 
users (std. dev.: $103 vs $53) (Figure 5-2). 
 
Figure 5-2.  Marijuana Prices by OMMP Status 
 
Illegal users have a greater chance of both paying more for their drug than licensed 
medical users and receiving steep discounts.  This is likely to be a function of the amount 
of marijuana consumed by medical patients and their access to quasi-legitimate sources 
of the drug.  Illegal users who consume small amounts report paying little to nothing for 
their supply, but more regularly users pay much more.  
Who Sells and How Much? 
52% of respondents (n=38) have sold marijuana at some point in their life.  Those 
who have sold are disproportionately male (76%), educated (76% hold a bachelor’s 
degree or above), and are much more likely to have a criminal record than other 
respondents.  In fact, of the 16 respondents who have been arrested, 15 have sold 
marijuana and 8 have been arrested on marijuana-related charges.  Those who begin 
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using the drug at an early age are slightly more likely to have sold during their lifetimes.  
Current use amounts are also positively related to lifetime selling events, though the 
effect is small.  There is no relationship between having sold marijuana and an 
individual’s political ideology, size of close friends network, ethnicity, income, or 
relationship status.   
33% (n=24) of respondents have sold marijuana in the past year.  75% of recent 
sellers are male, 66% hold a bachelor’s degree or above, and 91% are employed.  The 
relationship between the number of ounces sold and an individual’s income are not 
statistically significant, though the coefficient is negative; this suggests that sellers of 
marijuana are either not making a profit, under-reporting their actual income, using sales 
to offset their own use, or attempt to use marijuana sales to buttress lower-than-average 
incomes.  The mean income of recent sellers is lower than those who have not sold 
($28,937 vs. $34,975), which provides support to the possibility that selling is used as an 
adjunct income source for employed, low wage earners or simply offsets the cost of 
personal use.  Of the 24 recent sellers, 14 are participants in the Oregon Medical 
Marijuana Program (OMMP); re-stated in slightly different terms, 18 of the respondents 
are participants in the OMMP program and 14 of those sold in the last year. 10 of the 14 
individuals who have sold more than 1 pound of marijuana (16 ounces) in the last year 
are participants in the program as well (see Table 5-3).   
Table 5-3.  Marijuana Selling and OMMP Participation 
 
Ounces Sold      OMMP Participant?   Total 
in Last Year     No  Yes   
15 or less     6  4   10 
16-48      3  6   9 
49 or more     1  4   5 
Total      10  14   24 
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The groupings present in Table 5-3 can be elaborated further by examining the aggregate 
amount of marijuana sold:  the first group (n=10) sold 51 ounces, the second group (n=9) 
sold 253 ounces, and the third group (n=5) sold 850 ounces.  The top three sellers moved 
nearly an equivalent amount of marijuana through the underground economy as all other 
sellers combined (544 ounces vs. 559 ounces).  Though it sounds like a lot of marijuana 
(69 lbs.), the magnitude of these sales must be contextualized in relation to the total 
demand in Oregon.  The amount of marijuana reportedly sold by respondents in this 
study would meet the personal needs of 245 average users, with an overall 
consumer/seller ratio of approximately 10:1. 
 Who Grows and Why? 
  Sixteen respondents admit to growing marijuana; 12 of those are participants in 
the OMMP and 4 produce the drug without state protection.  Growers from this study 
sold a total of 721 ounces (mean: 45 ounces per grower; non-growers sold a total of 433 
ounces) of marijuana in the last year for a mean price of $175 an ounce.  Limited data 
obviously hampers the generalizability of these findings, but the results do provide an 
interesting window into demographic characteristics of growers, rationalizations for 
growing, and the size of production operations.  13 of the 16 growers are male; 11 of the 
16 hold a bachelor’s degree or above; 14 are employed; the average age is 31 years; all 
but one is white; and all are either married or in a stable relationship.  The ranked 
rationalizations for growing offered by these producers are presented in Table 5-4.  Self-
reliance is the highest ranked and most cited reason for growing, followed closely by 
“enjoy gardening”.  There appears to be a strong ideological commitment to the notion 
that marijuana has a positive impact on people’s lives, as well as to helping other people 
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in need (by extension, marijuana is viewed as fulfilling this unmet need).  Surprisingly, 
making extra money or engaging in production because of the business challenge 
involved are the least cited and lowest ranked of all rationalizations, despite the fact that 
14 of the 16 growers claimed to have sold marijuana in the last year. 
Table 5-4.  Counts and Ranks of Reasons for Growing 
 
 
Reason    n  Mean rank         n ranked as #1 
         Medical Illegal 
Being Self-Sufficient  12  1.75   6  2 
Enjoy Gardening  12  2.66   1  0 
Marijuana’s Positive Impact 10  2.9   2  2 
Helping Others in Need  8  3.75   0  0 
Black Market Avoidance 8  4.25   0  0 
Commitment to Freedom 6  4.5   0  0 
Spiritual Aspects  5  4   0  0 
Making Extra Money  4  4.5   0  0 
Business Challenge  2  6.5   0  0 
n=13 
 Most growers use both indoor and outdoor methods to produce marijuana (n=9); 2 
exclusively grow outdoors and 5 only grow indoors.  The mean plant counts reported—
i.e. the average number of plants (seedling, vegetative, and flowering) grown at one 
time—is 18.5 (std. dev.: 12.8; min: 4, max: 50).  All of the respondents who are growing 
marijuana would be considered small-scale producers by previous researchers (Weisheit 
1992; Decorte 2010).  The mean gross revenue generated by marijuana sales by these 
growers ($7800) supports the “small-scale” designation as well, particularly when larger 
producers (n=2) are excluded:  in that case, the gross revenue drops to $2971 per grower.  
Marijuana and Oregon’s Informal Economy 
 How much marijuana is consumed and produced in Oregon, and how large is its 
informal marijuana economy?  As noted above, estimations suggest that around 550,000 
adult Oregonians use marijuana each year (SAMHSA 2009), and data collected in this 
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study indicate that the average user consumes 4.5 ounces a year—using these figures, 
Oregon requires about 154,000 pounds of marijuana to meet its internal demand.  At an 
average reported price of $177 / ounce, this market would generate over $436 million in 
revenue per year, making it Oregon’s third most valuable commodity (Oregon Blue Book 
2009).  Using the data gathered in this study offers the possibility of a slightly more 
nuanced projection of marijuana’s contribution to Oregon’s informal economy; 
unfortunately, the RDS sample constructed for this study did not attain equilibrium, so 
accurate population estimates are not possible.  On the other hand, enough data was 
collected to offer tentative econometric projections (which should be re-examined in a 
fully-funded study of this population). 
Demand 
Estimates for Oregon indicate that 10.27% of individuals 26 or older have used 
marijuana in the last year, and 6.58% used in the last month; for persons in the 18-25 age 
category, 36.96% used in the last year and 21.9% used in the last month (SAMHSA 
2009).  If “light users” are operationalized as individuals who use once a month or less 
and “heavy users” are operationalized as any individual using multiple times in one 
month, marijuana demand models can be constructed using population estimates for these 
age groups (18-25 and 26+) and the survey-derived use amounts associated with each 
category of user and age:  
D = ((18-25 POP * % Users) * Use Amount) + ((>26 POP * % Users) * Use Amount) 
(3)  Light User Demand Model 
Demand = (((265,677 * .15) * 1.75g) + (2,701,901 * .0369) * 3.25g)) * 12 
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(4)  Heavy User Demand Model 
Demand = (((265,677 * .219) * 22.4g) + (2,701,901 * .0658) * 17.6g)) * 12 
Using this approach, the total amount of marijuana demanded in Oregon for 2012 was 
approximately 169,183 pounds, which translates to $480 million.  This is a larger 
estimate than was derived from mean usage data.  Separating medical users out of the 
illegal user population can further specify demand models, since many produce their own 
marijuana and are self-sufficient.  About 55,000 individuals are registered with the state 
as legal medical users; data collected in this study suggests that 11% are between the ages 
of 18-25, 11% meet the criteria for “light users,” and usage rates vary between illegal and 
legal using populations.  The augmented demand models are:  
(5)  Light User Demand Model + Medical Users 
D = (((265,677 * .15) * 1.75g) + ((2,701,901 * .0369) - 6,050) * 4g)) + (6,050 * 1g) 
(6)  Heavy User Demand Model + Medical Users 
D = (((265,677 * .219) - 6,050) * 20.54g) + (((2,701,901 * .0658) – 42,900) * 10.4g) + 
(6,050 * 33g) + (42,900 * 32.6g) 
This approach suggests that total demand is around 119,846 pounds, with a value of $339 
million—not as large as previous estimates, but still sizeable in relation to other 
commodities in the state.  Demand from medical patients alone is estimated to be 42,515 
pounds and valued at $120.4 million.   
Supply 
Estimates of marijuana supply are difficult to construct due to the small sample 
size obtained in this study.  For example, 75% of medical users in this study produce their 
own supply (all are considered “heavy users”)—if this were true for the population of 
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Oregon medical users, total demand would be reduced by 31,927 pounds ($90.4 million).  
Additionally, most produce a small surplus (mean: 45 ounces per year).  If this were an 
accurate depiction of the medical population of users, the quasi-legal production of 
medical marijuana in Oregon would supply the market (after meeting personal needs) 
with 140,508 pounds of the finished drug for $398 million in gross revenue.         
 Similarly, 6.9% of illegal users also grow marijuana without a state license.  75% 
of these growers are under 26 years of age and are considered “heavy users”.  The mean 
amount sold in the last year by these producers is 16.5 ounces.  Projecting these rates 
onto the estimated population of Oregon users yields 11,103 illegal growers (9,309 are 
18-25 years old; 1,794 are 26 or older).  Estimated production from these growers is 
approximately 11,450 pounds, which would produce gross revenue of $32 million.  If 
self-sufficient, their production would also reduce aggregate demand by 4827 pounds 
($13.6 million). 
 Table 5-5 presents estimated marijuana demand and supply figures for Oregon.  
Demand estimates range from 83,092 to 169,183 pounds ($235-$480 million).  Supply 
estimates are very rough projections. 
Table 5-5.  Oregon Marijuana Demand and Supply Estimates 
 
 
Demand / Supply     Pounds  Gross Revenue 
Demand 
Light / Heavy / Medical User, less Growers  83,092  $235 million 
Light / Heavy / Medical User    119,846 $339 million 
Mean Use      154,000 $436 million 
Light / Heavy User     169,183 $480 million 
 
Supply 
Medical Growers     140,508 $398 million  
Illegal Growers      11,450  $32 million 
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Supply and demand estimates are highly sensitive to changes in self-sufficiency 
assumptions, particularly regarding medical users.  Anecdotal evidence from within the 
Oregon medical community suggests that far less than 75% of patients produce their own 
marijuana, but more data is required to confirm this. 
Discussion 
 
 Even though the sample of Oregon marijuana users constructed for this study are 
not representative (RDS equilibrium was not achieved), the data collected offers several 
key insights into the structure and size of this particular informal economy and suggests 
policy changes are probably necessary.   
Oregon decriminalized the possession of 1 ounce or less of marijuana to the level 
of a civil infraction—you can receive a ticket and pay a small fine—decades ago, but the 
sale of any amount of marijuana is still charged as a felony.  Most marijuana users—legal 
or otherwise—obtain the drug from friends.  This re-confirms decades old research 
(Becker 1963; Goode 1970) and suggests that the buying and selling of personal 
quantities of the drug primarily occurs peer-to-peer, rather than “pusher-to-user”.  The 
importance of this finding cannot be overstated; if 33% of marijuana users sold the drug 
in the last year, this translates to approximately 181,500 Oregonians committing drug 
distribution felonies for the year.  To put this figure in context, 19,262 were arrested on 
drug related charges in Oregon in 2011; further, 133,414 adults were arrested in total in 
the state in 2011 (FBI UCR 2011).  This either means that law enforcement has 
dramatically failed to uphold Oregon laws or Oregon lawmakers have ignored the reality 
of drug distribution network topologies (or, more likely, both).  Oregon marijuana 
distribution appears to meet “robust network” criteria in the dual sense that (1) many 
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nodes are responsible for and take part in the exchange of this drug, and (2) it “performs 
well in the face of attack” (Goyal and Vigier 2010).  Lawmakers and law enforcers must 
take note:  the criminalization of marijuana sales is an ineffective and piecemeal 
approach to controlling this substance—there is no centralized source to attack and there 
are too many active participants to incarcerate.  If the goal is to control access to this 
drug, distribution must be centralized and overseen by the state (either directly or through 
licensure).  Controlling production in a logically consistent fashion may not be possible 
under the current legal regime, as the medical marijuana program has legitimized and 
culturally entrenched small-scale, distributed production (and, as demonstrated in this 
study, most medical users/growers sell the drug, albeit in small quantities).  
The situation is further complicated by the rationalizations offered by marijuana 
growers:  though the amount of marijuana produced and sold in the state likely rivals 
other top commodities, most producers reportedly engage in this activity to help other 
people and are not attempting to earn a significant profit.  Sales by growers seem to offset 
personal use costs, production costs, and to make up for slightly lower than average 
incomes.  This finding could be attributable, in part, to sampling bias, as all of the 
growers in this study are considered “small-scale” (under 99 plants; all but two had less 
than $10,000 in sales) and they adhere to Weisheit’s “communal grower” classification 
(1992).  Larger producers must exist to meet in-state demand; however, none were 
identified using the RDS procedure.  The implications of this are profound:  if a 
centralized distribution system is put into place (as is under review in Washington), 
thousands of small growers will be locked out of this emerging market, while a few large 
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scale producers will reap most of the benefits.  For a state with high unemployment and 
significant income inequality, this type of change is negative. 
 Proponents of legalization often cite potential tax revenue as a justification for 
altering the current legal environment.  How much could the state of Oregon raise if the 
drug were legalized?  The answer depends on the true market size, effective tax rates 
levied, retail price, and the proposed method of production and distribution.  California’s 
relatively laissez-faire approach to medical marijuana (plant count limits are still in effect 
for producers) offers some insightful clues; the state levies a sales tax on medical 
marijuana at the final distribution point (dispensaries) and raised between $58 million and 
$105 million in 2011 (Lifsher 2011).  Using the demand models constructed from this 
study’s survey results, the estimates of tax revenue are offered in Table 5-6. 
With a total tax of $1 per gram, Oregon could see gross tax revenues increase 
between $37 million to $76 million per year.  At $2 per gram, gross tax revenue 
generated would be between $75 million to $153 million per year.  These taxes could be 
collected from growers, at the point of sale, or a combination of the two.  Even the lowest 
estimates are more than double the tax revenue obtained from alcohol licensure ($16.2 
million 2011). 
Table 5-6.  Oregon Marijuana Tax Revenue Estimates 
 
 
Demand Model     Pounds     Total Tax / Gram Revenue 
Light / Heavy / Medical User, less Growers 83,092  $1  $37,624,057 
Light / Heavy / Medical User   119,846 $1  $54,266,268 
Mean Use     154,000 $1  $69,731,200 
Light / Heavy User    169,183 $1  $76,606,062 
Light / Heavy / Medical User, less Growers 83,092  $2  $75,248,115 
Light / Heavy / Medical User   119,846 $2  $108,532,538 
Mean Use     154,000 $2  $139,462,400 
Light / Heavy User    169,183 $2  $153,212,125 
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The amount of revenue generated by legitimizing marijuana-related occupations 
(growers, trimmers, retailers, plant and seed sales) could prove to be more than direct 
taxes levied on marijuana itself.  Assuming that 15% of the market’s gross revenue is 
recouped through personal income taxes, Oregon could expect to see between $35 
million and $72 million in additional income tax revenue.  Combined with the above 
estimates of direct taxation on marijuana sales, the state could likely expect to earn 
between $72 million and $225 million by legalizing marijuana.  Though this sounds 
impressive, particularly in the midst of crushing cuts to state programs from reduced 
revenues, these additions only amount to 1.4% and 4.6%, respectively, of the current $4.8 
billion in revenue collected by Oregon.  Additional savings could be derived from the 
criminal justice system; a thorough calculation is outside the scope of this study, but 
Miron (2005) estimates that enforcement and incarceration savings are likely to be double 
that of tax revenue generated from marijuana sales.  If that were the case, marijuana 
legalization—in addition to providing a more logically coherent legal system and social 
integration for those participating in this particular black market activity—could prove to 
be a serious economic force in the state.  
Conclusion 
 This study investigated the size and composition of Oregon’s informal marijuana 
economy using WebRDS and survey methods.  The results suggest that average 
marijuana users consume approximately 4.5 ounces per year and pay approximately $177 
per ounce.  Most users purchase the drug from friends and nearly 1/3 of respondents 
indicate that they sell marijuana in small quantities.  Growers tend to sell inauspicious 
quantities to friends and relatives, and rarely earn more than $10,000 from their sales. 
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Importantly, the composition of distribution networks suggest that the informal marijuana 
economy is a “robust network,” particularly in states that allow personal medical 
production; the implications of this for lawmakers and law enforcers is profound in that it 
demonstrates that the 40 year old “war on drugs” is not winnable using traditional law 
enforcement techniques.  Several taxation schemes are presented to offer estimates of 
revenue if the drug were legalized; these findings suggest that marijuana could contribute 
modestly to the state’s total revenue (much more than alcohol), but the most 
economically beneficial aspect of legalization could be from criminal justice savings.    
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CHAPTER VI 
CONCLUSION:  THE FUTURE OF MARIJUANA IN AMERICA 
 
This study has (1) investigated the sociopolitical factors responsible for passage 
(or failure) of marijuana-related voter initiatives and legislation in states and detailed the 
process of policy diffusion occurring amongst states that adopt such measures; (2) 
assessed which social, political, economic, and ecological factors explain the wide 
variations in medical cardholder rates between Oregon counties; (3) identified differences 
amongst marijuana users (legal or otherwise) and general population; and (4) estimated 
the economic impact of marijuana on Oregon’s informal economy and its potential boon 
to Oregon tax revenues.  The findings of this study suggest that: (1) states with strong 
Democratic majorities and histories of adopting innovative policies are the most at risk to 
pass marijuana liberalization measures in the near future; (2) the production of medical 
marijuana—in Oregon at least—is strongly associated with economic malaise and is 
particularly present in counties whose economies were based on extractive industries in 
the recent past and are experiencing high levels of unemployment today; (3) users of 
marijuana do so to alleviate pain, relax, and to stimulate creativity; they are similar in 
many ways to the population at large, but are more educated, politically liberal, and have 
healthier average weights—additionally, most who use the drug consume more often and 
in greater amounts than was previously presumed; and (4) the production of marijuana (in 
Oregon) is handled by many individuals at small scales (under $10,000 per year in gross 
revenue for nearly all growers) and distribution is most often a peer-to-peer affair.  
Additionally, this study successfully demonstrated that RDS techniques are not effective 
at achieving sampling equilibrium sample after the third wave of recruiting without 
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monetarily derived primary incentives.  I conclude the study with a brief look at the 
future of marijuana in America. 
In the time between starting this study and preparing to defend it, marijuana laws 
in the United States took an unexpectedly radical turn.  In the November 2012 election, 
Washington and Colorado voters passed the first initiatives legalizing recreational use 
and possession of up to an ounce of marijuana for adults 21 and over.  Both have stopped 
arresting and prosecuting individuals for possessing small amounts of the drug, though no 
official system of supply or distribution has been established yet.  Government 
committees in both states are investigating possible avenues for commercialization, but 
the structure of the new marijuana marketplace will be strongly influenced by the federal 
response.   
The electoral wins were strong; Washington’s I-502 passed with 55% of the 
vote33, and Colorado’s Amendment 64 garnered 54.8% (more than re-elected President 
Obama)34.  The newfound support for legalization has forced elected officials to seriously 
consider a topic that, historically, was easily derided; for example, in 2009, during an 
online “town hall” meeting, the most popular questions (voted on by participants) 
directed at President Obama dealt with marijuana reform—his response was telling 
(Sarno 2009):  
Three point five million people voted. I have to say that there was one 
question that was voted on that ranked fairly high and that was whether 
legalizing marijuana would improve the economy—(laughter)—and job 
creation. And I don't know what this says about the online audience -- 
(laughter)—but I just want—I don't want people to think that—this was a !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!33!http://vote.wa.gov/results/current/Initiative-Measure-No-502-Concerns-
marijuana_ByCounty.html!34!http://data.denverpost.com/election/results/amendment/2012/!
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fairly popular question; we want to make sure that it was answered. The 
answer is, no, I don't think that is a good strategy—(laughter)—to grow 
our economy. (Applause.) 
 
The president and federal agencies now confront a situation where laughter will not 
resolve or clarify the federal position.  If the reaction is a retrenchment of previous 
policies, marijuana producers following state law will be targeted by arrest and asset 
forfeiture just like medical growers in recent years (Crombie 2012); however, if the 
federal policy allows this experiment to go forward uninterrupted, a new, legitimate 
market will supplant the current quasi-illegal one.  At least one legal scholar (Mikos 
2009) argues that the Supreme Court’s anti-commandeering rulings prevent the federal 
government from forcing their state and local counterparts to enforce the prohibition, so 
long as they “do not actively assist marijuana users, growers, and so on—they may 
continue to look the other way when their citizens defy federal law” (1424).  What 
dynamics can we expect from a newly legitimated marijuana market?  With an 
opportunity to shape the market for decades to come, what policy path should states 
follow? 
The case of alcohol re-legalization in America is illustrative in many ways and 
problematic in others.  In pre-prohibition years (1865-1920), the brewing industry was 
dichotomized between large, national shippers of beer (e.g. Pabst, Schlitz, Blatz, 
Anheuser-Busch, Lemp, and Christian Moerlein) and a diverse population of local 
producers (Stack 2000).  During this time, beer was distributed in kegs and consumed 
primarily in saloons, which were often controlled by local breweries (Stack 2000).  
Between 1865 and 1895, national shippers grew in prominence through vertical and 
horizontal integration, technological advances (i.e. pasteurization, refrigerated rail cars, 
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automated bottling machines), advertising, and a five-fold increase in per capita 
consumer demand (Stack 2000).  From 1895 to 1920, however, local producers—who 
widely varied in their productive capacity—began undercutting the profits of national 
shippers with their cheaper product (due to lower transportation costs) (Stack 2000).  
Local prohibition laws also played a role in this process; by 1910, 17% of US lived in dry 
states and 48% lived in states, counties, or municipalities that strictly regulated or 
prohibited the sale of alcohol (Brewers Almanac 1979).  These market closures placed 
national shippers under duress, as a significant source of their profits were cut off by the 
emerging prohibition regime; however, local breweries in wet states prospered in these 
times, increasing their market share to 72% of the US production total by 1905 (Stack 
2000).  The tide turned with national prohibition (1920-1933), forcing most local 
producers into liquidating their production facilities; the national shippers turned to 
producing bottles of 0.5% alcohol “near beer” (which did not generate much profit, but 
allowed the large firms to maintain their productive capacity), canned malt extract (sold 
to quasi-illegal small-scale brewers), and “medicinal beer” licensed by the federal 
government (Plavchan 1969).  Production of intoxicating liquors shifted to a cottage 
industry of small-scale producers and resulted in higher-potency concoctions—the 
alcohol industry, for a short time, became a decentralized, democratic (albeit illegal) 
affair (Levine and Reinarman 2004).  When prohibition was finally lifted in 1933, the 
large breweries were strategically positioned to re-enter the marketplace.  New 
regulations prohibited alcohol manufacturers from owning saloons or bars, and 
individuals were banned from creating their own alcohol (a change from pre-prohibition 
days); this had a dramatically negative effect on home production and sales of kegged 
 146 
beer, giving the large, shipping breweries a distinct competitive advantage—bottled beer 
sales skyrocketed and, with it, control over the beer marketplace was ceded to large 
manufacturers (Cochran 1948).  An inexorable march towards oligopolic control was 
carried out in the intervening decades by the largest firms; by 1982, only 67 breweries 
produced beer in the US (Gisser 1999) and today, two firms—Anheuser-Busch InBev 
and MillerCoors—control 80% of the domestic beer market (Rosenbaum et al. 2009).  
Despite concentrated control of the marketplace, craft breweries—owing their origins to 
the re-legalization of home brewing in 1977—have exploded in recent years, leading to a 
diversity of small firms even under oligopolic conditions (Carroll 2000).  While this new 
diversity has not lead to a dramatic change in market share controlled by the top 
producers, it has tapped states into the revenue stream of craft beer sales and helped re-
democratize beer production in an important way (Carroll 2000).   
The data collected in this study and others (Weisheit 1992; DeCorte 2010) suggest 
that the current marijuana market structure is populated by many growers who produce 
and sell in small quantities, with a tiny minority of growers producing large amounts.  
This mirrors the known structure of alcohol production during prohibition, with an 
important caveat:  even with the rise of medical production in key states, industrial 
producers of marijuana are not waiting in the wings to meet demand following the repeal 
of prohibition, even at the state level.  The lessons gleaned from the tradition of tight 
control in the alcohol industry suggest that restrictive rules—especially at the outset of 
legalization—will have a profound influence on market structure, with oligopolic control 
ceded to a handful of firms (through official licensure, firms’ ability to invest, and the 
early adoption of legalization by particular states).  The historically specific rate of 
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consolidation will obviously vary, but the tendency of mature capitalist economies is 
towards monopolization in key sectors (Sweezy 1942; Baran and Sweezy 1966; Veblen 
1904, 1923; Heffernan 2000).  Oligopolic control presents important ramifications for 
specific industries, workers within those industries, consumers, and the underlying 
natural systems required to produce particular products—essential elements of these 
problematics are addressed by the Treadmill of Production (ToP) theory. 
ToP was first proposed by Schnaiberg (1980) and focuses on the consequences of 
the production of goods and services in the capitalist world economy.  Schnaiberg posited 
that capital-intensive producers create consumer goods (and manufacture buyers’ consent 
through advertising and political maneuvering) at whatever rate is necessary to expand 
production and grow rates of profit.  In a general sense, the theory is one of crisis; the 
necessity for constant growth in production leads to unsustainable consumption of natural 
resources, which in turn undermines the foundations for all production (nature and labor).  
In many ways, ToP is an empirical and ecologically-oriented explication of the 
underconsumption/overaccumulation school of Marxian crisis theory (Gould et al. 
(2004)).  Buttel calls ToP the “single most important contribution sociological concept 
and theory to have emerged within North American environmental sociology” because it 
is “based in sociological reasoning and is not a biological or ecological analysis” (Buttel 
2004: 323).  ToP locates the roots of social and environmental exploitation within the 
capitalist production process.  This has been critiqued for its glossing over of the 
accumulation process as the motive social force within capitalism (Wright 2004)—some 
have even said it should be renamed to the “Treadmill of Accumulation” (Foster 2004).  
However, by demonstrating that capitalism is a social system that deals with the 
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contradictions it generates through further expansion (in production, extraction, and 
exploitation of labor), the ToP school levies a lasting critique at any conception of “green 
capitalism,” while bringing an ecological element to Marxian crisis theories.   
The nature and history of capitalism, as developed through ToP theory, suggests 
that the legalization of marijuana will wrest control from small artisan producers and turn 
it over to large firms (Heffernan 2000; Baran and Sweezy 1966; Foster, McChesney, and 
Jonna 2011).  The legalization of marijuana—in this lens—is both an economic and 
social loss for many communities, but especially those with long traditions of illegal 
growing; even if traditional “hot spots” of production (Northern California and Southern 
Oregon, for example) become legal cannabis production centers, the economic benefits 
will disproportionately accrue in the hands of corporate owners and politically 
disenfranchise small marijuana farmers (Lewontin 2000).  ToP theory, in addition to 
highlighting the inevitable capture of surplus generated from marijuana production by 
large firms, suggests that legalization will follow a path of profit maximization to the 
detriment of nature; the loss of genomic diversity is of particular concern with marijuana, 
as a capitalist approach to its production will focus on yield, maturation time, and ease of 
harvest (and Glenna 2006).  Many scholars of marijuana botany suggest that specific 
policy decisions during prohibition were already responsible for several radical changes 
in this domesticated plant (Clarke 1993; Hillig and Mahlberg 2004; Hillig 2005).  In 
particular, the tall, long-flowering, narrow leaf cannabis indica varieties (known 
colloquially as “sativas”) were crossed with short, fast-flowering, broad leaf cannabis 
indica (“indicas”) to facilitate indoor growing after US and Mexican authorities 
adulterated outdoor crops in Mexico with Paraquat in the late 1970s (Clarke 1993; 
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Landrigan et al. 1983).  In addition to altering the physical stature and maturation time, 
this selective breeding regime led to significant changes in the chemical profile of 
commercially available marijuana; as predicted by the “iron law of drug prohibition,” 
THC concentrations and overall potency increased (Thornton 1991).  Similarly, the 
infusion of broad leaf genes into narrow leaf varieties produced plants with much higher 
cannabidiol (CBD) ratios than previously seen in domestic marijuana (Clarke 1993).  
Other chemical changes—which, to this point, have been unelaborated—undoubtedly 
occurred, as users’ accounts of shifting phenomenological experiences induced by 
marijuana was altered; older varieties of the drug tended to influence perception, whereas 
newer varieties have a strong impact on motor coordination (Clarke 1993; King 2001).  
At this point, it is unknown whether or not legalization will have a more profound effect 
than prohibition did, but the prohibition years helped to demonstrate how versatile 
marijuana can be when subjected to the whims of human ingenuity (Pollan 2001)—ToP 
theory suggests that a legalized production regime will influence marijuana breeding 
efforts towards strictly profit-oriented goals (Gould et al. 2004).  Steps must be made to 
preserve the remaining genetic diversity of this species before capitalism casts non-
profitable traits and expressions on the funeral pyre of progress. 
Consumers also stand to lose in some troubling ways.  The modernization of 
marijuana production by industrial capitalism will—if it follows the rationalized 
developmental path (Weber 2002) of other products—be conducted according to the 
principles of efficiency, calculability, predictability, and control—or what Ritzer (1996) 
terms “McDonaldization”.  “McDonaldized” marijuana and its production would adhere 
to the following principles:  (1) production will occur at very large scales and with the 
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use of advanced technology (farming combines, automated trimming machines, industrial 
vacuum-packing, genetically engineered seed, etc.) to achieve high efficiency in pursuit 
of maximum profitability (Ritzer 1996: 35); (2) production and sales will be dictated by 
the quantitative aspects (calculability) of profits, costs, and total volume sold, as opposed 
to qualitative considerations or for public benefit (Ritzer 1996: 59); (3) finished products 
will be predictable, both in physical consistency and, as much as possible, in 
phenomenological experience (Ritzer 1996: 80; Merleau-Ponty 2002); and (4) control 
over the individuals participating in the production process will be exercised to the point 
where their actions are vapidly machinelike (Ritzer 1996: 101).  Marijuana users will 
have little choice in the matter, since oligopolic markets sell their goods through 
advertising rather than following actual consumer preference (Gould et al. 2004). 
After the dust has settled on the nationwide marijuana legalization debate, future 
policy battles will be over non-commercial personal production (reminiscent of the home 
brewers movement) and limited commercial production by small artisan growers, though, 
in all likelihood, this will be—much like the microbrewery movement spawned by 
creative, entrepreneurial home brewers—relatively insignificant in terms of corporate 
profits.  Artisan growing will enable small producers to take advantage of the grape-like 
terroir influences that induce positive manifestations of marijuana traits (Clarke 1993); it 
will also provide an outlet and expression for the art of marijuana growing, allowing the 
continued cultural transmission of location and experiential-specific knowledge, which 
cannot be expressed through rationalized, industrial production.  Despite their limited 
financial impact, artisan cannabis producers—or, alternatively, “micro-weederies”—will 
fill an important niche in the market (Swaminathan 1995), enable more local decision-
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making and economic benefit (Ostrom 2010), help protect cannabis’ genomic diversity 
(Clarke 1993), and provide users with the peak expression of marijuana’s potential.  
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APPENDIX A 
 
MEDICAL MARIJUANA LAWS IN THE US 
 
A statewide minimum weight and plant count is in effect in California, set at 8 oz. 
of processed marijuana and 18 plants per patient.  However, counties and cities are still 
allowed to set their own guidelines above this amount, leading to wide variations between 
areas.  Of California’s 58 counties, 35 abide by the state minimum; the other 23 range 
from 8 oz. to 3 lbs. of processed marijuana per patient, and permissible plant counts vary 
from 18 to infinite (capped by garden canopy size:  largest = 150 square feet).  
Not surprisingly, counties with the largest allowable possession limits are in 
Northern California, a traditional “hot-spot” of illegal production.  These high plant and 
possession amounts—coupled with legally sanctioned marijuana dispensaries, legal 
provision for the “reasonable compensation” of growers, and allowances for growers to 
produce for multiple patients—make small-scale commercial production possible. While 
not as laissez-faire in its allowance as some California counties, Oregon is still far above 
the national average.  Each patient is allowed 24 oz. of processed marijuana, and 24 
plants (6 mature, 18 immature).  However, any for-profit sale of marijuana is illegal and 
no provision for marijuana dispensaries exists.  Registered growers may produce 
marijuana for up to 4 patients, which would equate to 6 lbs. of cannabis and 96 plants (24 
mature) at any given time.  !
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APPENDIX B 
 
QCA TRUTH TABLE 
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APPENDIX C 
 
NUMBER AND RATES OF CHANGE IN MEDICAL MARIJUANA CARDHOLDERS  
 
IN OREGON COUNTIES !
Number of Medical Marijuana Cardholders Per 1000 County Residents, 2005-2011. 
x > 95% CI  |  95% CI > x > 5% CI  |  x < 5% CI  
County 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 
Mean 
(n=x) 
3.98 
(n=24) 
4.40 
(n=24) 
4.61 
(n=25) 
5.39 
(n=27) 
6.49 
(n=30) 
8.04 
(n=30) 
11.08 
(n=32) 
Baker   3.47 3.77 4.62 4.74 7.49 
Benton 1.39 1.71 1.81 2.19 3.04 3.98 5.44 
Clackamas 1.92 2.19 2.56 3.20 4.26 5.16 7.20 
Clatsop 2.67 3.13 3.13 4.19 5.97 6.21 10.00 
Columbia 3.94 3.98 4.42 5.55 7.54 8.86 13.01 
Coos 8.34 9.35 8.91 9.59 11.65 12.65 19.91 
Crook     3.27 5.21 6.19 
Curry 12.74 12.92 12.95 13.25 14.20 17.11 22.22 
Deschutes 1.69 1.89 2.49 3.67 5.38 7.29 9.60 
Douglas 9.80 9.60 9.06 9.62 11.61 12.81 15.72 
Gilliam        
Grant       10.57 
Harney       7.11 
Hood River 3.82 3.37 4.52 5.60 6.40 7.92 9.78 
Jackson 4.28 5.22 5.80 6.98 9.31 14.11 23.27 
Jefferson    2.32 3.61 4.50 6.47 
Josephine 7.70 9.26 10.83 12.26 15.79 24.09 34.98 
Klamath 3.34 3.32 3.83 4.11 5.64 6.89 11.50 
Lake    7.25 7.37 10.30 11.74 
Lane 4.01 4.69 4.37 5.43 6.83 8.61 11.95 
Lincoln 5.36 6.24 7.13 8.61 10.45 11.27 14.93 
Linn 2.45 2.80 2.84 3.40 4.95 5.98 8.51 
Malheur     1.73 2.73 3.83 
Marion 1.42 1.63 1.83 2.27 2.95 3.71 5.60 
Morrow        
Multnomah 2.46 2.69 3.07 3.99 5.17 6.12 8.98 
Polk 2.09 2.19 2.49 2.89 3.71 4.54 6.61 
Sherman        
Tillamook 7.58 8.62 7.82 8.60 10.03 10.89 12.90 
Umatilla 0.72 0.76 0.89 1.69 2.39 2.75 4.84 
Union 2.00 2.75 2.69 3.98 4.32 5.18 7.62 
Wallowa     7.04 8.61 9.89 
Wasco 2.63 3.86 4.52 6.16 8.87 10.67 15.11 
Washington 1.41 1.59 1.67 2.03 2.70 3.34 4.86 
Wheeler        
Yamhill 1.78 1.94 2.27 3.10 4.08 4.99 6.99 
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Rates of Change in Medical Marijuana Cardholders by County, 2006-2011. 
x > 95% CI  |  95% CI > x > 5% CI  |  x < 5% CI  
County 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 
Mean 
(n=x) 
.13 
(n=24) 
.09 
(n=24) 
.25 
(n=25) 
.29 
(n=27) 
.24 
(n=30) 
.41 
(n=30) 
Baker   .09 .23 .03 .58 
Benton .23 .05 .22 .39 .31 .37 
Clackamas .14 .17 .25 .33 .21 .39 
Clatsop .17 .00 .34 .42 .04 .61 
Columbia .01 .11 .26 .36 .18 .47 
Coos .12 -.05 .08 .22 .09 .57 
Crook     .59 .19 
Curry .01 .00 .02 .07 .20 .30 
Deschutes .12 .32 .47 .47 .36 .32 
Douglas -.02 -.06 .06 .21 .10 .23 
Gilliam       
Grant       
Harney       
Hood River -.12 .34 .24 .14 .24 .24 
Jackson .22 .11 .20 .33 .52 .65 
Jefferson    .56 .25 .44 
Josephine .20 .17 .13 .29 .53 .45 
Klamath -.01 .15 .07 .37 .22 .67 
Lake    .02 .40 .14 
Lane .17 -.07 .24 .26 .26 .39 
Lincoln .17 .14 .21 .21 .08 .32 
Linn .14 .02 .20 .46 .21 .42 
Malheur     .57 .40 
Marion .15 .12 .24 .30 .26 .51 
Morrow       
Multnomah .09 .14 .30 .30 .18 .47 
Polk .05 .14 .16 .28 .22 .46 
Sherman       
Tillamook .14 -.09 .10 .17 .09 .18 
Umatilla .06 .16 .90 .42 .15 .76 
Union .37 -.02 .48 .08 .20 .47 
Wallowa     .22 .15 
Wasco .47 .17 .36 .44 .20 .42 
Washington .13 .05 .21 .33 .24 .45 
Wheeler       
Yamhill .09 .17 .37 .32 .22 .40 
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APPENDIX D 
 
EFFECTS OF MARIJUANA:  RESPONSES BY USERS (1970)1 
 
       N       Percent  
More relaxed, peaceful, calmer; marijuana acts as a tranquilizer 88 46 
Senses in general are more sensitive, perceptive 69 36 
Think deeper, have more profound thoughts 60 31 
Laugh much more; everything seems funny 55 29 
Exaggeration of mood; greater subjective impact, emotional significance 48 25 
Time seems slowed down, stretched out, think more time has passed 44 23 
Become more withdrawn, introverted, privatistic 42 22 
Generally, feels nice, pleasant, enjoyable, fun, good, groovy 40 21 
Mind wanders, free-associates, stream of consciousness 40 21 
Feel dizzy, giddy, lightheaded 39 20 
Become tired, lazy, lethargic, don't want to move 37 19 
Feel light, airy, floating, elevated 35 18 
Feel "happy" 35 18 
Forget easily, have memory gaps, can't remember things 34 18 
Feel freer, unrestrained, uninhibited 34 18 
Stimulation of senses more enjoyable 34 18 
Become hungry, want to eat more 32 17 
Hear music better, musical ear sharper, more sensitive, accurate 32 17 
Enjoy music more, greater pleasure from listening to music 30 16 
Feel paranoid 28 15 
Have hallucinations 28 15 
Feel sleepy 26 14 
Care less about everything, worry less, don't give a damn 25 13 
Become erotically aroused, marijuana acts as an aphrodisiac 25 13 
Mouth and throat feel dry 24 13 
Concentrate better, become more involved in anything 24 13 
Selective concentration: concentrate on one thing, shut out all else 23 12 
Can communicate with others better 22 12 
Euphoria, ecstasy, exhilaration 22 12 
Sense of depersonalization: being cut off from myself 22 12 
Food tastes better 20 10 
Tend to fixate on trivial things 20 10 
Feel secure, self-confident, get a sense of well-being 20 10 
Able to understand others better, their meaning and being 20 10 
The pleasure of touching is greater, touch more sensuous 19 10 
Feel depressed 19 10 
Tend to talk a lot more 19 10 
Hear better, auditory sense more acute, hearing more sensitive 18 9 
Colors appear to be brighter, more vivid 17 9 !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!1!Reproduced from Goode (1970).!
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More uncoordinated, clumsier, motor skills impaired 17 9 
Sex is more enjoyable 16 8 
Become pensive, introspective, meditative 16 8 
Senses become numb; marijuana acts as an anesthetizer 15 8 
Body feels warm 15 8 
Other people annoy me more, find fault in others 15 8 
My vision is clearer, sight improved, see more, see more detail 15 8 
Enjoy dancing more 14 7 
Subconscious comes out; the real you emerges, one's truer self 14 7 
Feel a sense of unity in the universe, a sense of oneness 14 7 
Aesthetic impulse greater, enjoy art works more 14 7 
Feel more nervous 14 7 
I feel thirsty 14 7 
Skin feels tingly 14 7 
Become outgoing, gregarious, convivial, extroverted 13 7 
Eyes become hot, heavy, bloodshot, puffy 12 6 
Body feels heavy 12 6 
Sense of touch improved, more sensitive, can feel things sharply 12 6 
Mind works more quickly, mind races 11 6 
Experience synesthesia phenomena 11 6 
Become more active, want to move around more 11 6 
Feel a sense of unreality of everything around me 10 5 
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APPENDIX E 
 
ASSOCATION OF USE MEASURES WITH CLOSE FRIENDS WHO USE 
 
 
Figure 4-7:  Frequency of Use and Number of Close Friends Who Use 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4-8:  Use Amount and Number of Close Friends Who Use 
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Figure 4-9:  Frequency of Use and Close Friend Acceptance of Use 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4-10:  Use Amount and Close Friend Acceptance of Use 
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APPENDIX F 
 
RECRUITMENT LETTER AND SURVEY INSTRUMENT 
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Recruitment*Letter*
Dear Oregonian, 
 
I am writing to invite you to participate in a unique research study I am conducting at the 
University of Oregon.  Participation in the study is completely voluntary and no personally 
identifiable information will be collected from or about you.  Please be forewarned that the 
questions will ask you to provide sensitive information regarding illegal activities.  If you choose 
to participate, please take the survey in a private, secure setting.  Your responses are anonymous 
and confidential. 
 
The study is examining a specific “hidden population” in Oregon and attempting to gather 
information about their attitudes, opinions, and experiences.  If you are receiving this letter, it 
means that a previous participant in the study believes you could contribute to the project in a 
meaningful way (i.e. another participant believes you are a member of the “hidden population” 
being studied).  If you choose to complete the survey, you will also have the chance to refer other 
participants to the study.   
 
A unique aspect of this study is that previous participants identify future potential participants in 
a process known as “respondent-driven sampling”.  This helps ensure that the researcher will not 
collect any personally identifiable information from you (your name, address, etc.), and provides 
a way of accessing difficult to reach populations.  At no point in the research process will your 
identity be identifiable by any of the researchers conducting this study.  Each participant receives 
a unique “study ID” (located below); this ID protects your identity and allows researchers to 
identify patterns of association between study participants along key variables (such as gender, 
age, and ethnicity).  The ID is used to anonymously link participants to their anonymous 
referrers. 
 
The study is open to all adults (18+) who live in Oregon and who have received a unique version 
of this letter.  Participation would involve completing an online survey, which will take about 20 
minutes to complete.  I cannot guarantee that you will personally benefit from this research.  The 
study is seeking approximately 500 participants. 
 
After completing the survey, you will be asked to refer other participants to the study.  The 
success of this research project is entirely reliant on the recruitment of additional respondents.  
Please take a few moments to consider referring other people to this study. 
 
If you are interested in participating in this study, you may do so at the following website:  
 
http://tinyurl.com/oregon-seth 
 
You will be asked to enter your unique study ID.  Your study ID is: ---------> 
  
Please contact me at scrawfo1@uoregon.edu if you would like to learn more information about 
the study.  Your participation is voluntary.  Thank you in advance for considering this request, 
 
Seth Crawford, MPP, MS 
Doctoral Candidate 
Department of Sociology 
University of Oregon 
1a0000 
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Introduction and Informed Consent
 
University of Oregon Consent Form
 
University of Oregon 
Department of Sociology
Informed Consent for Participation as a Subject in:
The Political Economy of Medical Marijuana
Investigator: Seth Crawford
Type of consent: Adult
 
Introduction
•  You are being asked to be in an anonymous and confidential research study designed to contribute
to a doctoral dissertation on licensed medical marijuana users and non-licensed marijuana users.  
•  You were selected as a possible participant because you were referred by a previous participant of
this study as a potential    marijuana user.  The person who referred you to this study is anonymous to
researchers.  You will be anonymous to researches as well.
•  We ask that you read this form and ask any questions that you may have before agreeing to be in
the study.
•  After completing the survey, you will be asked to refer other marijuana users that you know into the
study.  This portion is optional, though the success of this study hinges on collecting a large sample of
users. 
 
Purpose of Study:
•  The purpose of this study is to identify characteristics of licensed medical marijuana users and
characteristics of non-licensed marijuana users.
•  Participants in this study are adults living in Oregon. 
 
Description of the Study Procedures:
•  If you agree to be in this study, we would ask you to answer several questions about yourself and
provide information about the attitudes of people in your community.  Please note:  the questions will
ask you about illegal behaviors, including marijuana use, frequency of use, marijuana growing, and
the purchasing/selling of marijuana.  To protect your privacy, please take the survey alone and in a
private setting.  This process should take about 20 minutes to complete.  After completing the
survey, you will be redirected to a web site that will provide you with documents to distribute to other
marijuana users that you may know.  If you choose to recruit other users into this study (by either
printing out the recruitment letter and hand-delivering it or sending it electronically), please exercise
caution when recruiting others to this study.  Sending a recruitment letter to an acquaintance, friend,
co-worker, or family member will most likely identify you as a marijuana user to the recipient.  Please
also consider the implications for your intended recipient; receiving a recruitment letter will also signal
to others that they are a marijuana user.  Your responses and those of people you refer to the study
are anonymous and confidential.  No personally identifying information will be collected.   
 
Risks/Discomforts of Being in the Study:
•  There are no potential physical risks known in this study.  The primary risk in this study is derived
from the illegality of marijuana production, consumption, and distribution at the federal level; though
Oregon allows these types of activities with official licensure, the federal government does not. 
Potential prosecution poses both financial and emotional risks to participants.  To minimize this risk,
no personally identifiable information is collected.  Attempting to contact other respondents for
referral into the study poses emotional risks to respondents; since this survey is directed at marijuana
users, recruiting others could be interpreted as admission to marijuana use and cause
embarrassment, other social sanctions, or threat to employment.  Please exercise appropriate
discretion when contacting potential recruits into this study.  There is also a slight possibility of
emotional risk derived from the discussion of previous or currently illegal behavior associated with
marijuana production, consumption, and distribution. 
• Due to the nature of the questions asked in this survey, please take the survey alone, in a private
setting.  Do not take the survey at work or in a place where someone may see your responses.
 
Benefits of Being in the Study:
•  The benefits of participation include having access to the final report, which will be available at 
http://pages.uoregon.edu/scrawfo1/Seth/Dissertation.html 
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By clicking on this box, I acknowledge I have read (or have had read to me) the contents of this consent form and have
been encouraged to ask questions. I have received answers to any questions I might have. I give my consent to participate
in this study. I have received a copy of this form.
Male
Female
•  However, I cannot guarantee that you will receive any personal benefit from participating in this
study.
Payments:
•  You will not receive any direct reimbursement for participating in this study.
 
Costs:
•  There is no cost to you to participate in this research study.
 
Confidentiality:
•  The records of this study will be kept private, though none of the information collected will contain
any personally identifiable data.  Each respondent is assigned a unique, non-personally identifying
"study ID" number (located on your recruitment letter).  This number allows researchers to track
recruitment chains without collecting any personally identifiable information.  Study IDs allow
researchers to identify patterns of association between marijuana users, but in a way that protects
your anonymity.  In any sort of report we may publish, we will not include any information that will
make it possible to identify a participant.  Research records will be stored in an encrypted, password-
protected computer file.
 
Voluntary Participation/Withdrawal:
•  Your participation is voluntary.  If you choose not to participate, it will not affect your current or future
relations with the University.
•  You are free to withdraw at any time, for whatever reason. 
•  You will be asked, upon completing the survey, to refer other individuals to the study.  You are not
required to participate in this aspect of the research.
•  There is no penalty or loss of benefits for not taking part or for stopping your participation.
Contacts and Questions:
•  The researcher conducting this study is Seth Crawford.  For questions or more information
concerning this research you may contact him at scrawfo1@uoregon.edu.
•  If you have any questions about your rights as a research subject, you may contact:  Research
Compliance Services, University of Oregon at (541) 346-2510 or ResearchCompliance@uoregon.edu
 
Copy of Consent Form:
•           You may print this consent form to keep for your records and future reference.
Demographics
What is your study ID? (located on your recruitment letter)
Thank you for participating in this survey!
The first section of this survey will ask you to provide some general information about yourself.  The
second will ask questions about your relationship with marijuana. The third section will ask a couple
questions about your views on the world.  Participation is voluntary and you may stop at any time.
Estimated time to complete survey: 15 minutes.
Thank you for participating in this survey!
The first section of this survey will ask you to provide some general information about yourself.
 Participation is voluntary and you may stop at any time.
What is your gender?
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White
Black
Asian American
Latino
Native American
Other
Republican
Democrat
Independent
Libertarian
Green
Constitution
Other
Not registered with any political party
Some high school
High school graduate (or GED)
Associate's degree
Bachelor's degree
Master's degree or above
How old are you?
How tall are you?
How much do you weigh? (in lbs.)
How many days do you exercise for 20 minutes or more each week?
 
Days per week of
exercise
What county do you live in?
Please identify the ethnic/racial category that best describes you.
Which political party are you registered with?
What is the highest level of education you have completed?
 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
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Master's degree or above
Yes
No
Yes
No
Regence Blue Cross / Blue Shield
Kaiser Foundation Health Plan
Providence
Pacificsource
Health Net
Unitedhealthcare Insurance
Pacificare
Lifewise
ODS Health Plan
Oregon Health Plan
Other
Single or divorced
Married or in a civil union
In a stable relationship (but not married or in civil union)
Yes
No
Yes
Are you currently employed?
Which occupational category best describes your employment?
Do you have health insurance?
Who is your health insurance provider?
What is your current relationship status?
Do you have children who live with you?
What is your current gross yearly income (include unemployment insurance if unemployed)?
Marijuana Questions
The following questions will ask you describe aspects of your life that are potentially illegal.  Your
participation in this study is voluntary and you may stop taking the survey at any time.
Have you ever used marijuana?
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Yes
No
Yes
No
Less than Once a Month
Once a Month
2-3 Times a Month
Once a Week
2-3 Times a Week
Daily or near daily
At what age did you first use marijuana?
 
Age
Have you consumed marijuana in the last year?
How often do you consume marijuana?
On average, how much marijuana do you consume each month (in grams--28g per ounce)?
 
Marijuana Consumed
(grams)
Which of the following are reasons that you consume marijuana?
Euphoria To dull reality
Sleep aid To forget problems or worries
Pain management Stimulate creativity
Appetite stimulant Depression
Relaxation Other medical reasons
Spiritual aspects To get "stoned"
To be social Other
Please order your reasons for consuming marijuana from most important to least important.
 5 15 24 34 43 53 62 72 81 91 100
 0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100
» Euphoria
» Sleep aid
» Pain management
» Appetite stimulant
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Yes
No
Patient
Caregiver
Grower
Severe pain
Cancer
Glaucoma
Agitation due to Alzheimer's disease
HIV/AIDS
Cachexia
Severe nausea
Seizures
Persistent muscle spasms
Do you have a current Oregon Medical Marijuana Card?
About how long have you been a licensed participant in the Oregon Medical Marijuana program?
Which of following describes your role(s) in the Oregon Medical Marijuana program?  Please select
any that apply.
What is your qualifying medical condition? (select all that apply)
How do you primarily obtain your marijuana?
Grow it myself Receive it for free from friends or family
Purchase it from black market sources Other
Purchase it from co-ops or quasi-dispensaries I do not use marijuana and do not provide it to others
Obtain it from licensed growers   
Please select any of the following items that motivate you to grow marijuana. 
» Relaxation
» Spiritual aspects
» To be social
» To dull reality
» To forget problems or worries
» Stimulate creativity
» Depression
» Other medical reasons
» To get "stoned"
» Other
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Indoors only
Outdoors only
Both indoors and outdoor
Yes
No
Making extra money Political commitment to freedom
Being self-sufficient Belief that marijuana has a positive impact in people's lives
Enjoy gardening The business challenge associated with marijuanaproduction
Spiritual satisfaction Staying out of the black market
Helping friends or others in need   
Please rank your motivations to grow marijuana from most important to least important.
Do you grow indoors, outdoors, or both?
How many marijuana plants (on average) do you grow at a time?  Please include seedlings,
vegetating, and flowering plants in your count.
 
Number of Plants
What is the average "reimbursement" amount for an ounce of marijuana when you obtain it from
someone else? 
 
Reimbursement
Amount
Have you ever sold or received "reimbursement" for marijuana (legal or otherwise)?
» Making extra money
» Being self-sufficient
» Enjoy gardening
» Spiritual satisfaction
» Helping friends or others in need
» Political commitment to freedom
» Belief that marijuana has a positive impact in people's lives
» The business challenge associated with marijuana production
» Staying out of the black market
 0 10 20 30 40 50 59 69 79 89 99
 0 25 50 75 100 125 150 175 200 225 250 275 300 325 350 375 400
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How many ounces did you sell or receive reimbursement for in the last year? (16 oz = 1 lb)
 
Ounces of Marijuana
Sold
On average, how much reimbursement did you receive per ounce?
 
Price per ounce
What percentage of your social circle (friends, family, co-workers) are accepting of marijuana use?
 
% of social circle who
accept marijuana use
How many close friends do you have (not including family members)?
 
Number of close
friends
How many of your close friends use marijuana?
 
Friends who use
marijuana
How acceptable are the following activities in your community? 
 Never Acceptable Always Acceptable
Using marijuana
Growing marijuana
 0 32 64 96 128 160 192 224 256 288 320
 0 40 80 120 160 200 240 280 320 360 400
 0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100
 0 2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20
 0 2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
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Yes
No
Yes
No
Selling marijuana
Having a medical
marijuana card
Have you ever been arrested for any crime?
Have you ever been arrested for a marijuana-related crime?
Pew Political Orientation Factors
This is the final section of the survey.  Please choose the response from each pair that comes closest
to your views.  Your participation in this study is voluntary and you may stop taking the survey at any
time.
Choose the response that comes closest to your views.
Religion is an important part of my life. Religion is not that important to me.
Business corporations make too much profit. Most corporations make a fair and reasonable amount of profit.
Government regulation of business is necessary to protect the
public interest.
Government regulation of business usually does more harm
than good.
This country should do whatever it takes to protect the
environment.
This country has gone too far in its efforts to protect the
environment.
The growing number of newcomers from other countries
threatens traditional American customs and values.
The growing number of newcomers from other countrires
strengthens American society.
Homosexuality should be accepted by society. Homosexuality should be discouraged by society.
The best way to ensure peace is through military strength. Good diplomacy is the best way to ensure peace.
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I often don't have enough money to make ends meet. Paying the bills is generally not a problem for me.
I'm generally satisfied with the way things are going for me
financially. I'm not very satisfied with my financial situation.
Too much power is concentrated in the hands of a few large
corporations. The largest companies do NOT have too much power.
Poor people today have it easy because they can get
government benefits without doing anything in return.
Poor people have hard lives because government benefits
don't go far enough to help them live decently.
Government is almost always wasteful and inefficient.
Government often does a better job than people give it credit
for.
It is NOT necessary to believe in God in order to be moral and
have good values.
It IS necessary to believe in God in order to be moral and have
good values.
Most people who want to get ahead can make it if they're
willing to work hard.
Hard work and determination are no guarantee of success for
most people.
Racial discrimination is the main reason why many black
people can't get ahead these days.
Blacks who can't get ahead in this country are mostly
responsible for their own condition.
Immigrants today strengthen our country because of their hard
work and talents.
Immigrants today are a burden on our country because they
take our jobs, housing and health care.
Using overwhelming military force is the best way to defeat
terrorism around the world.
Relying too much on military force to defeat terrorism creates
hatred that leads to more terrorism.
Our country has made the changes needed to give blacks
equal rights with whites.
Our country needs to continue making changes to give blacks
equal rights with whites.
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equal rights with whites. equal rights with whites.
Click to write the question text
The government should do more to help needy Americans,
even if it means going deeper into debt.
The government today can't afford to do much more to help the
needy.
.
Stricter environmental laws and regulations cost too many jobs
and hurt the economy. Stricter environmental laws and regulations are worth the cost.
End Survey
Thank you for participating in this survey!  Your responses are greatly appreciated and will help us to
understand Oregon marijuana users.  The final analysis of this data will be made available at:  
http://pages.uoregon.edu/~scrawfo1/Seth/Dissertation.html
You will be redirected to the recruitment letter generator web site in a moment.  Please follow the
instructions on that web page if you are willing to recruit other participants into this study.    
The success of this study relies on your willingness to recruit additional Oregon marijuana users (legal
or not) to take the survey.  While you are not required to do so, please consider recruiting other people
that you know (who use marijuana) into this study.  Due to the sensitivity and federal illegality
surrounding marijuana use, please exercise caution when recruiting others to this study.  Sending a
recruitment letter to an acquaintance, friend, co-worker, or family member will most likely identify you
as a marijuana user to the recipient.  Please also consider the implications for your intended recipient;
receiving a recruitment letter will also signal to others than they are a marijuana user.    
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